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 Executive Summary 
 Uninterrupted provision of vital energy services (see  Chapter 1 ,  Section 1.2.2 ) – energy security – is a high priority of 
every nation. Energy security concerns are a key driving force of energy policy. These concerns relate to the robustness 
(sufﬁ ciency of resources, reliability of infrastructure, and stable and affordable prices); sovereignty (protection from 
potential threats from external agents); and resilience (the ability to withstand diverse disruptions) of energy systems. 
Our analysis of energy security issues in over 130 countries shows that the absolute majority of them are vulnerable 
from at least one of these three perspectives. For most industrial countries, energy insecurity means import dependency 
and aging infrastructure, while many emerging economies have additional vulnerabilities such as insufﬁ cient capacity, 
high energy intensity, and rapid demand growth. In many low-income countries, multiple vulnerabilities overlap, making 
them especially insecure. 
 Oil and its products lack easily available substitutes in the transport sector, where they provide at least 90% of energy 
in almost all countries. Furthermore, the global demand for transport fuels is steadily rising, especially rapidly in Asian 
emerging economies. Disruptions of oil supplies may thus result in catastrophic effects on such vital functions of 
modern states as food production, medical care, and internal security. At the same time, the global production capacity 
of conventional oil is widely perceived as limited. These factors result in rising and volatile prices of oil affecting all 
economies, especially low-income countries, almost all of which import over 80% of their oil supplies. The costs of 
energy (primarily oil) imports exceed 20% of the export earnings in 35 countries with 2.5 billion people and exceed 
10% of gross domestic product (GDP) in an additional 15 countries with 200 million people. 
 The remaining conventional oil resources are increasingly geographically concentrated in just a few countries and 
regions. This means that most countries must import an ever-higher share or even all of their oil. More than three 
billion people live in 83 countries that import more than 75% of the oil products they consume. This does not include 
China, where oil import dependency is projected to increase from the current 53% to 84% in 2035. The increasing 
concentration of conventional oil production and the rapidly shifting global demand patterns make some analysts and 
politicians fear a “scramble for energy” or even “resource wars.” 
 Import dependency is also common in countries that rely on natural gas to provide heat and generate electricity. 
Almost 650 million people live in 32 Eurasian countries that import over 75% of their gas. Many of these countries are 
landlocked and import gas through a limited number of pipelines. The interregional trade in natural gas is projected to 
signiﬁ cantly increase, with yet more uncertain consequences for energy security. Developments in unconventional gas 
extraction and liqueﬁ ed natural gas (LNG) technologies may have a deﬁ ning inﬂ uence in this regard. 
 Vulnerabilities of electricity systems are not limited to power plants relying on imported fossil fuels (which currently 
provide over 50% of electricity in some 39 countries with 600 million people). Hydroelectric power production, 
especially from major dams located on internationally shared rivers, is often perceived as insecure, particularly in light 
of climate change affecting seasonal water availability. Over 700 million people live in 31 countries that derive a 
signiﬁ cant proportion of their electricity from just one or two major dams and thus are vulnerable to failures of these 
dams. 
 Many countries using nuclear power are experiencing an aging of the reactor ﬂ eet and workforce, as well as difﬁ culties 
in accessing capital and technologies to renew, expand, or launch new nuclear programs. Twenty of the 31 countries 
with nuclear power programs have not started building a new reactor in the last 20 years, and in 19 countries the 
average age of nuclear power plants is over 25 years. Large-scale enrichment, reactor manufacturing, and reprocessing 
technologies and capacities are currently concentrated in just a few countries. Transfer of these technologies and 
capacities to a larger number of countries is constrained by serious concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation, which 
is one of the main controversies and risks associated with nuclear energy. If nuclear energy can address energy security 
challenges, it will only happen in a few larger and more prosperous economies. 
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 Various vulnerabilities in electricity supply are often made worse by demand-side pressures. Some 4.2 billion people live 
in 53 countries that will need to expand the capacity of their electricity systems massively in the near future because 
they have either less than 60% access to electricity or an average demand growth of over 6% over the last decade. Both 
fuels and infrastructure for such an expansion will need to be provided without further compromising the sovereignty or 
resilience of national electricity systems. The reliability of electricity supply is a serious concern, especially in developing 
countries. In almost three-quarters of low-income countries blackouts are on average for more than 24 hours per month, 
and in about one-sixth of low-income countries blackouts average over 144 hours (six days) a month. In over one-half 
of low-income countries blackouts occur at least 10 times a month. 
 The energy sector also provides vital export revenues for some 15–20 countries. In the majority of these oil- and gas-
exporting countries the revenues are not expected to last for more than one generation, and in several cases they may 
cease in less than a decade. In addition, poor energy-exporting nations are at a high risk of the “resource curse”: 
economic and political instability eventually affecting human development and security. 
 Almost all countries associate enhanced energy security with higher diversity of energy sources (especially in the 
transport sector), lower energy intensity of national economies, and reduced import dependency by relying on domestic 
energy sources. International regimes fostering cooperation between exporters and importers of energy and interacting 
with global governance arrangements for climate change and energy access are important for achieving these energy 
security goals. Energy security under sustainable energy transitions will be determined by the dynamics of phasing 
out fossil fuels and their substitution by new energy sources, as well as by new technologies in the end-use sector. A 
quantitative analysis of such developments is conducted in  Chapter 17 . 
 Table 5.1 |  Summary of energy security issues in the world. 
Energy sector and its significance
Energy security concerns and the population affected
Shorter term Longer term
 Oil 
 (125 countries, 5.9 billion)* 
 >75% import dependency ( 3 billion ) 
 consumption growth >5%/year ( 1.8 billion ) 
Reserves/Consumption <15 years ( 1.7 billion )
 Gas 
 (78 countries, 2 billion)* 
>75% import dependency ( 650 million ) Reserves/Consumption <16 years ( 780 million )
 Coal 
 (45 countries, 4.5 billion)* 
>80% import dependency ( 300 million )
 Nuclear 
 (21 countries, 1.3 billion)** 
 Average age of nuclear power plants >25 years ( 1.9 billion ) 
 Start of last plant construction >20 years ( 1.4 billion ) 
 Hydro 
 (58 countries, 1.5 billion)*** 
Low diversity (one or two major dams) ( 730 million )
 Electricity 
 (all countries) 
 >50% dependency on imported fossil fuels ( 600 million ) 
 low diversity (one or two fuel sources) ( 450 million ) 
annual demand growth >6%/year and/or access rate <60% ( 4.2 billion )
 Transport >50% dependency on imported fuels ( 4.9 billion ) annual consumption growth >8% ( 1.7 billion )
 Industry 
 (>25% of GDP in 60 countries; 4.5 billion) 
>50% dependency on imported fuels ( 800 million )
 Residential and commercial 
 (all countries) 
>50% dependency on imported fuels ( 500 million ) Reliance on traditional biofuels for >80% of the residential sector energy 
( 700 million )
 Cross-sectoral energy supply 
 (all countries) 
 >50% overall import dependency ( 700 million ) 
 low diversity of PES (one or two dominant sources) ( 1 billion ) 
 cost of energy imports >20% of export earning ( 2.5 billion ); 
cost of energy imports >10% of GDP ( 200 million ) 
 energy intensity >50% of world average ( 400million ) 
 consumption growth >6% ( 1.8 billion ) 
 consumption per capita <30 GJ/year ( 3 billion ) 
 Notes: PES – primary energy sources; 
 Numbers in brackets indicate the number of people who live in countries with the indicated energy security conditions; 
 *  – more than 10% in total energy supply; ** – more than 10% in electricity generation; *** – more than 20% in electricity generation 
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 5.1  Introduction 
 Energy systems are closely entangled with national and human security. 
Concerns over the reliability of vital energy services have shaped pub-
lic opinions and political agendas, eventually affecting broader secu-
rity issues ranging from risks of armed conflicts, to viability of national 
economies, and to integrity and stability of political systems. Policies 
developed in the quest for energy security have been – and are likely to 
remain – a key driving force in the transformations of energy systems. 
 Our analysis of energy security in the world is based on a rich trad-
ition of addressing this topic in political, professional, and academic 
circles. Historically, the notion of energy security emerged in the first 
half of the 20th century as a concern over the secure supply of fuels 
(coal and oil) for naval fleets and armies. Political and military leaders 
sought to ensure security of fuel supplies through diversifying suppli-
ers, substituting foreign imports with domestic production (e.g., syn-
thetic aviation fuel in Germany), restricting non-essential uses of fuels 
(e.g., rationing of gasoline in the United States) and, finally, seeking 
military control over energy resources and infrastructure (military cam-
paigns in Indonesia, Caucasus, and other theaters during World War II) 
(Yergin,  2006 ). 
 In the second half of the 20th century, oil became increasingly impor-
tant not only for the military but also for sustaining such vital functions 
of industrialized societies as transport, mechanized agriculture, electric-
ity generation, and the heating of buildings. At the same time, the global 
oil trade dramatically increased as major economies such as the United 
States became dependent on imported rather than domestic resources. 
The oil embargoes in the 1970s brought energy security to the forefront 
of political attention in industrialized countries. Energy security strat-
egies prompted by these embargoes included establishing emergency 
stocks and joint response mechanisms in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, substituting oil by 
other energy sources (natural gas, nuclear, coal, etc.) in heating and 
electricity generation, investing in oil reserves outside the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – for example, in Alaska 
and the North Sea – and promoting energy efficiency to decrease oil 
intensities of economies. 
 By the end of the 20th century, many of these strategies bore fruit so 
that the fear of global oil supply disruptions subsided. At that time, 
other concerns at the interface of energy systems and national security 
emerged. One was the security of electricity transmission and genera-
tion systems. Vulnerability of nuclear power plants was exposed by the 
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima accidents, with Chernobyl 
virtually halting the construction of new nuclear reactors in the world 
for two decades. Large-scale blackouts due to failures of generation 
and transmission exposed the vulnerability of modern societies to even 
short-term disruptions of electricity supply. At the same time, with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it became clear that the economies of 
many oil-exporting nations are not viable without steady energy export 
revenues. This prompted a shift in attention towards “demand security,” 
another aspect of energy security. 
 Nowadays, the energy security debate is a mixture of many concerns, 
as “[i]n the background – but not too far back – is the anxiety over 
whether there will be sufficient resources to meet the world’s energy 
requirements in the decades ahead” (Yergin,  2006 ). More immediate 
concerns include high and volatile oil prices, especially painful for lower-
income countries; the predicted “plateau” of conventional oil produc-
tion apparently falling short of the rising demand (see  Chapter 7 ,  Figure 
7.4 ); the increasing geographic concentration of conventional oil and 
gas resources in just a few countries and regions; the shift of oil demand 
to India and China; and the fear of tensions and conflicts as new and 
old consumers “scramble” for the remaining, increasingly concentrated 
resources. The present energy security concerns also include the recent 
conflicts over deliveries of Russian natural gas to Eastern Europe, and 
fears over the excessive dependency of some European countries on a 
very limited number of energy supply options. In light of the September 
2001 terrorist attacks and the disruption brought about by Hurricane 
Katrina, there are also serious worries over the vulnerability of criti-
cal energy infrastructure to terrorist attacks or extreme natural events. 
Moreover, energy security concerns are now closely entangled with 
other critical energy issues, most notably energy access and climate 
impacts of energy systems. 
 Throughout history, energy security has been viewed as protection from 
disruptions of essential energy systems. The notion of “essential energy 
systems” evolved from supplies of oil for military purposes to encom-
pass various energy sources, infrastructure, and end-use sectors. The 
idea of “protection from disruptions” has also evolved from securing 
military or political control over energy resources to setting up complex 
policies and measures of strategically managing risks that affect all ele-
ments of energy systems. 
 Though it is possible to discuss energy security at household, commu-
nity, and other levels, most political concerns and scholarly research 
are about energy security of individual countries. This is because 
nation-states have a historic responsibility for security, national energy 
systems provide appropriate units of analysis of key risks and vulner-
abilities, and the majority of policy interventions to maintain energy 
security occur at the national level. Consequently, the analysis pre-
sented in this chapter primarily concentrates on the national level of 
energy security. 
 In line with the existing tradition, our analysis defines a nation’s energy 
security as protection from disruptions of energy systems that can jeop-
ardize nationally vital energy services. Numerous definitions of energy 
security ( Box 5.1 ) are largely elaborations of this broader concept, par-
ticularly on the notions of “protection from disruptions” and “vital 
energy systems.” 
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 Box 5.1 |  Deﬁ ning Energy Security 
 The analysis of energy security in academic literature recognizes that its meaning varies from one country or one context to another. Thus, 
universal deﬁ nitions of energy security are less frequently attempted than contextualized discussions of its various aspects or dimensions. 
One of the most frequently quoted deﬁ nitions is the “availability of sufﬁ cient supplies at affordable prices” suggested by Yergin ( 2006 ). It 
is preceded by the European Commission’s ( 2000 ) deﬁ nition of energy security as the “uninterrupted physical availability on the market 
of energy products at a price which is affordable for all consumers.” Energy insecurity is deﬁ ned by (Bohi and Toman,  1996 ) as “the loss 
of economic welfare that may occur as a result of a change in the price or availability of energy.” 
 These deﬁ nitions contain notions of “availability,” “sufﬁ ciency,” “affordability,” “welfare,” “energy products” (or “supplies”), and 
“interruptions,” which are open to wide interpretations. For example, Yergin ( 2006 ) discusses the different meaning of energy security – 
within his given deﬁ nition – for several different countries. This concept of variability of the notion of energy security is also stressed by 
M ü ller-Kraenner ( 2008 ), Kruyt et al. ( 2009 ), and Chester ( 2010 ). 
 In its analysis of energy security, scholarly literature draws different boundaries for energy systems and subsystems. These boundaries 
differ between how many and which fuels are considered, as well as how far up- and downstream boundaries are drawn within that 
system. In terms of fuel-related boundaries, studies range from focusing on a speciﬁ c fuel (generally oil) (Kendell,  1998 ; Gupta,  2008 ; 
Greene,  2010 ); looking at all fossil fuels (Le Coq and Paltseva,  2009 ); analyzing the security of an electricity system (Stirling,  1994 ) or 
critical energy infrastructure (Farrell et al.,  2004 ) to evaluating the security of the whole primary energy system (Neff,  1997 ; Jansen et al., 
 2004 ; Jansen and Seebregts,  2010 ). Within each of these divisions, some studies focus only on the supply side, while others integrate 
supply and demand aspects and indicators. 
 With respect to the characteristics of energy systems that are associated with their security, various studies propose and discuss 
different dimensions of energy security. The simplest discussion uses two dimensions of energy security: the “physical” and 
“economic” dimensions (Kendell,  1998 ; Gupta,  2008 ). Another commonly used taxonomy is the 4 A’s, or: “availability” (i.e., physical 
availability of resources), “accessibility” (geopolitical aspects associated with accessing resources), “affordability” (economic costs of 
energy), and “acceptability” (social and often environmental stewardship aspects of energy) (Kruyt et al.,  2009 ). Other dimensional 
classiﬁ cations include “economic, environmental, social, foreign policy, technical and security” (Alhajii,  2007 ) dimensions, as well 
as “energy supply, economic, technological, environmental, social-cultural, and military security” dimensions from von Hippel et al. 
( 2009 ) and others. 
 Contemporary literature on energy security considers risks linked to natu-
ral (e.g., resource scarcity, extreme natural events), technical (e.g., aging of 
infrastructure, technological accidents), political (e.g., intentional restric-
tion of supplies or technologies, sabotage and terrorism), and economic 
(e.g., high or volatile prices) factors. Correspondingly, “protection from 
risks” is defined by various authors as independence, reliability, resilience, 
availability, accessibility, affordability, or sustainability of energy systems. 
 This analysis considers three perspectives on energy security linked to dis-
tinct policy strategies and rooted in specific scholarly disciplines: robust-
ness, sovereignty, and resilience (Cherp and Jewell,  2011 ) (see  Box 5.2 ):
  • Robustness is focused on protection from disruptions originating 
from predictable and “objective” natural, technical, and economic 
factors such as resource scarcity, rapid rise of demand, aging of 
infrastructure, or rising energy prices. 
  • Sovereignty is focused on protection from disruptions originating 
from intentional actions of various actors (such as unfriendly politi-
cal powers and overly powerful market agents). Sovereignty implies 
the ability to control the behavior of energy systems and is often 
linked to much-discussed “energy independence.” 
  • Resilience is focused on protection from disruptions origin-
ating from less predictable factors of any nature, such as polit-
ical  instability, game-changing innovations, or extreme weather 
events. 
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 Box 5.2 |  Three Perspectives on Energy Security 
 For assessing energy security, when it is deﬁ ned as protection from disruptions of energy systems, it is necessary to understand the 
nature of such disruptions and adequate protection mechanisms. Energy security policies as well as scholarly literature present three 
distinct but complementary perspectives on this issue. 
 Historically, the oldest – “sovereignty” – perspective on energy security focuses on disruptions potentially arising from actions of 
“external” actors, be it hostile powers or terrorists, “unreliable” exporters, “foreign” energy companies, or overly powerful market 
agents. Protection from such disruptions is seen in increasing control over energy systems, be it by military, political, economic or 
technical means. In a broader sense, the sovereignty perspective focuses on interests, intentions, power, and the space for maneuver 
of various energy actors and institutions. In its most familiar and most simplistic form, a sovereignty strategy is the quest for energy 
independence. 
 The “robustness” perspective on energy security focuses on risks that arise from predictable and largely controlled characteristics of 
energy systems rather than from malevolent actions. Scarcity of energy resources, failures of infrastructure, or inadequate capacity to 
cope with the rising demand are examples of the issues addressed within this perspective. The main strategies for minimizing the risks 
of disruptions within this perspective are switching to more abundant and accessible energy sources, investment in infrastructure to 
minimize the risks of technical failures, and decreasing energy intensity to reduce vulnerability to high prices. 
 In contrast, the “resilience” perspective emphasizes unpredictable factors affecting energy security. Precisely due to the complexity 
and unpredictability of energy systems, this perspective focuses on diversity of energy options as the main strategy to cope with the 
potential threats. 
 Figure 5.1 shows the three perspectives on energy security in relation to fundamental assumptions about the nature of potential 
disruptions. The robustness strategies are most prominent when disruptions of energy systems are both controllable and predictable. 
Sovereignty strategies are focused on disruptions arising from forces outside of our control (these can be more or less predictable). 
Resilience strategies work in situations of unpredictability, independently of whether or not we have control over energy systems. 
 Figure 5.1 also shows that many widespread energy security strategies are deﬁ ned by more than one perspective. For example, increasing 
diversity of energy suppliers or maintaining competitive energy markets addresses both resilience and sovereignty concerns, since it 
reduces the power of individual agents to disrupt energy systems and provides a diversity of options which may be useful in the face of 
unpredictable disruptions. Investing in redundant capacities responds to both robustness and resilience concerns, whereas maintaining 
emergency stocks and selecting “trusted” partners is an overlap of sovereignty and robustness strategies. 
 Source: Cherp and Jewell,  2011 
 “Vital energy systems” that should be protected to ensure energy 
security were historically interpreted as a supply of oil and subse-
quently included other fuels, energy infrastructure, and eventually 
energy services. The literature identified “vital” as linked to “national 
values and objectives” (Yergin,  1988 ), “affecting welfare” (Bohi and 
Toman,  1996 ), and, in some cases, not associated with unacceptable 
environmental and social impacts (Sovacool and Brown,  2010 ) of 
energy systems. 
 In this analysis, “vital energy services” mean those that are necessary 
for the stable functioning of modern societies. Inherent in this defini-
tion is the notion that governments and the public perceive the inter-
ruption of such services as a national security concern. Such services 
vary from one country to another but commonly include transportation 
and energy for buildings. Most countries also depend upon a supply 
of energy for industrial purposes, and for some countries uninterrupted 
energy exports provide vital revenues. Security of these vital serv-
ices is linked to vulnerability of energy sources (such as oil, gas, coal, 
hydro, and nuclear energy) and infrastructure for energy conversion 
and transmission (such as power plants, fuel reservoirs, and pipelines). 
Thus, our analysis is not limited to energy supply but also extends to 
energy conversion and distribution infrastructure and to the demand 
aspects within the vital energy sectors. We also analyze the connections 
between supply, demand, and infrastructure to understand how vulner-
abilities propagate within energy systems so that if one element is at 
risk, other connected elements may also be affected. 
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 Figure 5.1 |  Three perspectives on energy security. With their roots in political studies, natural science, engineering and economics, the three perspectives on energy security 
focus on different types of threats and risk minimization strategies. Source: Cherp and Jewell,  2011 . 
 Table 5.2 |  Summary of the three perspectives on energy security.  
Perspective Sovereignty Robustness Resilience
 Historic roots War-time oil supplies and the 1970s 
oil crises
Large technological accidents, electricity 
blackouts, concerns about resource scarcity
Liberalization of energy systems.
 Key risks for energy systems Intentional actions by malevolent agents Predictable natural and technical factors Diverse and partially unpredictable factors
 Primary protection mechanisms Control over energy systems. Institutional 
arrangements preventing disruptive actions
Upgrading infrastructure and switching to 
more abundant resources
Increasing the ability to withstand and 
recover from various disruptions
Source: Cherp and Jewell,  2011 .
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 This chapter does not consider environmental and social impacts of 
energy systems as part of energy security, although such consideration 
is sometimes encountered in academic literature. For example, among 
91 scholarly articles on energy security reviewed by Sovacool and Brown 
( 2010 ), about one-quarter include environmental performance of energy 
systems in their definition of energy security. Our decision to separate 
the analysis of environmental and social impacts from the more con-
ventional analysis of energy security is guided by two considerations. 
First, such impacts are analyzed in other chapters in this publication 
( Chapters 2 ,  3 , and 4). Second, policies in the majority of countries con-
sider energy security and climate change as distinct, although related, 
concerns. Thus, an analysis focused on energy security in a more narrow 
sense may be more policy relevant, as it appeals to a distinct policy com-
munity. Nevertheless, we acknowledge strong linkages between energy 
security and climate change, as explained in  Box 5.3 and discussed 
throughout the chapter. 
 Box 5.3 |  Energy Security and Other Energy-Related Concerns 
 Energy security concerns overlap with other concerns related to energy systems. This box brieﬂ y discusses this overlap with respect to 
climate and other environmental impacts, energy access and poverty, and energy affordability. 
 1.  Climate change and energy security. Limiting the impacts of energy systems on climate change and ensuring energy security are 
clearly distinct policy concerns, as evidenced by many countries (especially in the developing world) that rigorously pursue energy 
security agendas without strong climate change agendas. Energy security and climate change concerns are associated with different 
policy communities, paradigms, and discourses. Yet there are strong links between the two policy areas. First, in some cases changes 
in climate present energy security risks affecting, for example, availability of water for hydro and thermal power generation or 
stability of permafrost in areas of oil and gas exploration. In some other cases, climate change results in new energy options such 
as hydropower from the melting glaciers of Greenland, or additional hydrocarbon resources available for exploration or marine 
transportation routes opened as a result of a retreat of Arctic sea ice. Second, climate and energy security policies may interact in 
a synergistic or conﬂ icting manner. For example, reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels and promoting distributed generation 
from renewable energy sources has both climate change and energy security beneﬁ ts. On the other hand, switching from imported 
natural gas to domestic coal advocated on energy security grounds is clearly disadvantageous from the climate change perspective. 
New technological dependencies, market arrangements, and international regimes associated with climate change governance may 
also have energy security implications. A similar argument also applies to other environmental impacts of energy systems and energy 
security. 
 2.  Energy access and energy security. Whereas climate change is mostly a global concern, energy security is primarily a national 
concern, and energy access is often a local concern. Concerns over access to modern energy primarily focus on rural poor people, 
who are often not a high priority for statesmen dealing with national-level energy security, which concentrates on vital sectors often 
located in more prosperous urban centers. Likewise, poverty is often tolerated by national policymakers insofar as it does not affect 
the stability of national political or economic systems. Yet there are several strong links between energy security and energy access. 
First, enhancing access to modern energy services usually imposes a need to ﬁ nd additional resources and investments, which may 
exacerbate already existing energy security challenges. Second, lack of access to affordable energy  can actually catalyze political 
or economic instability and thus become an energy-related security threat (for example, the uprising that resulted in the change of 
regime in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 was allegedly initially triggered by high electricity prices and unreliable supply). Thus, our analysis 
considers lack of access an indicator of energy insecurity. 
 3.  Energy security and energy affordability. Affordability of energy is often quoted as an important aspect of energy security. 
There is extensive literature analyzing and even deﬁ ning energy security in purely economic terms. This is understandable, since 
some disruptions of energy systems are often nothing other than rapid increases in energy prices and can even, in other cases, be 
translated into economic losses. Yet, there is a clear distinction between “affordability” of energy and energy security. The former is a 
measure expressing the cost of energy relative to other economic parameters (GDP, income per capita, etc.). Thus energy affordability 
can be increased or decreased by changes outside energy systems, such as increases in income levels. Affordability also primarily 
addresses the relative cost of energy in the situation of economic equilibrium. In contrast, energy security deals with price disruptions 
that are outside economic equilibrium and induced by changes in energy systems (such as supply disruptions) rather than by general 
economic developments. 
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 This chapter includes three main sections. The next section contains an 
assessment of energy security in over 130 countries carried out within a 
framework designed specifically for this purpose. The goal of this assess-
ment is not to compare or rank the nations, but rather to identify com-
mon energy security concerns affecting significant parts of the world’s 
population. The following section discusses energy security strategies 
pursued by individual countries and embodied in various international 
institutions. The last section provides an outlook for energy security in 
the future, connecting to  Chapter 17 (Energy Pathways for Sustainable 
Development). 
 5.2  Energy Security Conditions in the World 
 This section presents a global overview of energy security in more 
than 130 countries using a National Energy Security Assessment 
Framework (“the Framework”) specifically developed for this purpose. 
The Framework is presented in the first subsection and used in subse-
quent subsections to identify and map vulnerabilities of national energy 
systems globally. 
 5.2.1  National Energy Security Assessment Framework 
 There is extensive scholarly literature on measuring energy security. The 
methods and indicators used for this purpose vary depending upon the 
chosen definition of energy security, the intended use of the results of 
the analysis, the selection of boundaries of energy systems and time-
horizons, the assumptions about the nature of potential risks, and the 
availability of data (Cherp and Jewell,  2010 ).  Table 5.3 summarizes the 
key choices made in this study as compared to other quantitative evalu-
ations of energy security. 
 The Framework used in this study proceeds from the definition of energy 
security as the protection from disruptions of nationally vital energy 
services. Our analysis aims to identify globally predominant national 
energy security concerns rather than to compare or rank countries as 
more or less secure. 
 This definition and the purpose of assessment leads to certain choices 
regarding the boundaries of energy systems analyzed within the 
Framework (see  Figure 5.2 ). At the center of the analysis are national 
energy systems subdivided into subsystems of primary energy supply (oil, 
natural gas, hydro, nuclear energy, biomass, and “new renewables”); 
systems for the generation and transmission of electricity; and energy 
end-use sectors. This national-level analysis is supplemented by a global 
analysis of the vulnerabilities of internationally traded fossil fuels (oil, 
natural gas, and coal) electricity systems, and the nuclear fuel cycle. 
 The significance of energy end-use sectors analyzed in this chapter varies 
across countries. The first three of such sectors, discussed in  Chapters 8 , 
 9 , and  10 , are energy for (1) industry, (2) transport, and (3) commer-
cial and residential buildings. The fourth important energy end-use sec-
tor is energy exports, which provide vital revenues to certain countries. 
By analyzing vulnerabilities of export revenues, we address “demand 
security,” a serious concern of energy-exporting countries. 
 The Framework takes into account the propagation of vulnerabilities from 
energy sources to electricity systems and to energy end-uses. Electricity 
generated from less secure primary energy sources is considered more 
vulnerable. In turn, vulnerability of end-uses depends upon the vulnerabil-
ities of primary energy sources and electricity used in a given sector. With 
respect to time-horizons we look into short- to medium-term concerns (up 
to 15–20 years), which are typically predominant in policy agendas. 
 The second set of choices concerns the nature of potential risks of dis-
ruptions of energy systems. The Framework assesses three dimensions 
of energy security: robustness (protection from disruptions due to pre-
dictable natural and technical factors), sovereignty (protection from dis-
ruptions originating from external actors), and resilience (the ability to 
withstand shocks and disruptions of various natures). We have chosen 
these three dimensions rather than other attributes of energy systems 
 Table 5.3 |  Goals, choices and assumptions for measuring energy security made in this chapter as compared to other studies of energy security. 
Choices and assumptions Existing studies quantifying energy security Chapter 5 of the Global Energy Assessment
Assessment goals Rank groups of countries Identify energy security concerns affecting a large number of 
countries and people globallyIdentify vulnerabilities of particular countries
Deﬁ nition of energy security  See  Box 5.1 Low risk of disruptions of nationally vital energy systems
Energy security concerns  See  Box 5.1  As reﬂ ected in sovereignty, robustness and resilience of 
energy systems, see  Table 5.2 . Exclude environmental and 
social issues 
Energy systems and subsystems Depending on the assessment purpose; often focused on 
energy supply, especially oil
Global systems for internationally traded fuels and nuclear 
fuel cycle; national energy systems including subsystems for 
energy sources, electricity generation and end-use sectors: 
transport; industry, residential and commercial energy, and 
energy export revenues
Aggregation of data Compound or disaggregated energy security indicators Aggregated for fuel systems, electricity and end-use sectors 
at the national and, where appropriate, the global level
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proposed in the literature because they are linked to distinct policy 
mindsets and strategies, and thus we believe that the analysis along 
these dimensions will have the most policy relevance, as explained in 
 Figure 5.1 and  Box 5.2 . 
 The four types of energy systems and the three dimensions of energy 
security are combined in a matrix defining key energy security concerns 
( Table 5.4 ). 
 The application of the Framework consists of several elements, as 
shown in  Figure 5.1 . This figure and the text below it provide only a 
brief description of the sample indicators. Further explanation of the 
choice of indicators and a qualitative analysis are given in the main text 
of the chapter. 
 The first element is the analysis of the global vulnerabilities of internation-
ally traded fuels. The main robustness concerns regarding such fuels are 
available resources and reserves, as well as predicted supply-demand bal-
ances. Although these estimates are surrounded by large uncertainties, 
they nevertheless allow us to compare the major fuels and explain pol-
icy concerns about their vulnerabilities. The sovereignty concerns related 
to globally traded fuels are the share of international trade in total fuel 
production (which roughly indicates the degree of global dependency on 
imported fuels) and the geographic concentration of the fuel production 
(which indicates the market power of individual producing countries). 
Finally, the resilience concerns of the global primary energy sources sys-
tem can be measured by the diversity of the global fuel mix. 
 The nuclear fuel cycle is also first evaluated at the global level, where 
we look at the concentration of capacities for uranium enrichment, 
manufacturing of nuclear power plant components, and nuclear fuel 
reprocessing. 
 The rest of the analysis is conducted at the national level for each of the 
134 countries where the data are available in the IEA database (IEA, 
 2010b ). With respect to the national primary energy supply, the Framework 
looks into such robustness indicators as domestic reserves and resources 
of non-renewable fuels, demand growth, and energy intensity. It uses 
import dependency (by fuel and for primary energy sources as a whole) 
as indicators of sovereignty concerns. Finally, the overall diversity of pri-
mary energy sources at the national level and the diversity of hydroelectric 
dams are used as an indicator of resilience of energy supply. 
 Figure 5.2 |  Energy security assessment framework. The framework addresses the security of national energy systems with focus on energy sources, carriers and nationally vital 
energy services. The ﬁ gure shows the elements of energy systems and their interconnections accounted for in the framework. The blue, red and green text indicates concerns related 
to the three perspectives on energy security (see  Figure 5.1 ) – robustness, sovereignty and resilience respectively. The dotted line separates external and domestic factors. 
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 With respect to national electricity systems, the robustness indicators 
are the age of power plants, demand growth, and the reliability (black-
out) statistics. The sovereignty indicator is the dependency of electricity 
systems on imported electricity and fuels. The resilience indicator is the 
diversity of primary energy sources used in electricity production. 
 With respect to end-use sectors, the Framework uses the rate of demand 
growth as the robustness indicator, the share of imported fuels in the 
sectoral primary energy sources mix as the sovereignty indicator, and 
the diversity of primary energy sources as the resilience indicator for a 
particular sector. 
 The final set of choices in evaluating national energy security concerns 
the aggregation of indicators and interpretation of results. This chapter 
recognizes that the nature of energy security risks varies among coun-
tries and in time, and thus a unified indicator is not plausible or relevant. 
The Framework seeks to identify, map, and explain the varying condi-
tions of energy insecurity encountered around the world. It uses simpli-
fication and aggregation, necessary for mapping these concerns, rather 
than producing a single universal energy security index. 
 The Framework used in this analysis is naturally not capable of evalu-
ating all important energy security concerns. Some of the issues that 
were intentionally left outside the analysis are discussed in  Box 5.4 . 
The method and some of the key indicators used in the Framework are 
subsequently deployed in analyzing energy security within the GEA 
Scenario in  Chapter 17 . The method of such analysis is explained both in 
 Chapter 17 and in the last section of this chapter. 
 5.2.2  Security of Primary Energy Sources 
 This section considers the security of key primary energy sources. It starts 
by analyzing major internationally traded fuels: oil, natural gas, and coal. 
For each of these fuels, the analysis of their global vulnerabilities is fol-
lowed by the analysis of national vulnerabilities in individual countries. 
The second subsection discusses vulnerabilities of nuclear energy: both 
at the global and the national level. The remaining three subsections 
discuss vulnerabilities of hydro energy, biomass, and “new renewables.” 
The final subsection contains an analysis of the total primary energy 
supply of individual countries by aggregating the data on individual 
sources at the national level. The indicators used for the analysis in this 
section are summarized in  Table 5.5 ; they cover the robustness, sover-
eignty, and resilience perspectives on each of the energy sources. 
 5.2.2.1  Globally Traded Fuels 
 The three major fuels traded on an international and global scale are oil 
and its products, natural gas, and coal. Global trade in these fuels means 




 Global level 
Globally traded fuels: oil, coal, and gas Availability of resources and reserves Share of international trade in the overall 
production
Dominance (share) of a fuel in the total 
global PES mix
Geographic concentration of fuel production
Nuclear fuel cycle Geographic concentration of uranium enrichment, manufacturing of nuclear power plant 
components, and reprocessing of nuclear fuel
 National level 
Energy sources
 Fossil fuels: oil, natural gas, and coal Available domestic reserves (R/C ratio)
Demand growth for a particular fuel Import dependency Diversity of import routes
 Hydro energy Climate change effects on water 
availability and variation
Usage of transboundary water resources Diversity of hydroelectric dams 
(see also electricity generation)
Electricity generation and transmission  Age of power plant ﬂ eet 
 Growth in consumption of electricity 
 Reliability (frequency of blackouts) 
 Access rate 
Reliance on imported fuels  Diversity of fuels used for electricity 
production 
 Diversity of power plants 
End-use sectors: industry, transport, residential 
and commercial, energy exports
Growth (decline*) in energy demand for 
the sector
Reliance on imported fuels within the 
sector
Diversity of energy sources used in the 
sector
National energy systems (cross-sectoral)  Energy intensity 
 Growth in overall energy consumption 
 Energy consumption per capita 
 Overall import  dependency  Overall diversity of PES  used in the 
national energy system 
 Notes: Concerns quantiﬁ ed by indicators are highlighted in bold. * – for energy exports 
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that their vulnerabilities can be analyzed within the global and national 
systems using the three perspectives on energy security: robustness, 
sovereignty, and resilience. 
 Robustness of globally traded fuels means their physical availability, 
technological accessibility, and economic affordability (Kruyt et al., 
 2009 ). Although each of these characteristics is affected by a number 
of complex and often uncertain factors, for the purposes of this analysis 
they can be described by relatively simple proxy indicators such as the 
global reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio, supply and demand projec-
tions, and price dynamics. 
 At the national level, robustness of a particular fuel source can be charac-
terized by national R/P ratios. Although such ratios are notoriously fluid 
(because the estimates of “resources” and “reserves” often change in 
time with economic and technological changes), they still signal import-
ant vulnerabilities to policymakers, especially if they are relatively short-
term (under 10–20 years). A rapidly growing demand for a particular fuel 
signals a pressure on resources and infrastructure. Other national-level 
indicators of robustness of a particular fuel supply are the fuel intensity of 
a national economy (higher fuel intensity means that it is more difficult to 
adjust to potential disruptions of supply) and the proportion of national 
gross domestic product (GDP) or export revenues that is spent on imports of 
this fuel. 
 The main sovereignty concern related to internationally traded fuels at 
the global level is market power of dominant actors, which relates to 
their potential ability to disrupt prices or even physical supply of that 
fuel. Proxy indicators of this concern include the share of internationally 
traded fuel in the total fuel production and the geographic concentra-
tion of fuel production in particular countries or regions. These indica-
tors are more informative where there is a single global market for the 
fuel (as in the case of oil and, partially, coal). In the case of gas, such 
indicators should be used in each of the separate regional markets. 
 The main sovereignty concern at the national level is import dependency 
on a particular fuel. This is probably the most widely used metric of energy 
security. Import dependency is important for policymakers because it makes 
their energy supply vulnerable to (a) global price volatility determined by 
factors beyond their control; (b) market power of major exporters, which 
may in extreme cases be manifested in direct physical supply disruptions; 
and (c) exposure to other disruption factors (including in transit countries) 
along import routes. In addition, many nations are concerned about the 
security of their energy imports if these originate in countries considered 
 Box 5.4 |  Limitations of Current Analysis 
 The analysis presented in this chapter does not consider several issues that are occasionally addressed in energy security literature. These 
issues have been scoped out to maintain the focus of the assessment as well as due to time, space, and data limitations. The limitations 
relate to the types of energy systems considered in this assessment, time-horizons, and the nature of risks and disruptions analyzed. 
 First, the assessment is focused on key energy security issues that presently dominate policy concerns in a large number of countries. 
This means that only major traditional mainstream energy security systems are analyzed. For example, wind, solar, geothermal, and 
tidal energy at the moment do not make for a large share of energy supply in many countries and thus are not analyzed in detail. Yet, 
availability of alternative energy sources – to say nothing about technologies and ﬁ nances – may be key factors in shaping national 
energy security in certain countries. 
 For largely the same reason, the analysis in this chapter is focused on short- to medium-term concerns (up to 15–20 years) that typically 
dominate policy agendas. We believe that energy security in a longer-term future will largely depend on policy choices and may unfold in 
the context of radical energy transitions. If these policy choices are guided by economic, environmental, and social sustainability goals, 
energy systems may evolve along pathways described in the GEA Scenario ( Chapter 17 ). Energy security under such pathways is analyzed 
in  Chapter 17 using the assumptions, methods, and indicators developed in this chapter. 
 Third, energy security is affected by a large number of complex and often intangible factors that are difﬁ cult to identify, quantify, or 
compare on the global scale. Some of these factors are subjective, such as trust between various actors in energy systems, consistency 
and predictability of policies, or reﬂ exivity of market price-setting. Other factors are related to vulnerabilities of complex technical 
systems ranging from technological interdependencies (with respect to materials, equipment, expertise, and capacities related to energy 
systems) to cyber-security of critical energy infrastructure, especially electricity networks. Another critical group of factors relates to 
ﬁ nancing options, availability and effectiveness of investment, and capacities to develop various energy options. None of these factors 
could be extensively analyzed in this chapter, which does not make them less important in speciﬁ c national contexts. 
 Despite these limitations, we believe that this chapter fulﬁ lls its goal of mapping the major energy security concerns of today’s world and 
provides a methodological and factual basis for analyzing the potential evolution of these concerns under sustainable energy transitions. 
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unfriendly, unstable, unreliable, politically unacceptable, or potentially 
exercising asymmetrical market power. In other situations, imports come 
from culturally and politically close and trusted partners and thus lead 
to few security concerns. In the global context, we do not systematically 
quantify these idiosyncrasies but comment on them in particularly rel-
evant cases (e.g., in regional energy security discussions). 
 Finally, the main resilience metric with respect to energy supply is 
the diversity of primary energy sources, either nationally or globally. 
Strategic reserves of oil and, to a lesser extent, gas and coal support 
both resilience and robustness of energy supply, but their presence was 
not quantitatively analyzed in this chapter due to data limitations. 
 Global oil supply vulnerabilities 
 Oil is a non-renewable resource massively traded on the global scale. It 
is the largest single primary energy source worldwide and dominates the 
transport sector, where it lacks easily available substitutes. The global 
demand for oil is steadily rising, particularly as a result of increasing motor 
 Table 5.5 |  Overview of concerns and indicators of national energy security addressed in this chapter. 
Energy sector
Energy security concerns (indicators)*
Shorter term > Longer term
 Oil 
 Exposure to the global oil market (import dependency, cost of imports, 
 Demand-side vulnerabilities (annual growth in oil consumption,  oil intensity )  Global conventional oil scarcity (“peak oil”) 
 Domestic availability of oil (R/C) 
Environmental acceptability of oil production and use
 Gas 
 Exposure to the global and international gas markets (import dependency, cost of imports 
 Demand-side vulnerabilities ( gas intensity )  
Domestic availability of gas (R/C)
 Environmental acceptability of gas production and use 
 Coal 
 Exposure to the global coal market (import dependency)
 Domestic availability of coal (R/C) 
 Environmental and health acceptability of coal production and use 
 Nuclear 
Seasonal water availability
 Aging infrastructure (average age of nuclear power plants) 
 Capacity to replace existing ﬂ eet (start of last plant construction) 
 Access to capital, enrichment, reactor manufacturing, reprocessing 
 Environmental, safety and security acceptability of nuclear power 
 Hydro 
 Reliance on dams which are shared ( transboundary dams or  dams on transboundary rivers ) 
 Seasonal water availability 
Effects of climate change on water patterns 
and availability
Aging and silting of dams and other infrastructure
 Exposure to risk of dam failure or sabotage (diversity of dams)
 Electricity 
 Exposure to imported fuels (dependency on imported fuels) 
 Exposure to a single fuel market (low diversity of energy sources used for electricity production) 
 Adequate capacity (annual demand growth rate, access rate) 
 Underinvestment and aging infrastructure 
 Transport 
 Exposure to imported fuels (dependence on imported fuels)
 Demand-side vulnerabilities (annual consumption growth rate)
 Industry 
 Exposure to imported fuels (dependence on imported fuels) 
 Demand-side vulnerabilities (industrial energy intensity) 
 Residential and 
commercial 
 Exposure to imported fuels 
(dependency on imported fuels)
 Demand-side vulnerabilities (annual consumption growth rate) 
 Adequacy of provision (reliance on traditional biofuels in the residential sector) 
 Energy for export 
 Exposure to price ﬂ uctuations (revenue from energy exports as share of GDP) 
 “Security of demand” (diversity of export routes and destinations) 
 “Dutch disease” and “resource curse” 
 Cross-sectoral 
 Exposure to imported fuels (overall import dependency, cost of energy imports compared to GDP, cost of 
energy imports compared to export earnings) 
 Overall resilience of primary fuels (diversity of PES) 
 Exposure to energy price volatility (overall energy intensity) 
 Demand-side pressure (annual growth rate in consumption, 
consumption per capita)
 Notes: R/C – reserves to consumption ratio; PES – primary energy sources 
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fuel consumption in emerging economies. Given limited new discoveries, 
the global production of conventional oil is predicted to “peak” or “plat-
eau” in the first half of this century (see  Chapter 7 for details) in spite of 
globally rising demand. This supply-demand imbalance will lead to higher 
oil prices in the medium to long term, as exploration and production will 
turn to progressively more demanding, and thus more expensive, sources 
(such as oil in deep-sea water or the Arctic). The costs are rising even in 
established production regions. The Kashagan oilfield in the Caspian Sea, 
one of the biggest discoveries in decades, was due to enter production in 
2005. Now the target is 2012, and the costs could exceed US$100 billion. 1 
The  2010 disaster at BP’s well in the Gulf of Mexico may increase costs 
further as environmental regulations are tightened. 
 In addition to this expected medium- to long-term cost increase, global oil 
prices have been increasingly volatile in the last decade for several rea-
sons. First, the global demand for oil has been growing faster than produc-
tion capacity, and as a result the spare production capacity (the difference 
between what is possible to produce in the short term and what is actu-
ally produced to meet the demand) has significantly decreased. With 
the smaller spare capacity, even relatively minor disruptions of supply – 
whether they are due to natural, economic or political causes – may knock 
the demand and supply off balance, thus signaling rocketing prices or even 
a physical scarcity of fuel at least in the short term, 2 or the reverse. 
 Furthermore, the global oil price has been increasingly affected by highly 
volatile market expectations through speculation. Future contracts and 
other derivates have opened the oil market to speculative money, which 
is blamed as a contributing factor in oil price volatility. Due to the rapid 
increase in the number of actors and improvements in communication 
tools, the oil markets have become highly reflexive – i.e., driven by mar-
ket sentiments and expectations. This reflexivity does not blend well 
with the decreasing and often uncertain spare capacity. A speculative 
market combined with low spare capacity and high uncertainty easily 
results in price bubbles and longer-term volatility. 
 1  According to the Cambridge Energy Research Associates’ (CERA) Upstream Capital 
Costs Index (UCCI), prices of drilling technology, skilled labor, and equipment have 
soared. Even in spite of recent economic recession, exploration and development 
costs in oil and gas have risen by 200% between 2000 and 2011 (IHS,  2011 ) adding 
a signiﬁ cant cost to crude supply. 
 Figure 5.3 |  Global oil and gas production and trade. The ﬁ gure shows the concentration of global oil and gas production in a limited number of regions and large volumes of 
trade in these fossil fuels. Source: BP,  2009 ; IEA,  2009a ; b. 
 2  When BP had to shut down a single reﬁ nery in 2006, world crude prices jumped 2% 
(Sovacool,  2009 ). 
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 Moreover, the volatility of the global oil market is exacerbated by the 
fact that, whereas oil is traded globally, its production and reserves are 
heavily concentrated in just a few countries and regions (see  Figures 5.3 
and  5.4 ) away from the major consumption centers. In 2006 the Middle 
East accounted for 62% of the world’s identifiable proved liquid reserves 
and 31% of the output. The world’s top 10 producers represent approxi-
mately 62% of global output. Eight of the top 10 producers are net oil 
exporters that collectively supply 34% of global oil demand. On the other 
hand, seven of the world’s 10 largest consuming countries lack suffi-
cient oil production capacity to meet their internal consumption, import-
ing more than 35% of the world’s demand (Lehman Brothers,  2008 ). 
According to the IEA ( 2010a ), the concentration of oil production and the 
market power of major producers are expected to increase by 2030, not 
only in the Reference Scenario but also in the presence of strong climate 
policies (the “450 scenario”). The interregional trade in oil will increase 
by over 30% and comprise almost one-half of the total volume of global 
production by 2035 (IEA,  2010a ) in the New Policies Scenario. 
 This means that global oil supply is becoming increasingly more vul-
nerable to conditions in oil-producing countries and regions, as well as 
the demand dynamics and expectations of major consumers. There is 
an extensive record of political, economic, and natural events, military 
conflicts, and deliberate acts of sabotage that have either physically dis-
rupted global oil flows or resulted in price hikes. According to (Jones 
et al.,  2004 ), quoted in (Farrell et al.,  2004 ), 24 oil supply shocks between 
1950 and 2003 averaged eight months or 3.7% of the global supply. The 
1990 Gulf War, for instance, resulted in production loses of 2.8 million 
barrels per day (mbd) of Iraqi and 1.4 mbd of Kuwaiti oil – some 7% of 
global supply (BP,  2007 ). The strike at Petr ó leos de Venezuela, SA during 
2002/2003 brought to a halt the country’s entire oil sector and tempo-
rarily reduced global oil supplies by 2.3 mbd, or 3% of total world supply 
(US Government Accountability Office,  2006 ). As it coincided with unrest 
in oil producer Nigeria and the looming US invasion of Iraq, the strike 
contributed to pushing the nominal price of oil to new highs (Shore and 
Hackworth,  2003 ). For an overview linking oil price developments and 
major political events since the early 1970s, see  Figure 5.4 . 
 Thus, countries relying on imported oil are at risk of facing medium- to 
long-term price increases combined with volatility of oil prices in the 
short term. Physical supply disruptions similar to the Arab OPEC oil 
embargo of the early 1970s are less likely nowadays because alterna-
tive suppliers can normally be found, given the “liquid” character of the 
 Figure 5.4 |  Price of oil (in US 2005 $) and major political events 1970–2011. Source: modiﬁ ed from US EIA,  2011b . Note: Imported Reﬁ ner Acquisition Cost (IRAC) is the volume-
weighted average price of all crude oil imported to the United States. 
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global oil market, and strategic oil reserves present in most major econ-
omies can smooth out such impacts. However, infrastructural limitations 
(e.g., pipeline capacities or refineries “tuned up” to deal only with a 
particular kind of crude) can still make physical disruptions very pain-
ful for particular countries. For example, several landlocked countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe receive the majority of their oil supplies 
from Russia through the Druzhba pipeline and are, therefore, vulner-
able to disruptions affecting this particular supplier and the transporta-
tion route. Globally, 64% of the global oil supply flows through just 10 
supply chain “choke” points, with the top three accounting for 46% of 
supply (Lehman Brothers,  2008 ). In addition to the Druzhba pipeline, 
these include the Straits of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Abqaiq process-
ing facility, Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandab, Bosporus/Turkish Straits, Mina 
al-Ahmadi terminal (Kuwait), Al Basrah oil terminal (Iraq), and LOOP 
(United States). 
 In summary, the global oil supply is vulnerable from robustness, sover-
eignty, and resilience perspectives. The main robustness concerns are 
the increasing demand in the face of limited conventional production 
capacities, rising costs of production, and high and volatile prices. The 
main sovereignty concerns are the increasing concentration of pro-
duction away from major demand centers and the increasing market 
power of major producers. The resilience concerns include not only the 
dominance of oil in the world’s energy use and the lack of easily avail-
able substitutes for oil in the transport sector (as we will be discussing 
further later in this chapter), but also the limited diversity of global oil 
supply routes and the vulnerability of the “choke” points. 
 National oil supply vulnerabilities 
 Oil is the only primary energy source that plays an important role in all 
of the national energy systems except in a few less-developed countries. 
Virtually every country (125 countries with 5.9 billion people) 3 has at 
least 10% of its primary energy derived from oil, while over 5.5 billion 
people live in 112 countries which rely on oil for more than 18% of their 
total primary energy supply. Moreover, some 370 million people live in 32 
countries that use oil for more than half of their primary energy supply. 
 The majority of countries import most or even all of the oil and petro-
leum products they need. Over three billion people live in 83 countries 
that import more than 75% of the oil and petroleum products they con-
sume, and 101 countries with 5.3 billion people import over 25% of the 
oil they consume. 
 The number of people living in countries significantly dependent on oil 
imports is likely to rise in the near future. At the moment there are 3.6 
billion people in countries that import more than half of their oil, but a 
further 1.7 billion people live in countries (including Argentina, China, 
Indonesia, and the United Kingdom) where the ratio of domestic oil 
reserves to domestic annual oil consumption is under 15 years. 4 Even 
though some countries (e.g., Ghana) may become less dependent on 
imported oil due to new discoveries and developments, this is unlikely 
to reverse the overall trend of the rapid increase of oil import depend-
ency in the world. 
 Several of the highly import-dependent countries have additional 
demand-side vulnerabilities. In 16 such countries (with 1.8 billion peo-
ple), the demand for petroleum products grew at 5–10% per year on 
average from 1996–2006. In addition, five of these (including several 
African countries and Vietnam) have outstanding fuel intensities that 
make them highly vulnerable to market price disruptions. 
 China and India – which are together home to about 2.5 billion people – 
tell a story of their own. Oil consumption in China more than quadrupled 
between 1980 and  2009 . It has grown at the annual rate of over 7% a 
year in the last 10–15 years. In the WEO (World Energy Outlook)’s New 
Policies Scenario, it is expected to almost double between  2009 and 
2035, increasing on average by 2.4% per year. In this scenario, China 
accounts for 48% of the global rise in demand for oil. The majority of 
this increase will likely come from imports, as China already imports 
over 40% of its oil supply and its domestic reserves/consumption ratio is 
between seven and eight years. India already imports over 75% of its oil, 
and its domestic resource/supply ratio is under six years, with consump-
tion growing on average 4.6% per year and projected to grow faster 
than in China at 3.6% between 2009 and 2035, accounting for a further 
30% of the increase in the global demand for oil (IEA,  2010a ). 
 It is worth commenting that all low-income countries (over 600 mil-
lion people) except Uzbekistan, 5 Myanmar, 6 and Yemen import over 
80% of their oil and petroleum products. In sub-Saharan Africa, apart 
from South Africa, Gabon, Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Congo, Cameroon, 
and C ô te d’Ivoire, all of the countries are completely dependent on the 
import of petroleum products! 
 Global natural gas supply vulnerabilities 
 Natural gas is the fastest growing fuel of choice for electricity gen-
eration in the Western hemisphere and has also gained an increasing 
importance in emerging economies. In addition, it is extensively used 
in the residential sector (for heating and cooking) and in many indus-
trial applications. Similarly to oil, gas is a non-renewable resource with 
reserves and production concentrated in a few countries and regions, 
and most nations relying on imported supplies. There are, however, 
 3  According to IEA ( 2007 ), oil and its products represented less than 10% of total 
ﬁ nal energy use in only nine countries: Mozambique, Tanzania, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, Zimbabwe, Nepal, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Nigeria. 
 4  The concepts of reserve/production or reserve/consumption ratios are notoriously 
unreliable when used for projecting the date of “running out of oil.” This is because 
the estimates of reserves are constantly updated and the rates of production/con-
sumption also change. However, the very low (<10–15 years) ratio usually signals 
serious energy security concerns and the need to develop new reserves, imports, or 
other energy sources. 
 5  Uzbekistan has the resource/supply ratio of about 16 years. 
 6  Currently, Myanmar is a net crude oil exporter, but it imports more than 50% of its 
petroleum products and has the resource/supply ratio of just 3.75 years. 
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important differences between energy security concerns associated with 
oil and natural gas as globally traded energy sources. 
 With respect to globally available resources, the production of conven-
tional gas is likely to peak (or plateau) several decades later than con-
ventional oil in most scenarios. In addition, technological advances have 
recently added significant quantities of unconventional (primarily shale) 
gas to global reserve estimates (see  Box 5.5 ). There are, generally speak-
ing, fewer concerns about the risk of rapid increases in gas prices than 
in the case of oil (S ö derbergh et al.,  2009 ; S ö derbergh et al.,  2010 ). In 
other words, “peak gas” may not be as significant a concern as “peak 
oil.” 
 Yet the global demand for natural gas is projected to increase faster than 
that for oil (by 44% in the WEO’s New Policies Scenario, compared to 
18% for oil). A quarter of this rise in global demand is set to come from 
China, where the consumption of natural gas is projected to increase on 
average by 6% per year up to 2035 (IEA,  2010a ). 
 On the other hand, similarly to oil, a globally sufficient supply of natu-
ral gas depends upon adequate investments in exploration, production, 
and transportation. Such investment is all but granted, especially in con-
nection with uncertainty over shale gas and other factors affecting gas 
prices (see  Box 5.5 ). According to the IEA ( 2007 ), the total upstream 
and infrastructure investment needs in natural gas amount to US$4.2 
(US 2005 $ 4.0) trillion until 2030. 
 The difference between oil and natural gas is also in the volumes of inter-
national trade. Whereas about two-thirds of the globally produced oil is 
traded, this share is only about one-third for natural gas (see  Table 5.6 ). 
However, interregional trade in natural gas is projected to increase 
very significantly (by 80% between 2008 and 2035 in the WEO’s New 
Policies Scenario (IEA,  2010a ) to account for over one-quarter of the 
total production). China’s imports of natural gas are set to grow some 
40-fold in this scenario, accounting for some 40% of the total growth in 
the interregional gas trade over this period (IEA,  2010b ). 
 In contrast to oil, there is no unified global market for natural gas, pri-
marily because the regional price differentials do not exceed the still 
high costs of interregional transportation (Stevens,  2010 ). Natural gas is 
transported via pipelines or between liquefied natural gas (LNG) instal-
lations tied with long-term contracts. Natural gas is traded on several 
largely independent regional markets, most notably the Eurasian, North 
American, and Asia-Pacific markets. While the North American natural 
gas market is liquid, regionally integrated, and deregulated, the Eurasian 
gas market is dominated by long-term bilateral contracts, entailing off-
take agreements and destination clauses. Consequently, the Eurasian 
gas market, though considerably larger in volume than the North 
American one, is characterized by a comparably lower liquidity and a 
still marginal, although growing, role of spot markets. The emergence 
of a global gas market was widely predicted by experts and signaled 
by considerable investments in LNG infrastructure but delayed by the 
economic crisis and shale gas developments. 
 Natural gas is traded in regional markets by pipelines and globally as 
LNG. This has two major implications for energy security concerns asso-
ciated with this fuel. On one hand, it prevents the emergence of glo-
bally powerful market actors, be it individual producers or cartels (like 
OPEC in the case of oil). On the other hand, it significantly increases the 
market power of regionally dominant market actors, such as Russia in 
Eurasia. Regional markets dominated by long-term contracts may also 
be more protected from price volatility, especially if the prices of gas 
are decoupled from those of oil, which has been a long-term trend and 
expectation (Stern,  2009 ; Stevens,  2010 ). 




 Globally traded fuels 
Global R/P ratio  Projected demand 
growth  2008 –2035* 
 Share of international trade 
in global production in  2009 
Number of people (billions) in countries with 
import dependencies over 25/50/75%
Diversity of global 
producers by region, SWDI
Oil 30 yr. 15% 66% 5.3/3.6/3.1 1.63
Gas 80 yr. 44% 29% 2.2/0.75/0.65 1.84
Coal 150 yr. 19% 14% 1.3/1.1/0.70 1.92
 Other energy sources 
Nuclear Aging of nuclear power plants; sensitivity to 
political interventions
Concentration of enriched uranium and reactor 
manufacturing technologies; nuclear fuel cycle 
controlled for non-proliferation reasons
Generally large facilities; difﬁ cult to substitute in 
case of failure
Hydro Sensitivity to water availability; vulnerability 
to climate change in some regions.
Hydroelectric facilities located on internationally 
shared rivers
In certain cases extremely large facilities providing 
majority of electricity of certain countries
NRES High initial costs; intermittency of supply Technological dependencies; potential import 
dependencies for biofuels
Generally assumed to be higher than in the case of 
traditional sources due to distributed generation 
and more diverse energy mix
 Source: see main text; *– New Policies Scenario (IEA, 2010a). 
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 Thus, sovereignty concerns related to natural gas are highly region-
specific. They are most prominently highlighted by the recent gas 
disputes between Russia and the Ukraine (in  2006 and  2009 ) which 
led to interruptions in the supply of gas to members of the European 
Union (EU). This interruption most severely affected such countries as 
Slovakia, which is significantly dependent on Russian gas and lacks 
emergency gas stocks to cope with such short-term disruptions of 
supply. In another similar case, the Georgian gas supply in 2005/2006 
was struck by a sabotaged Russian gas pipeline, causing severe 
energy shortages during that winter. Subsequently, the EU’s energy 
security debate has become largely framed by the need to diver-
sify the routes and origins of gas imports (as well as to substitute 
gas by other energy sources). The tense political relations between 
some Central and Eastern European countries and Russia played an 
important role in sustaining this debate. Outside Europe such delib-
erate disruptions of gas pipeline deliveries have been rarer, although 
not unknown. 
 Finally, in contrast to oil, which currently lacks readily available substi-
tutes in the transport sector, natural gas can be more easily replaced 
by other sources such as oil, coal, nuclear power, or imported electricity 
(not to mention biogas and other renewable sources). Naturally, such a 
replacement might require substantial infrastructure investment. 
 In summary, the global vulnerabilities of the natural gas supply are 
largely similar to those of oil but with several important distinctions. 
With respect to robustness, it has larger conventional reserves and prob-
ably more optimistic expectations concerning non-conventional reserves, 
although it still remains a limited resource and upstream investment 
requirements are very high. In the case of natural gas, sovereignty con-
cerns are strongly articulated on the regional level, particularly in Eurasia. 
With respect to resilience, the substitutability of natural gas is its major 
advantage, but for many markets the low diversity of origin of imports 
and supply routes presents a potential vulnerability to natural or political 
disruptions. 
 Box 5.5 |  Shale Gas Revolution and Energy Security 
 Over the last several years the production of unconventional shale gas in the United States has dramatically increased (from 1% of 
total energy supply in 2000 to some 20% in 2009) and its share of total gas reserves increased by 50%. This has been heralded as the 
“shale gas revolution,” with signiﬁ cant implications for energy security not only in the United States but also in the rest of the world, 
particularly in Western and Central Europe, which may become signiﬁ cantly less dependent on Russian gas imports. 
 At the same time, many uncertainties have been quoted with respect to shale gas developments. Even in the United States, cost 
estimates vary widely, and there are concerns over shorter life and low recovery rates of shale gas ﬁ elds as well as environmental 
impacts of shale gas exploration. More uncertainties are associated with replication of North American success on other continents. 
Obstacles to shale gas development in Europe include different geology, lack of tax breaks, lack of technologies and expertise, more 
sensitive natural and cultural environment, potential opposition of local communities, and different land/natural resource structure than 
in the United States. Despite the potential shale gas revolution, the IEA New Policies Scenario predicts the overall decline in natural gas 
production in Western Europe, with the average rate of –1.5% per year up to 2035. Globally, the share of unconventional gas is predicted 
to increase from the current 12% to 15% in 2030, much of this increase being in North America. 
 In spite of these potentially positive (although less than certain) effects of the shale gas revolution, there may be some negative effects 
as well. So far, increasing shale gas production has resulted in decreasing gas prices and cancellation of investment projects in LNG and 
natural gas infrastructure. If the developments in shale gas do not follow the most optimistic forecasts, there may be a signiﬁ cant lack of 
capacity to meet the global demand. The shale gas revolution has also slowed down the development of spot trading and the emergence 
of a global gas market, leading to a temporary “glut” in LNG production and capacity. Investments in renewable energy alternatives to 
natural gas have also been slowed by this decrease in price. 
 Another concern associated with shale gas may be technological dependency. Chemicals, drilling technologies, and the expertise required 
for shale gas production are primarily available in the United States, where they have been developed over decades of trial and error. 
These will need to be exported, at least in the short term, to enable a similar increase in production in other countries. 
 Source: Stevens,  2010 ; IEA,  2010a . See also  Chapter 7 for the discussion of technical issues related to shale and other unconventional 
natural gas. 
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 National natural gas supply vulnerabilities 
 Significantly fewer countries rely on natural gas than on oil. Fifty-seven 
countries with a population of almost two billion people use gas for 
20% or more of their primary energy supply. Among those, 16 countries 
(with a combined population of over 350 million people) use natural 
gas for more than half of their energy needs. A further 850 million 
people in 21 countries rely on natural gas for between 10% and 20% 
of their energy. Further analysis in this section relates to these 78 coun-
tries (which notably exclude India and China, where the consumption 
of natural gas is still not very high, although it is projected to grow 
rapidly). 
 Most of the countries using natural gas have to rely on imports. Almost 
650 million people live in 32 countries that import over 75% of all their 
gas needs. All of these countries are in Eurasia: most are in Europe, 
Turkey, and the former Soviet Union, but they also include Jordan, 
Singapore, Korea, and Japan. Remarkably, only seven of these highly 
import-dependent countries have LNG facilities. Of those, Korea and 
Japan only import natural gas through LNG facilities, and the remaining 
countries use pipeline imports as well. The remaining 25 highly import-
dependent countries do not have LNG re-gasification terminals and rely 
exclusively on pipelines for gas imports. Eleven of those countries are 
landlocked and thus have no prospects of benefiting from LNG trade 
(Coutsoukis,  2008 ). At the same time, global LNG markets are rapidly 
expanding (IGU,  2010 ). 
 There are 35 countries, with a combined population of over 750 mil-
lion people, which import more than 50% of their gas needs, while the 
number of people living in countries which import over 25% of their gas 
needs is almost 2.2 billion. 
 Among the countries that import less than 50% of their natural gas 
needs, including those relying on domestic reserves (such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Bangladesh, Mexico, Thailand, Brazil, and 
Argentina), 12 (780 million people) have a domestic reserves/supply 
ratio under 16 years, which signals the likely increase in import depend-
ency in the near future. 
 Thus, over 1.5 billion people live in countries that are either seriously 
dependent on imported natural gas or are likely to experience such 
dependency soon. In addition, the majority of the 37 countries (with 
over 2.5 billion people) relying on natural gas for more than 10% of 
their supply experienced a growth rate of over 6% per year over the 
last decade, which is likely to put further pressures on their natural 
gas supply. 
 Global coal supply vulnerabilities 
 Coal is the world’s fastest growing fossil fuel energy source, currently 
providing about one-third of the global primary energy supply. Similarly 
to oil and gas, coal is a non-renewable fuel that is traded on the global 
market. However, coal is different than oil and gas in several important 
aspects, which affect the vulnerability of coal supplies. 
 First of all, the worldwide reserves of coal are larger than those of con-
ventional oil and gas, although they are subject to large uncertainties, 
as explained in detail in  Chapter 7 . The global R/P ratio of coal var-
ies between different organizations and years in which estimates are 
provided but is generally believed to exceed 130 years. 7 Global coal 
production is expected to increase by some 14%, growing on average at 
0.6% per year until 2035 in the WEO’s New Policies Scenario. All of this 
growth is projected to come from non-OECD countries, with over 90% 
concentrated in China, India, and Indonesia (IEA,  2010a ). 
 Global coal reserves are not as geographically concentrated as those 
of oil and natural gas. The United States, China, India, and the former 
Soviet Union together account for some 80% of global hard core reserves. 
Southern Africa and Australia account for 13% of the remaining 17% 
of reserves, with the remainder being split among the rest of the world. 
However, the existing coal reserves and production capacities are largely 
located in the same countries that consume or are expected to consume 
the majority of coal. For example, the WEO projects that China will account 
for half of global coal production in 2035 but will also consume all of this 
coal, being the largest world consumer and producer at the same time 
(IEA,  2010a ). International trade in coal was only 16% of its total con-
sumption in 2009 (compared to 66% of oil and 29% of natural gas). It 
may nevertheless increase in both the short and medium term. The main 
driver of this increase will be consumption and production of coal in China. 
In 2009, China’s imports of coal tripled, but their growth in the future will 
be determined by the competitiveness of imported coal against the coal 
domestically produced and transported from China’s western provinces. 
In the WEO’s projections the share of globally traded coal will remain at 
approximately today’s 16% of global demand, whereas the absolute vol-
ume of trade may grow some 15%. In this scenario the largest exporters 
will be Australia and Indonesia, and the largest importer, India. 
 The geographic distribution of coal reserves means that supplies of coal 
are less likely to be disrupted for such “geopolitical” reasons that are much 
feared in the cases of oil and gas. However, coal production may be slowed 
down because of its severe environmental and health costs. (Coal has the 
highest greenhouse gas emission factor of all fuels and also contributes 
significantly to local air pollution). Global climate change policies may 
also affect coal affordability (if carbon capture and storage becomes a 
requirement). If coal becomes a globally traded commodity, fluctuations of 
domestic currencies and a host of other factors can also affect its price. 
 As with other fuels, domestic availability of coal does not automati-
cally mean that it is easily accessible to consumers. A case in point is 
China, whose reserves are mainly found in its western provinces, while 
consumption is concentrated on its east coast. Given China’s rapidly ris-
ing consumption levels, its transport infrastructure faces heavy capacity 
challenges (see  Box 5.6 ). 
 7  The BP  Statistical Review of World Energy 2007 gives a coal R/P ratio as 133 years 
at the end of 2007 (BP,  2007 ). The  World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA,  2010a ) notes a 
1:150 R/P ratio. 
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number of countries even if the current levels of consumption do not 
notably grow. 
 5.2.2.2  Nuclear Power 
 Global nuclear energy supply vulnerabilities 
 Whereas the energy security concerns related to fossil fuels are prima-
rily related to the supply and demand of resources, in case of nuclear 
power the primary concerns relate to nuclear energy infrastructure and 
technologies. Unlike fossil fuels, the fuel of nuclear energy (uranium) has 
a fairly high security of supply, offers protection from fuel price fluctua-
tions, and is possible to stockpile. In comparison to oil and gas, uranium 
is abundant and more geographically distributed, with a third of proven 
reserves in OECD countries (NEA,  2008 ). Recent estimates indicate that 
even in the face of a large expansion of nuclear energy, proven uranium 
reserves would last at least a century (Macfarlane and Miller,  2007 ; 
NEA,  2008 ). 8 Furthermore, electricity produced from nuclear energy 
offers a greater protection from fluctuations in raw commodity prices; 
while doubling uranium prices leads to a 5–10% increase in generat-
ing cost for nuclear power, doubling the cost of coal and gas leads to 
a 35–45% and 70–80% increase, respectively (IAEA,  2008 ). Uranium is 
also a relatively easy fuel to stockpile. The refueling of a nuclear power 
plant generally provides fuel for two to three years of operation (Nelson 
and Sprecher,  2008 ), and it is possible to store up to a 10-year supply of 
 Box 5.6 |  Coal Use in China 
 China relies heavily on coal as a primary fuel for industrial use and electricity generation. Coal combustion provided 65% of national 
electricity in 1985 but ballooned to more than 80% in 2006 (though it shrank to 71% in 2008). From 2002 to 2007, demand for electricity 
in China grew by about 12%, and more than 70,000 MW of capacity were brought online to meet it. A majority of this capacity was 
coal-ﬁ red, and China is currently constructing the equivalent of two 500 MW coal-ﬁ red plants per week, or a capacity comparable to the 
entire power grid in the United Kingdom every year. During this time, every week to 10 days over the course of ﬁ ve years, a coal-ﬁ red 
power plant opens somewhere in China big enough to serve all of the households in Dallas or San Diego. More than half of China’s total 
coal use is in the non-electricity sector. Coal provides 60% of Chinese chemical feed-stocks, 55% of industrial fuel, and about 45% of 
China’s national railway capacity is devoted to the transport of coal. Coal is, therefore, China’s most abundant and widely used fuel, and 
China is the world’s largest coal producer (mining about 2.3 billion tons per year compared to just 1.1 billion tons in the United States). 
Put another way, coal production and consumption account for more than 65% of China’s total energy supply and use. China already 
uses more coal than the European Union, Japan, and the United States combined. 
 In 2009, coal imports of China tripled, and for the ﬁ rst time it became a net coal importer. This import dependency may be reversed if coal 
production capacities of remote western provinces are utilized. For example, the province of Xinjiang holds about 40% of China’s total 
coal resources. According to the expectations of its regional government reported by the IEA ( 2010a ), the planned upgrade of the railway 
line linking Xinjiang to the east coast may help to increase coal production there by more than 10-fold so that its share of global coal 
production will be double the share of current oil production of the world’s biggest oil ﬁ eld, Ghawar in Saudi Arabia. 
 Source: IEA,  2010a ; Sovacool and Khuong,  2011 . 
 8  Chapter 7 contains a more extensive discussion of uranium resource availability. 
 National coal supply vulnerabilities 
 At present, 4.2 billion people live in 45 countries where coal represents 
more than 10% of the primary energy supply. About 3.4 billion peo-
ple live in 28 countries (including China, India, Japan, and the United 
States) where coal represents more than 20% of the total primary 
energy supply. About 1.4 billion people live in seven countries (includ-
ing China) where coal accounts for more than one-half of the total 
primary energy supply. In Mongolia, South Africa, and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, more than 70% of the primary energy sup-
ply is derived from coal. 
 Only seven of these 28 countries (approximately 300 million people) 
import more than 80% of the coal they consume. These include Japan, 
which imports 100% of its coal. Some of these countries (e.g., Morocco, 
Slovakia, and the Republic of Korea) may be considered especially vul-
nerable, as either their coal consumption has been growing at over 5% 
per year or their economies have very high coal intensities. Despite its 
rapidly growing coal extraction, India is a net coal importer and is pro-
jected to increase its imports of coal more than five-fold between 2008 
and 2035 (IEA,  2010a ). 
 Most of the countries that significantly rely on domestic coal (net 
exporters and those that import less than 50% of their consump-
tion) have a domestic resource/consumption ratio of over 30 years. 
The only exception is Vietnam, for which this ratio is 8.5 years. This 
makes the situation for coal very different than that for oil and gas, 
where import dependency is likely to significantly increase in a large 
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nuclear fuel (IAEA,  2007b ). In contrast, oil and gas emergency reserves, 
where they exist, are measured in days, weeks, or – in exceptional 
cases – months, not years. 
 At the same time, there are significant energy security risks associ-
ated with technological, economic, and institutional characteristics of 
nuclear power production. As the most capital-intensive electricity-
generation technology, it is economically difficult for nuclear energy 
to compete in liberalized markets where the investor has to assume 
the financial risk of investment. As a result, strong government back-
ing is necessary for the development of nuclear power (Finon and 
Roques,  2008 ). Such political backing depends on the public support 
of nuclear power, which has been very uneven. In particular, public 
opinion is swayed by nuclear accidents such as the ones at Three Mile 
Island in the United States in 1979, Chernobyl in the USSR in 1986, and 
Fukushima in Japan in 2011. Each such change of public opinion and 
the resulting change in the government policy may affect energy secu-
rity both in the short term (e.g., as a result of shutting down nuclear 
power plants immediately affected by the accident 9 and those deemed 
unsafe) and in the longer term (through complicating the investment 
climate). Unlike other energy sources and electricity-generating tech-
nologies, for nuclear energy the risks associated with accidents extend 
beyond the plant level or national level to the entire nuclear power 
plant fleet. Thus, nuclear power globally faces the systemic risk of 
nuclear accidents. 
 Additionally, in most countries nuclear power plants are aging and often 
reaching the end of their licenses. The mean age of nuclear power plants 
worldwide is 26 years (calculated from IAEA,  2010 ). Since the standard 
lifespan of nuclear power plants is 30–40 years, many plants are near-
ing the end of their planned operational period. The IAEA has recently 
begun efforts to create a dialogue on effective management and safety 
enhancements to extend the lifespan of many of the world’s nuclear 
power reactors (IAEA,  2007a ). The power plants are not the only part of 
the industry that is old; in many countries the industry faces an aging 
workforce and a dearth of young workers to replace retiring nuclear 
engineers and plant operators (Sacchetti,  2008 ). 
 Nuclear power and other thermal plants are also subject to heat waves 
and water shortages. In 2006, France, Spain, and Germany had to shut 
down or scale back electricity production in several of their nuclear 
power plants due to low water levels. With growing concerns over water 
availability due to increasing pressure from uses and climate change, 
thermal power plants could face problems involving water supply more 
frequently. In addition to these robustness concerns, there are also 
sovereignty issues associated with nuclear power since capacities for 
fuel enrichment and nuclear reactor construction are concentrated in 
relatively few countries. Only six countries currently possess large-scale 
enrichment plants, and seven countries possess small-scale enrichment 
facilities (see  Figure 5.5 ). 10 The fact that several countries (including 
Australia, Brazil, and South Africa) are considering constructing enrich-
ment facilities indicates that even though countries can relatively easily 
stockpile nuclear fuel, national governments may feel too vulnerable 
if they rely solely on foreign suppliers. In addition to the concentra-
tion of nuclear fuel enrichment, construction capacity for new nuclear 
power plants is concentrated in just 12 companies in eight countries 
(see  Figure 5.5 ). The number of countries holding the ability to forge the 
bottleneck component of large LWR pressure vessels is currently even 
more restricted. 
 National nuclear energy supply vulnerabilities 
 Currently, 29 countries with a total population of 4.4 billion people 
operate nuclear reactors. Nuclear power is located in middle- and high-
income countries that are almost all relatively stable (see  Figure 5.5 ). 
Nuclear energy comprises more than 10% of the electricity supply in 
21 countries with a population of 1.3 billion people. Of these, only 200 
million people live in 13 countries that rely on nuclear energy for at least 
30% of their electricity generation, and about 80 million people live in 
three countries that rely on nuclear energy for more than 50% of their 
electricity production. 
 The most pressing energy security concerns for nuclear power in most 
countries are robustness concerns related to the age and obsolescence 
of their nuclear power programs combined with a lack of recent invest-
ment. Twenty-one out of the 29 countries with nuclear power (with a 
combined population of 1.3 billion people) have not started construct-
ing a new nuclear power plant in the last 20 years. Without new nuclear 
power plants, the nuclear industry in these countries lacks the vitality 
of recent activity. This can, in turn, lead to a lack of dynamic capacity 
needs of the industry, from both a human resources and a manufactur-
ing perspective. 
 There is also clear evidence that many of the countries with stagnating 
nuclear power programs face imminent human resources shortages. A 
nuclear industry institute in the United States reports that in the next 
five years as much as 35% of the nuclear workforce may reach retire-
ment (NEI,  2010 ). The United Kingdom and Germany also face a dearth 
of young qualified workers: over 75% of nuclear employers in the United 
Kingdom report that they have trouble filling scientific and engineering 
positions, and in Germany in many recent years not a single person has 
graduated in a nuclear discipline (Sacchetti,  2008 ). 
 Nineteen of the 29 countries that use nuclear energy (with a combined 
population of 1.4 billion) have nuclear power plants with an average 
age greater than 25 years (see  Table 5.7 ). While countries can extend 
the operating licenses of their existing nuclear power plants, this raises 
 9  For example, in the immediate aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake in Japan, 
10.5 GW of nuclear power capacity was shut down (Nakano,  2011 ). 
 10  There are conventional security concerns linked with uranium enrichment due to the link 
between civilian enrichment capabilities and nuclear weapons. This topic is beyond the 
scope of this chapter but is discussed in detail in  Chapter 14 (Nuclear Energy). 
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safety concerns, especially in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear acci-
dent, which occurred at an older power plant. In Vermont, in the United 
States, the state legislature recently voted down extending the license 
of its nuclear power plant, which currently meets 73% of electricity 
demand, due to safety concerns over the 28-year-old plant. 
 Countries with aging plants will face the decision of whether to invest 
the required resources to jump-start a stale industry or redirect resources 
to fill the gap that aging nuclear power plants will open up. Such coun-
tries as the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa have 
recently expressed interest in restarting their nuclear power programs. 
However, the ability of these plans to get off the ground remains to be 
seen. This fact, combined with the lack of recent construction experience 
in all but eight countries ( Table 5.7 ), indicates that nuclear power faces 
significant robustness challenges in almost three-quarters of the coun-
tries with nuclear power. 
 Due to safety concerns regarding the obsolescence of the operating 
technology, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia were forced to close 
their early Soviet-designed plants as a precondition for accession to 
the EU. Since the Chernobyl-style nuclear power plant in Lithuania, 
the most recent EU Member State to close its nuclear reactor (at the 
end of  2009 ), met about 70% of its electricity demand, the govern-
ment has had to seriously reconsider its energy strategy. The only 
 Figure 5.5 |  Nuclear power worldwide. The ﬁ gure shows the concentration of nuclear power and related capacities in a few industrialized countries in the Northern Hemisphere. 
It also indicates the aspirations of a large number of new countries, predominately in the developing world to deploy nuclear energy. Source: NEA,  2008 ; IAEA,  2011 ; Jewell, 
 2011 ; World Nuclear Association,  2011a ; b; c. 
 Table 5.7 |  The average age of nuclear power plants and the date of the start of the most recent construction. 
 Start of the most recent construction (years prior to 2010) 
 Average age of NPPs (from the time of completion), years 
Less than 22 22 or more
 Less than 25 China, Brazil, India, Rep. of Korea Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Slovakia, Romania, Mexico
 More than 25 Russia, Japan, France, Pakistan, 
Finland
UK, USA, Canada, Germany, Argentina, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, 
Hungary, South Africa, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Armenia
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remaining countries that operate Chernobyl-type reactors are Armenia 
and Russia. Although not an EU candidate country, Armenia has come 
under significant pressure from both the EU and neighboring Turkey 
to shut down its nuclear power plant. However, as the nuclear power 
plant currently meets almost 40% of its electricity generation, there 
is resistance. 
 In addition to the 29 countries currently operating nuclear power, an 
additional 52 countries, often citing growing energy security concerns 
and electricity demand, have expressed interest in starting a national 
nuclear power program (Rogner,  2009 ). While nuclear energy can affect 
energy security in both types of countries, in so-called “newcomer 
countries” the energy security risks pertain to the  potential of and  cap-
acity for nuclear energy rather than risks to current generating capacity 
(Jewell, 2011). These newcomer countries will be discussed in  Section 
5.3.2 , which explores the future of energy security. 
 5.2.2.3  Hydroelectric Power 
 Global hydropower supply vulnerabilities 
 Although hydropower is a renewable resource and hydroelectricity is 
not associated with massive global trade, as in the case of fossil and 
nuclear fuels, there are still related energy security concerns from the 
robustness, sovereignty, and resilience perspectives. 
 With respect to robustness, hydropower is vulnerable to seasonal and 
annual variability in hydrological regimes, as well as local weather con-
ditions, temperature, and precipitation in the catchment area. These fac-
tors affect not only the availability of water for hydropower production, 
but also the amount of pressure on water resources in a region from 
competing uses. 
 The pressures on hydrological resources are likely to be exacerbated 
by climate change and shifting hydrological patterns. According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Bates et al.,  2008 ), 
climate change is likely to alter river discharge, and thus water avail-
ability, for hydropower generation, although the exact extent of these 
effects is difficult to forecast. Furthermore, intensified glacial melt-
ing, while it initially has a positive impact on hydropower production, 
will eventually lead to reduced water flows and could seriously affect 
regions with glacier-fed rivers used for power production. 11 Additionally, 
an increase in the frequency of extreme weather events (both floods 
and droughts), which is predicted by the IPCC to accompany climate 
change (Bates et al.,  2008 ), could alter the temporal availability of 
hydropower resources and place a greater stress on hydroelectric dam 
infrastructure. 
 In addition, changes in the available discharge of a river might have 
a direct influence on the economic and financial viability of a hydro-
power project, since hydropower plants have a life of more than 50 
years. Even if a significant part of the changes takes place in the dis-
tant future, the impacts are inevitable. For instance, in North America, 
potential reductions in the outflow of the Great Lakes could result in 
significant economic losses as a result of reduced hydropower gen-
eration both at Niagara and on the St. Lawrence River. For a Coupled 
Global Climate Model (CGCM1) projection with 2°C global warming, 
Ontario’s Niagara and St. Lawrence hydropower generation would 
decline by 25–35%, resulting in annual losses of C$240–350 million 
at 2002 prices (Buttle et al.,  2004 ). 
 Changing hydrology, but also possible extreme events such as floods and 
droughts (which are expected to increase as a result of climate change), 
pose sediment risks. More sediment, along with other factors such as a 
changed composition of water, could raise the probability that a hydro-
power project suffers greater exposure to turbine erosion. When a major 
destruction actually occurs, the cost of recovery will be enormous. An 
unexpected amount of sediment will also lower turbine and generator 
efficiency, resulting in a decline in energy generated (Iimi,  2007 ). 
 In addition to these relatively gradual pressures that hydropower faces, 
there is the risk of sudden failure either from terrorism, faulty construc-
tion, or aging infrastructure. A report by the American Society of Civil 
Engineers (2009) recently highlighted the risk of dam failure as hydro-
power dams age. 
 From the sovereignty perspective, energy security risks associated with 
hydroelectricity primarily arise in situations where multiple countries share 
rivers feeding hydropower dams. In such cases, competing uses on differ-
ent sides of a national border can be exacerbated by the fact that upstream 
countries can significantly affect the quantity and quality of hydrological 
resources that a downstream country receives. For example, China’s plans 
to build a series of dams on the Mekong has raised significant concerns 
downstream in Vietnam, where scientists worry that the planned dams 
would significantly accelerate the disappearance of the Mekong Delta, 
thus decimating fisheries and livelihoods of locals in the region. Another 
example of water scarcity and conflicting uses of water between sectors 
is manifested in the ongoing tension in Central Asia, where downstream 
countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) prefer to use 
water for irrigation in summer, while upstream countries (Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan) need it for generating hydroelectricity in winter. 
 Finally, from the resilience perspective, energy security of hydropower 
may be considered to be under threat where a nation’s electricity is 
supplied from just one or a few major hydroelectric facilities and thus is 
vulnerable to failures of these facilities. 
 National and regional hydropower supply vulnerabilities 
 Hydropower accounts for at least 20% of electricity generation in 58 
countries with a combined population of 1.5 billion people and for at 
 11  Rain rather than snow in the winter will lead to less snow pack acting as a reservoir 
for the spring and summer months, leading to summer shortages. Higher tempera-
tures can lead to more evaporation and less generation. Higher summer tempera-
tures lead not only to water scarcity but also to higher electricity demand for air 
conditioning. This puts an additional pressure on electricity generation. 
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least 10% of electricity generation in 74 countries with a combined pop-
ulation of 4.6 billion people. About 800 million people live 35 countries 
that derive over half of their electricity from hydropower. The risks to 
hydroelectric production are highly contextualized and subject to local 
factors. This brief assessment considers the regional vulnerability of 
hydropower to climate change and the diversity of hydropower facilities 
in a particular country. 
 The IPCC’s projections (Bates et al.,  2008 ) for the impact of climate 
change on hydropower are available for the following regions: 
 In Europe , the IPCC’s estimates state that the total European hydro-
power potential is projected to decrease by 7–12% by 2070s. The high-
est decreases of 20–50% are expected in Portugal, Spain, Ukraine, and 
Bulgaria. Some countries in Southern Europe are already vulnerable 
to water shortages. Albania, where 92% of power comes from hydro 
resources, has experienced severe shortages of power for a few con-
secutive summers. At the same time, in some parts of Europe, such as 
Scandinavia and northern Russia, the electricity production potential of 
hydropower plants is expected to increase by 15–30% by the end of 
the century. 
 In Africa , where little of the continent’s hydropower potential has been 
developed, climate change simulations for the Batoka Gorge hydroelec-
tric scheme on the Zambezi River projected a significant reduction in 
river flows and declining power production (a decrease in mean monthly 
production from 780 GWh to 613 GWh). 
 In Asia , changes in runoff could have a significant effect on the power 
output of hydropower-generating countries such as Tajikistan, which pre-
dominately relies on hydropower for its electricity needs and is among 
the larger hydroelectricity producers in the world. Climate change will 
also result in an increase in the frequency and duration of extreme cli-
mate events, i.e., floods and droughts. For instance, a hydrological model 
indicates a great risk of substantial increases in (mean) peak discharges 
in the three major rivers in Bangladesh: the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and 
Meghna (Iimi,  2007 ). 
 In Latin America , where hydropower is one of the main electrical 
energy sources, expected further glacier retreat is projected to nega-
tively impact the generation of hydroelectricity over the long term in 
countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru (Bates et al.,  2008 ). The 
consequences of droughts and increased energy demand caused a vir-
tual breakdown of hydroelectricity in most of Brazil in 2001, which 
contributed to a GDP reduction of 1.5% (Kane,  2002 ). More recently, 
because of a shift in precipitation patterns due to El Ni ñ o, Venezuela 
experienced a water (and hydroelectricity production) shortage. 
President Chavez ordered a 20% reduction in electricity consumption 
in December  2009 (Cancel,  2009 ). 
 In 10 countries (with 100 million people), hydropower is derived from 
one dam; another 11 countries (with 290 million people) rely on one 
major dam and one to three significantly smaller dams (with a com-
bined capacity less than half the size of the main dam). In another 10 
countries, 330 million people rely on two major dams and one to four 
significantly smaller dams. Ten countries with 560 million people rely 
on at least three main dams for electricity supply, and 16 countries 
with 260 million people have four or more dams. 
 5.2.2.4  Traditional Biomass 
 There are several difficulties in assessing the vulnerabilities of bio-
mass supply. First, biomass comes in a variety of very different forms 
ranging from dung, firewood, and charcoal to biodiesel, ethanol, palm 
oil, and specially grown plant species. Secondly, the flows of “trad-
itional” biomass (which is not commercially produced, processed, 
and distributed) are often difficult to estimate. The available statistics 
often do not distinguish between “modern” and “traditional”  solid 
biomass, especially when “modern” is used in a decentralized fash-
ion. Yet different types of biomass are associated with different risks 
and vulnerabilities. We discuss traditional biomass in this subsection 
and further deal with modern  liquid biomass (i.e., biofuels) in the next 
subsection. 
 Traditional biomass is primarily used for heating and cooking in resi-
dential buildings. It is estimated that 2.5 billion people rely on such 
energy in their daily lives. Over half of these people live in India, China, 
and Indonesia. In some countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, these 
sources account for 90% of total household energy use. The main threats 
to traditional biomass availability are resource scarcity resulting from 
the growing demand (population growth, migration and other demo-
graphics, growth in consumption) and depletion of resources (change 
of land use, climate change). Though demand for wood-fuel is unlikely 
to deplete or remove forest cover on a large scale (Arnold et al.,  2006 ), 
localized wood-fuel scarcities may indeed be projected to occur in parts 
of Southeast Asia and Africa. 
 Access to traditional energy resources may be further restricted for 
political or economic reasons. In many countries large portions of 
forest areas are controlled by the government, and access and use 
of firewood might therefore be limited. For example, in India in the 
mid-1990s about 55% of household needs for firewood were col-
lected for free from common pool resources (CPRs). The share of 
CPRs has been shrinking at a five-yearly rate of 1.9%; coupled with 
decreased productivity of what remains, this has seriously restricted 
the CPRs’ ability to meet the growing demand (Chopra and Dasgupta, 
 2000 ). Formal and informal privatization of land holdings in Africa 
have similarly reduced the areas available as CPRs, leading to local 
scarcity and shortages of firewood (Arnold et al.,  2006 ). Seasonal 
variability is also an important factor that might undermine the avail-
ability of resources: bio-waste is abundant in the time of harvest; 
without appropriate storage capacity it is difficult to sustain the sup-
ply through the year. 
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 Traditional biomass energy systems are typically inefficient, unreliable, 
and unsafe, with high environmental, social, and health externalities. 
They often fail to provide the level of services associated with mod-
ern energy systems (e.g., adequate heating in winter) and may not be 
equally available to vulnerable groups (elderly, disabled, landless, etc.). 
Therefore, residential energy sectors relying on traditional biomass are 
in most cases considered inadequate and need to be replaced by mod-
ern systems. We return to this issue in  Section 5.3.3 . 
 5.2.2.5  New Renewable Energy Sources 
 New renewable energy sources (NRES) include “modern” biomass (in 
solid, liquid, and gaseous forms), wind, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, 
geothermal, tide, waves, and ocean current energy. NRES can provide 
most of the nationally vital energy services by generating electricity or 
heat, or providing liquid fuels for transportation. Despite being labeled 
together as “renewables,” these are very different energy sources poten-
tially associated with distinct energy security concerns. At present, these 
sources significantly contribute to energy supply in only a small number 
of countries, so there is much less empirical evidence on the nature and 
scale of their potential disruptions than for traditional energy sources 
summarized in the previous sections. Therefore, the discussion in this 
section is limited to general considerations and a brief overview of 
available quantitative data. 
 The main robustness concern related to fossil fuels – finite resources – is 
not applicable to NRES. Instead, the main concerns about the robustness 
of NRES are costs, intermittency, and sufficient availability in locations 
where they are needed. With respect to costs, vulnerabilities of NRES 
are different from vulnerabilities of fossil fuels because the running 
(fuel) costs account for a much smaller share in the total cost of energy 
(except solid and liquid biomass). This means that, although NRES are 
less vulnerable to price fluctuations, they may be more expensive in 
terms of total lifetime costs per unit of energy. Intermittency of NRES 
(with the exception of biomass and geothermal) is another concern: it 
is connected with daily, seasonal, or other variations in natural factors 
(sun, wind, tides). The impacts of intermittency can be reduced if NRES 
sources are integrated in larger networks where energy generated in 
one part of the system can compensate for the shortage of energy in 
another part. Developing technological solutions concerning electricity 
and heat storage may be another answer to the challenge of inter-
mittency. More details on these solutions are provided in  Chapter 11 
(Renewable Energy). 
 Sovereignty concerns are in general less pronounced in the case of 
NRES. This is because most NRES are found locally and do not need 
to be imported as other fuels. The exception is liquid biofuels, which 
are already traded on a global scale, with Brazil and the United States 
accounting for over 90% of world production in 2007 (Balat and Balat, 
 2009 ). At the same time, most NRES require cutting-edge technologies 
that are not readily available for the majority of countries. There are 
signals that dependencies in renewable energy technologies may be 
perceived as energy security concerns by some countries (Burnett and 
Dwyer,  2011 ). 
 NRES also seem to be associated with better resilience than mainstream 
energy sources. This is because energy systems based on renewables are 
typically more diverse with respect to energy sources and more distrib-
uted in space. It has been argued (Lovins and Lovins,  1982 ) that such 
diversity means better protection from human or natural disruptions. 
Farrell et al. ( 2004 ) partially confirm this conclusion, but indicate that 
much more research needs to be done concerning the resilience of dis-
tributed energy generation. 
 Thus, NRES are widely perceived as providing better energy security, 
particularly from the sovereignty and resilience perspectives. That is why 
promotion of NRES figures prominently in almost all national energy 
security strategies. Although the number of countries where NRES com-
prise a significant share in energy supply remains small, some of these 
(notably the United States, Germany, Spain and China) have witnessed 
significant growth in NRES in recent years. Detailed information on the 
growth in the use of renewable energy resources in the world is pro-
vided in GEA  Chapter 11 . 
 In the residential sector, modern biomass (including waste residues) 
comprises over 10% of energy use in such high-income countries as 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, France, Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Greece. Biofuels are used for transport in Brazil (15.4% of the overall 
transport energy use), Germany (7.2%), Cuba (6.3%), France (3.2%), 
and the United States (2.3%), as well as in insignificant amounts in 
smaller countries (IEA,  2010b ). 
 As this discussion shows, energy security concerns associated with NRES 
are difficult to quantify empirically because the share of NRES in the total 
energy supply remains limited in the majority of countries. If large shares 
of renewables were to be used around the world, it might change the 
energy security landscape considerably and new energy security threats 
might emerge (e.g., demand for water and arable land). For example, it 
may turn out that trade in biofuels will acquire many characteristics of 
the current global oil market, which, as we argued, has many vulner-
abilities. Answering these concerns about the security of future energy 
systems where NRES play a large role is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Instead, they are systematically addressed in  Chapter 17 , which analyses 
energy security implications of major energy transformations. 
 5.2.2.6  Overall Energy Supply Security 
 The sectoral energy security analysis presented in the previous sec-
tions makes the most sense for identifying vulnerabilities to relatively 
minor disruptions unfolding in the short or medium term, when the 
elements and connections within energy systems remain largely fixed. 
Under such conditions we can make certain assumptions concerning the 
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propagation of risks and vulnerabilities. For example, we assume that 
if the supply of petroleum products is disrupted, the transport system 
will be affected. However, over a longer term or under much stronger 
shocks, the energy system may become reconfigured. Liquid fuels may 
be produced from coal or biomass, or electrically-driven trains may take 
more cargo and passengers. System-wide, cross-sectoral indicators may 
reflect the more general vulnerabilities of national energy systems to 
systemic shocks and long-term threats. 
 We use both supply and demand indicators of cross-sectoral vulner-
abilities of energy systems. On the supply side, we consider the overall 
import dependency, the diversity of primary energy sources, and the cost 
of imported fuels as a proportion of GDP or export earnings. On the 
demand side, we consider the total energy intensity, the overall rate of 
demand growth, and energy use per capita. 
 With regard to the supply side, 46 countries (700 million people) have a 
total energy import dependency higher than 50%. Fifty-eight countries 
(one billion people) have a low diversity (one or two dominant sources) 
of primary energy supply. For 15 countries (200 million people), the cost 
of imported fuels is higher than 10% of GDP, and for 35 countries (2.5 
billion people), the cost of energy imports exceeds export earnings by 
20% or more. In total, there are 102 countries (3.8 billion people) that 
are vulnerable in at least one of the abovementioned aspects. 
 In relation to the demand side, in 24 countries with 400 million people 
energy use per capita intensity exceeds the world average by more than 
50%. In 18 countries (1.8 billion people), including China, the average 
annual growth in energy use has been higher than 6% over the last dec-
ade. There are 55 predominately low- and lower middle-income coun-
tries (three billion people) with energy use per capita of 30 GJ/year or 
lower. Such levels of energy use – at least three times less than even in 
the least energy-intensive developed countries such as Israel, Italy, or 
Japan – are likely to signal pressures on energy systems to rapidly and 
radically increase production to meet the future demand. There are 76 
countries (4.7 billion people), primarily low- or lower middle-income, 
subject to at least one demand-side vulnerability mentioned above. 
 Cross-sectoral demand- and supply-side vulnerabilities overlap in 63 
countries with 2.8 billion people, of which 47 are either low- or lower 
middle-income countries. Additionally, three billion people live in 52 
countries that have either cross-sectoral demand or cross-sectoral sup-
ply vulnerabilities. Only 19 countries with 600 million people can be 
considered free from overall energy supply vulnerabilities. 
 5.2.3  Security of Electricity Systems 
 5.2.3.1  General Considerations 
 Due to the large and growing importance of electricity systems, the 
risks of their potential disruption are increasingly prominent on energy 
security agendas. The importance of secure delivery of electricity is 
growing in every country due to:
 the increasing dependency on electricity (for example, in the infor- •
mation and communications technology [ICT] sectors, and eventu-
ally in the transportation sector) of modern economies; 
 the expansion in the coverage of electricity grids in developing  •
nations; 
 the increasing “electrification” of energy services in emerging econ- •
omies where the entry into the middle class is often signaled with 
the arrival of domestic electrical appliances; and 
 the advance of “new” energy systems relying on distributed genera- •
tion, renewable energy sources, and possibly electric propulsion for 
vehicles. 
 In contrast to other energy carriers, electricity cannot at present be 
stored cheaply and easily and should in many critical cases be supplied 
without any interruption, closely matching the changing demand. This 
makes electricity systems vulnerable even to short-term disruptions 
and imposes particularly stringent requirements on electricity gener-
ation, conversion, and transmission. The vulnerability of electricity sys-
tems can be considered from robustness, sovereignty, and resilience 
perspectives. 
 In this analysis we use four indicators to estimate the robustness of elec-
tricity systems. Two of them relate to the supply side: the age of electric 
power plants and the frequency of blackouts. The two others relate to 
the demand side: the rate of access to electricity and the growth in 
demand for electricity. Rapid demand growth increases the pressure on 
existing electricity systems and stimulates countries to seek new sources 
of energy. 12 Another demand-side vulnerability is the inadequate provi-
sion of electricity, reflected in a low rate of access to electricity. The low 
access rate is untenable for most governments, and therefore results in 
pressures on the energy system to expand. Thus, all else being equal, 
a country with low access or higher growth will be less secure, as it 
will need to expand rather than merely maintain its electricity supply 
at the present level. Our analysis also considered the third demand-side 
vulnerability factor: the electricity intensity of the economy. In principle, 
more electricity-intensive economies should be more sensitive to energy 
price fluctuations and other disruptions of electricity systems. However, 
electricity intensity was not found to be a sufficiently discriminating fac-
tor in the final analysis. 
 The sovereignty perspective on the security of electricity systems is 
reflected in the reliance on imported fossil fuels for electricity generation 
and on imports of electricity. Finally, a proxy indicator for the resilience 
 12  Jewell ( 2011 ) demonstrates that the rapid growth in electricity demand has cor-
related with countries launching nuclear energy programs. 
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of national electricity systems used in this analysis is the diversity of 
fuels used for electricity generation. 
 In many industrialized countries, electricity subsystems are undergoing 
transformations. These include distributed decentralized generation, “smart 
grids,” and possibly an increasing role of international interconnectedness 
and electricity imports. Energy security factors associated with these new 
developments will play increasingly important roles in the security of elec-
tricity generation, distribution, and transmission in the future. For exam-
ple, it is often argued that distributed generation of electricity will result 
in higher reliability and resilience of energy provision (Lovins and Lovins, 
 1982 ). At the same time, the empirical evidence that distributed systems 
are more robust than centralized ones seems to be inconclusive (Farrell 
et al.,  2004 ). Key technological and institutional developments that may 
affect the reliability of electricity systems are discussed in  Chapter 15 . 
 5.2.3.2  Vulnerability of National Electricity Systems 
 The primary energy security concerns from the perspective of robust-
ness of electricity systems include the aging of power plants, rapid 
growth in demand and/or lack of adequate provision of electricity, and 
the reliability of electricity systems. The aging of power plants is par-
ticularly a problem for industrialized countries with established and 
stagnant fleets. Especially problematic is the aging of nuclear reactors 
because they typically provide large shares of national electricity and 
their replacement with other nuclear reactors may be problematic for 
economic and political reasons (see a more detailed discussion of this 
point, as well as statistics on the aging of nuclear reactors, in the previ-
ous section). Non-nuclear generating facilities are also aging in many 
countries. For example, in the United Kingdom, the aging of power sta-
tions is one of the three major national energy challenges (the other two 
being decarbonization and an increasing reliance on imported natural 
gas – see  Figure 5.6 ). 
 The reliability of electricity infrastructure is addressed in  Box 5.7 . The 
scale of the problem is dramatically higher in low- and middle-income 
countries, although it is high on the political agenda of industrialized 
nations as well because their economies are increasingly sensitive to 
even minor disruptions of electricity supply. 
 There are energy security concerns from the robustness perspective 
related to the demand side of electricity systems. There are 32 countries 
with a total population of some 2.4 billion people that have less than 
60% access to electricity. In 35 countries with some 2.6 billion peo-
ple, the electricity demand has been growing at over 6%. The need to 
increase electricity-generation capacities is especially dramatic in larger 
low-income countries. For example, Ibitoye and Adenikinju ( 2007 ) esti-
mate that under the assumption that Nigeria becomes a middle-income 
economy and meets its Millennium Development Goals by 2030, it will 
need to achieve a 25-fold increase in its electricity-generating capacities 
(from the current 6.5 GW to 164 GW). All in all, 53 countries with some 
4.2 billion people experience either one or both of these demand-side 
vulnerabilities. 
 The importing of fuels for electricity production or the importing of elec-
tricity itself are considered an energy security concern in some coun-
tries. Almost 1.3 billion people live in 62 countries that rely on imported 
energy for more than 25% in their electricity, almost 600 million live 
in 39 countries importing over 50%, and almost 200 million live in 21 
countries that import over 75% of energy for electricity production. Most 
of this energy is imported in the form of fuels for electricity production 
rather than directly as electricity imports. 13 
 From the resilience perspective, the security of electricity systems may 
be measured as the diversity of fuels used for electricity generation. 
The Shannon-Weiner Diversity Index 14 of such fuels is less than 0.2 in 
30 countries, which are home to some 360 million people. This means 
that virtually all of their electricity comes from a single source (often 
hydropower or natural gas-fired power plants). Even the diversity index 
of 0.4 (applicable to some 450 million people in 35 countries) can still 
be considered low. 
 All in all, some 990 million people live in 62 countries where electricity 
systems are vulnerable with respect to supply, because they are either 
significantly (over 40%) based on imported fossil fuels and/or have a 
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 Figure 5.6 |  Projected retirement of electricity-generating capacity in the United 
Kingdom. The ﬁ gure shows the decline in capacity much faster than if the regular 
pace of construction was maintained in recent years (as shown by the dotted line). 
Source: Parsons Brinckerhoff,  2009 . 
 13  There are only 12 relatively small countries (six in Europe and six in sub-Saharan 
Africa) that import more than 25% of the electricity they consume. 
 14  The Shannon-Wiener Diversity Index (SWDI) is a most common measure of diver-
sity of options or categories. It is based on the idea that the greater the variety and 
the more even the spread the greater is the diversity. The index is calculated as: 
SWDI = –  Σ i p i ln p i, where pi represents the share of each category/option in the 
energy mix (Stirling,  1998 ; Jansen et al.,  2004 ). 
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 Box 5.7 |  Reliability of Electricity Supply 
 Challenges for ensuring adequacy and reliability of electricity grids exist for both developed and developing countries. For developing countries, 
extending electricity networks and increasing generating capacity is the main challenge. Even for households connected to electricity grids, 
planned outages due to the lack of generating capacity are not uncommon. At the same time, an increasing number of emerging economies 
and all industrialized countries have sufﬁ cient network coverage and generating capacity. However, precisely because these societies rely 
heavily on permanent access to electricity, any disruptions of the systems are potentially very harmful. The increasing scale, complexity, age, 
and interconnectedness of modern electricity grids present a serious investment and energy security challenge worldwide. 
 Advanced electricity distribution systems are spatially distributed and technically complex. The spatial extent of electricity grids means 
that they face “distributed threats,” which are difﬁ cult to predict and manage. Moreover, the scale and the degree of interconnectedness 
of modern grids mean that even a minor failure can have dramatic consequences throughout the system – the so-called “cascading 
failure.” This is especially plausible when the system operates near its critical load. Paradoxically, some measures to control small-scale 
blackouts may actually increase the probability and severity of large-scale blackouts, since they increase the interconnectedness and thus 
the size of the system that may fail (Dobson et al.,  2007 ). 
 There are no comparative international statistics on the number and intensity of disruptions of electricity supply also known as blackouts. 
However, detailed data that exist on some industrialized countries can be not only interpreted but also compared with analysis of the 
situation in developing countries. 
 Several comprehensive studies analyze blackouts in the United States. The analysis of the US data from 1984– 2006 by Hines et al. ( 2008 ) 
indicates that the frequency of large blackouts was not decreasing with time despite the introduction of advanced data management, 
reliability standards, and many other measures. A particularly catastrophic blackout on August 14, 2003 affected approximately 50 million 
people in the northeastern United States and parts of Canada and resulted in US$3 billion in insurance claims alone. An assessment 
of major electricity blackouts conducted by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers estimates that no less than 17 major 
blackouts have affected more than 195 million residential, commercial, and industrial customers in the United States, with seven of these 
major blackouts occurring in the past 10 years. Sixty-six smaller blackouts (affecting between 50,000 and 600,000 customers) occurred 
from 1991 to 1995, and 76 occurred from 1996 to 2000. The costs of these blackouts are monumental: the US Department of Energy 
(DOE) estimates that power outages and power quality disturbances cost customers as much as US$206 billion annually, or more than 
the entire nation’s electricity bill for 1990 (Hines et al.,  2008 ). 
 According to Hines et al. ( 2008 ), the single most important reason for blackouts in the United States was technical failure (nearly 30% of all 
events), which together with operator failure, volunteer reduction, and weather conditions accounted for over 85% of all blackouts. Intentional 
attacks were responsible for some 1.6% of blackouts. Larger blackouts also resulted from earthquakes and hurricanes or tropical storms. 
 In the report on the reliability of the US electricity system presented to the Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Efﬁ ciency and 
Renewable Energy, Osborn and Kawann ( 2001 ) indicate that reserve capacity margins (for both transmission and generation) have 
been decreasing in most US regions for the past two decades and were projected to decrease until 2020, which may be the single most 
important factor explaining the lack of a downward trend in the number of blackouts in the United States. The decrease in this margin 
can be explained by both increasing demand and falling investment in transmission and electricity grid infrastructure. The report connects 
this fall in investment with institutional and market failures of the electric power system. 
 The frequency and severity of blackouts are reportedly less in Western Europe than in the United States. Nevertheless, severe blackouts in 
September 2003 affected some four million people in southern Sweden and eastern Denmark, and the nationwide blackout in Italy was 
the worst in the history of the nation (Andersson et al.,  2005 ). 
 Despite concerns that electricity blackouts cause in developed countries, their intensity is dramatically less than in the developing world. 
The three largest blackouts in world history occurred in developing nations, including the 2005 Java-Bali blackout in Indonesia, which 
affected 100 millllion people (Donnan,  2005 ), the 1999 South Brazil blackout, which affected 75 million people (Yu and Pollitt,  2009 ), and 
the November  2009 Brazil-Paraguay blackout, which originated in the world’s second largest hydroelectric plant and left tens of millions 
of people in Brazil and the whole of Paraguay without electricity (Reuters,  2009 ). 
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 In 28 countries with over 500 million people, high supply- and demand-
side vulnerabilities overlap. These electricity systems, pressed from both 
sides, can be considered especially insecure. The majority of the world’s 
population (some 4.3 billion in 65 countries) lives in countries that are 
vulnerable in at least one of the supply or demand aspects. Finally, some 
1.6 billion people live in about 38 countries with relatively secure energy 
systems, which rely primarily on diverse domestic resources and have 
high access to electricity and moderate rates of growth in demand. 
 5.2.4  Vulnerability of End-Use Sectors 
 A modern state cannot function without several vital services provided 
by national energy systems. For the purpose of this analysis, we distin-
guish between four such services. The first three are the “end-uses” dis-
cussed in  Chapters 8 ,  9 , and  10 , i.e., energy in (1) transport, (2) industry, 
and (3) buildings. The last energy “service” is (4) revenue from energy 
exports. It is only relevant to a relatively small number of countries 
whose economies rely significantly on such revenues. 
 This subsection evaluates the vulnerabilities of each of the vital energy 
services: transportation, residential and commercial (R&C), industrial, 
and export-revenue generation. Such vulnerabilities are generally 
divided into those associated with the energy service itself (demand-
side vulnerabilities) and those linked to the properties of the energy sys-
tem in which a particular service is embedded, particularly the security 
of relevant energy sources. 
 5.2.4.1  Energy for Transport 
 Transportation is vital for almost every aspect of modern societies, rang-
ing from personal mobility to food production and distribution, trade, 
availability of goods and services, and, not least of all, military security. 
Transport accounts for over 20% of energy use in virtually all developed 
countries. It is still under 15% in many developing countries, including 
China and India (where it is rapidly growing). Only in Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) does transport account for under 10% of their total 
energy use. Modern transport systems rely on motorized vehicles that 
share fuels with agricultural, construction, and other machinery. Thus, 
this discussion of energy security for transportation is also applicable for 
the security of fuels for agricultural production and related sectors. 
 Among all nationally vital energy services, transport is beyond doubt the 
most vulnerable. This vulnerability is primarily a result of the reliance on 
imported oil as transport fuel. The absolute bulk of energy for transport 
is derived from oil and its products. 
 Only nine countries (Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Moldova, Russia, 
Slovakia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) rely on oil for less than 85% of their 
transport energy needs. In all these countries except Brazil, natural gas 
is the main alternative to oil products in transport. Whereas Algeria, 
Argentina, Russia, and Uzbekistan have their own natural gas reserves 
(with the R/S ratio of only 11 years in the case of Argentina), the other 
countries import most of their natural gas. 
 This means that the security of energy for transport largely reflects the 
security of oil supply discussed in Section 5.1.2.1. Around 3.2 billion peo-
ple live in 85 countries that import 15 70% or more, and 4.9 billion live 
in 93 countries (including China) 16 that import one-half or more of their 
transport fuels. Finally, 101 countries (5.3 billion people) import more 
than 25% of the fuel used for transport. Two other countries (Argentina 
and the United Kingdom), which currently import less than 25% of their 
transport fuels, may face import dependency in the near future, since 
their oil R/S ratio is under 15 years. 
 Transport energy systems are also subject to demand-side vulnerabili-
ties. In particular, rapid growth in transport energy use signals a pres-
sure on transport. About 1.7 billion people live in some 17 countries 
(including China) where transport energy use has grown faster than 
8% annually over 1998–2007, and 29 countries with 1.9 billion people 
 15  Dependency on imported fuels for transport considers all fuels used in transport. In 
the case of oil, it includes petroleum products and crude oil imports. 
 16  In 2007, China’s dependency on imported fuels for transport was 47.4%. The 
resource/consumption ratio of domestic oil in China is 7.23 years, and the annual rate 
of growth of transport energy was 8.8% in 1998–2007. 
 World Bank’s Enterprise Survey data (World Bank,  2010 ) clearly show that both the number and severity of electricity blackouts are 
highest for low-income countries, lower for lower middle-income countries and the lowest for upper middle-income countries in the 
survey. For most lower-income countries, blackouts are not measured in hours per year (as in the United States and Europe), but rather 
in hours per  day . In almost three-quarters of low-income countries, blackouts are on average for more than 24 hours per month, and in 
about one-sixth of low-income countries blackouts average over 144 hours (six days) a month. There are more than 10 blackouts every 
month in more than half of the surveyed low-income countries. Companies in Albania, Guinea, Kosovo, Nepal, Pakistan, and Yemen 
experienced 30 or more blackouts in a month, whereas ﬁ rms in Bangladesh experienced, on average, 101 blackouts per month. The worst 
statistics of blackouts were shown in South Asia, followed by sub-Saharan Africa. The results of this analysis should be interpreted with 
an understanding that companies may, in fact, experience less frequent outages than private customers, as they tend to be located in 
urban areas with better infrastructure. 
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have experienced a growth rate of over 6%. This is in contrast with 
some developed countries, notably the United States, where the car fleet 
shrank by four million vehicles in  2009 and the consumption of gasoline 
peaked in 2007 (NADA,  2009 , quoted in Brown,  2010 ). 
 Supply- and demand-side vulnerabilities of transport energy systems 
overlap in some 15 countries (including China) with 1.7 billion people, 
which depend on imported fuels for one-half or more of their energy 
use and at the same time experience over 6% growth in demand. An 
additional 84 countries with 3.2 billion people experience either sup-
ply- or demand-side vulnerabilities. Only about 1.2 billion people live 
in 31 countries with relatively import-independent and slowly growing 
transport systems. 
 5.2.4.2  Energy for Industry 
 The industrial use of energy – mainly in the form of heat and electricity – 
varies between countries. Virtually all developed countries use at least 
15% of their energy in the industrial sector. In 60 countries with 4.5 
billion people, industry accounts for over 25% of their energy use, and 
in 12 countries with 1.7 billion people (which include Brazil, China, and 
Ukraine), it accounts for over 40% of their energy use. Many smaller 
developing and emerging economies are dominated by one or few 
industries relying on distinct energy systems, which are therefore critical 
for the energy security of those societies. 
 The industrial sector is less based on imported fuels than the transport 
sector. In 23 countries (400 million people) industry relies on fuels that 
are 75% or more imported, in 46 countries (800 million people) on fuels 
that are 50% or more imported, and in 77 countries (1.5 billion people) 
on fuels that are 25% or more imported. 
 Demand-side vulnerabilities should also be taken into account. Although 
many economies experience growth in industrial energy use, this can-
not be considered as permanent and pressing, as in the case of the 
transport and residential sectors, because industrial growth may be 
reversed. Industrial energy intensity, on the other hand, is an important 
characteristic that can make the industrial sector relatively more or less 
vulnerable to price volatility and other energy supply disruptions. In 34 
countries (including China, the Russian Federation, Brazil, Ukraine, and 
several other emerging economies) with 2.8 billion people, industrial 
energy intensity exceeds the world average by 25% or more (159% 
in Ukraine, 49% in China, 45% in Russia, 35% in Brazil). In the vast 
majority of these countries industrial products also account for a 
large portion of GDP (49% in China, 38% in Russia, 37% in Ukraine), 
which makes them even more vulnerable to industrial energy supply 
disruptions. 
 Supply- and demand-side vulnerabilities of industrial energy systems 
overlap in only two countries: Jordan and Moldova. About 80 countries 
in the world, with a combined population of some 3.6 billion people, 
experience either high import dependency of industrial fuels or high 
industrial energy intensity. 
 5.2.4.3  Energy in the Residential and Commercial Sector 
 The R&C sector in all countries vitally depends upon a supply of elec-
tricity that is used for lighting, cooking, heating, and other appliances. 
Other forms of energy are also used in this sector, particularly for heat-
ing, which is an important national priority in cold climates. In many 
countries, prevention of failures to provide adequate heating during cold 
seasons are rightly considered a matter of national priority. 
 Another key feature of the R&C sector is that it significantly relies on 
traditional biomass in many developing countries. Energy statistics typi-
cally designate this source as “renewables and combustibles” without 
making the distinction between “modern” (e.g., pellets, straw boil-
ers, modern heaters) and “traditional” (e.g., firewood or dung used in 
open cooking stoves) uses of biomass. However, reliance on traditional 
biomass in the R&C sector represents a national energy security issue 
because such use is generally considered unacceptable on health, envi-
ronmental, and developmental grounds. This means that the massive 
use of traditional biomass in the R&C sector, much like the low rate of 
access to electricity, is untenable for modern nation-states. When such 
use is widespread, the energy policy and the energy system are under 
pressure to find new sources of energy to replace traditional biomass, 
which can be combined with other pressures to exacerbate a nation’s 
energy vulnerabilities. 
 The patterns of energy use in the R&C sector differ greatly between 
developing and industrialized countries. Lower-income countries typi-
cally have a higher proportion of R&C energy in the total energy use and 
a higher share of (mostly “traditional”) biomass in R&C energy use. 17 
In the following analysis we make a distinction between three groups 
of countries that differ in the degree to which they rely on traditional 
biomass in their R&C sector:
 25 countries (700 million people) rely on combustibles and renewa- •
bles for over 80% of their R&C energy, most of them low- or lower 
middle-income countries. These countries are not included in our 
analysis of import dependency of fuels for the R&C sector. 18 
 22 countries (3.3 billion people) rely on combustibles and renewa- •
bles for between 33% and 80% of their R&C energy, of these two-
thirds are low- or lower middle-income countries and these rest are 
 17  All of the 27 countries with R&C energy representing more than 40% of total energy 
use are either low- or lower middle-income countries. The share of biomass in R&C 
energy use of those 27 countries is higher than 70%. 
 18  The rationale for this approach is that the overarching vulnerability for those countries 
is an excessive reliance on traditional biomass in their R&C sectors rather than import 
dependency of the relatively insigniﬁ cant remaining share of their R&C energy. 
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upper middle-income countries. This group also includes India and 
China. For these countries we analyze import dependency only for 
the share of their R&C energy, which does not include combustibles 
and renewables. 19 
 The remaining 86 countries (2.3 billion people) rely on combustibles  •
and renewables for less than 30% in their R&C energy. About 75% 
of these countries are high- or higher middle-income. For these coun-
tries we analyze vulnerabilities of the R&C sector. 
 The R&C sector is generally less dependent on imported fuels than trans-
port, but more dependent than the industrial sector. Twenty countries 
(400 million people) import more than 75% of their energy for R&C. In 
39 countries (500 million people), the energy imported for this sector is 
higher than 50%. Finally, 52 countries (2.3 billion people) rely on more 
than 25% of imported energy for the R&C sector. 
 There are also demand-side pressures on R&C energy use. In 28 coun-
tries (400 million people), the growth rate of energy use in this sector 
exceeded 5% per year. In many low-income countries per capita energy 
use is far below the world average, which probably indicates an inad-
equate provision of energy services in this area and signals a potential 
vulnerability. This question will be explored further. 
 Only three small countries (Portugal, Cyprus, and Albania) have an import 
dependency on energy for R&C higher than 50% and annual demand 
growth higher than 6%. Forty-seven countries (1.1 billion people) have 
either dependency on energy higher than 50% or demand per capita 
for R&C higher than 6%. These vulnerabilities should be considered in 
addition to 25 countries (with 700 million people) that primarily rely on 
traditional biomass in their R&C sector. 
 5.2.4.4  Energy for Export and Resource Curse 
 Energy exports are central for several countries where export revenues 
provide core funding for the public sector and where energy export 
industries sustain employment and a large part of the economies. To 
articulate the role of energy exports, these countries sometimes formu-
late them as “demand security” to contrast with the “supply security” 
of energy-importing nations. We consider export revenues as another 
energy sector vital for the stability of economic, political, and social 
order in exporting countries. 
 Yet energy exports are as vulnerable to various disruptions as other 
energy services and can also be considered from the robustness, sover-
eignty, and resilience perspectives. First of all, energy exports are only 
possible when sufficient domestic energy resources are available. This 
presumes both physical availability and accessibility of resources, as well 
as a reasonably satisfied (or artificially constrained) national demand 
for such resources. Second, resources can only be exported if there are 
adequate extraction, conversion, and transportation technologies and 
infrastructure. Third, any export depends upon safe export routes and 
destinations. Thus, exports security depends upon the physical safety of 
export routes (from adverse natural events and deliberate disruptions) 
as well as upon functioning institutional arrangements (e.g., markets) to 
match energy supply and demand and ensure sufficient and predictable 
revenues. 
 Energy exports can be considered a vital national service for only a few 
of all energy-exporting countries. There are about 15 countries where 
energy exports constitute 20% or more of GDP. About half of these 
countries are LDCs; most of the rest are middle-income countries. 
 The first insecurity stems from the very fact that a particular national 
economy extensively relies on oil exports. Worldwide, such dependency 
is highly correlated with slower long-term rates of economic growth 
and political problems. The economic and political risks of significantly 
relying on oil exports are particularly pronounced for poor countries 
and are extensively analyzed in the literature on the so-called “resource 
curse” discussed in  Box 5.8 . Furthermore, domestic oil reserves in some 
exporting countries are quite limited and will not last longer at current 
rates of production unless new resources are found or put in produc-
tion. For example, the R/P ratios for Angola, Cameroon, and Malaysia in 
2007–2009 were estimated at 12–20 years and for Argentina at about 
10 years (BP,  2007 ;  2009 ; US EIA,  2011b ). 
 5.2.5  Energy Security in Selected Regions 
 The above analysis primarily concerns energy security in individual 
countries, as well as relevant global considerations. At the same time, 
energy security issues have a strong regional dimension because coun-
tries located in geographic proximity often experience similar condi-
tions with respect to access to energy resources and the structure 
of energy use, and may be engaged in more intensive mutual trade 
and transit of energy carriers. This subsection outlines energy security 
issues from the robustness, sovereignty, and resilience perspectives 
in the major world sub-regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and 
South America. 
 5.2.5.1  Energy Security in Africa 20 
 Energy security is an important policy issue in Africa. A number of fac-
tors contribute to rising energy security challenges. The rising economic 
 19  The rationale for this approach is that such countries typically have two distinct resi-
dential sectors: one “modern,” which can be subject to standard import vulnerability 
analysis, and the other “traditional,” where the vulnerabilities associated with trad-
itional fuels are most prominent. 
 20  Source: Adenikinju,  2005 ;  2008 ; Anyanwu et al.,  2010 ; US EIA,  2011a ; Wohlgemuth, 
 2008 . 
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 Box 5.8 |  Energy Exports and Resource Curse 
 Exports of energy resources – primarily oil and gas – have strongly inﬂ uenced national economies and political systems in different 
historical periods in many countries. It has arguably supported economic development in such industrialized countries as Norway, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. It has fueled economic development in Malaysia, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, 
and other emerging economies. Yet it has been blamed for slower economic growth, poor governance, political instability, and conﬂ ict 
in several low- and middle-income countries. This latter phenomenon has been termed the “resource curse” or “natural resource trap.” 
There is an extensive body of scholarly literature that attempts to explain the resource curse and ﬁ nd appropriate remedies. 
 Poor economic performance of energy exporters, observed by many researchers, has been blamed on macroeconomic instability induced 
by the volatility of energy prices. More often than not, producers that face a season of windfalls spend extravagantly and have difﬁ culty 
curbing this spending during lower price periods. In addition, some energy exporters tended to unsustainably borrow in times of high 
oil prices and were saddled with unbearably heavy debts in times of lower prices. Added to this, many low-income energy exporters are 
faced with money ﬂ ows that far surpass their absorptive capacity, resulting in overheated economies and rampant inﬂ ation. 
 Another reason for slower economic growth of energy exporters is the so-called “Dutch disease,” an economic phenomenon named after 
the negative impact on the Dutch economy of natural gas-related revenues in the 1970s resulting from over-valuation of the national 
currency and a set of other factors which inhibit the development of non-energy branches of an economy producing “tradable goods.” 
The result of the Dutch disease is thus a steady decrease in non-oil productive activity and, in the face of the eclipse or lack of a non-oil 
ﬁ scal base, the growing dependency of state coffers on petroleum rents. 
 The political consequences of oil wealth have been shown to be equally negative for many countries. Indeed, it is primarily at institutions, 
the mentalities of decision-makers, and the quality of governance rather than at macroeconomic trends that one must look to account 
for the predicament of the petro-state. An immediate consequence of oil revenues is the increase in state power and the absolute social, 
economic, and political centrality it acquires. The boom phase characteristically includes a growth in construction and proliferation of 
employment in the state sector and the services sector. As the key actor of the domestic economy and main supporter of the lingering 
private sector through handouts and public contracts, the state is everywhere and in constant expansion. The oil economy is meanwhile 
managed under a shroud of secrecy. Production levels and ﬁ nancial amounts transacted are matters of speculation; budgets are ﬁ ctitious; 
and money ﬂ ows are the object of unheard-of detours and misappropriations in a context of no public accountability (Ross,  2001 ). It 
is, therefore, unsurprising that of the top 15 oil exporters only one (Norway) is a well-functioning democracy and four others (Mexico, 
Venezuela, Russia, and Iraq) can be considered “imperfect democracies.” This lack of accountability extends to the international level. 
More often than not, oil producers with questionable domestic records are nonetheless courted and protected by oil-consuming states in 
the industrial world, in a demonstration that oil, on account of its centrality for the functioning of modern economies, is a commodity like 
no other. 
 Easy oil money means that the state does not need to expand the domestic ﬁ scal base. In fact, OPEC members’ oil revenues represent 
an average of 42% of total government revenues. In cases where the building of state institutions runs parallel with the availability 
of oil wealth, no ﬁ scal administrations are created at all. Oftentimes, the state does not seek to pursue this option anyway, for it faces 
articulate national constituencies that see themselves as legitimate beneﬁ ciaries of the national wealth rather than as net contributors 
to it. This ﬁ scal aloofness strengthens the executive but also cuts its link with society as well as the minimal social contract the link 
might imply. 
 These arrangements, however, become unstable at times of low or decreasing oil prices. At such times, a petro-state becomes highly 
indebted, with a vast unemployed urban working class and a restive youth, a large and intermittently paid civil service, a neglected 
countryside, and an inequitable pattern of wealth distribution. Recent research shows that, faced with a powder keg of distorted 
economies and dissatisﬁ ed populations, oil states are far more likely than non-oil states to suffer from civil war or separatist bids from 
resource-rich regions. This political instability and poor governance can feed on each other, creating a vicious circle. In already unstable 
contexts such as West and Central Africa, for instance, oil is clearly a factor that exacerbates conﬂ ict and perpetuates the control of the 
state by self-seeking elites. 
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prosperity of the continent after decades of economic underperform-
ance has led to an increasing demand for modern energy. The rising 
costs of energy imports constitute a threat to economic resurgence of 
the continent. Weak investments in energy infrastructure, poor domestic 
policies that favor poorly targeted subsidies, and limited transportation 
connectivity across Africa also hamper the extent and pace at which 
trade in energy can occur between energy-surplus and energy-deficient 
parts of the continent. Most of the countries in the continent continue 
to depend on imports from outside the continent to meet the rising 
domestic demand. 
 Over the years, energy prices have risen rapidly and become highly 
volatile. While the upwards trend in global energy prices has led to a 
massive accumulation of reserves in many energy-rich African countries, 
net energy importers in the continent have borne the costs in terms of 
slower economic growth, rising trade deficit, faster depletion of foreign 
reserves, and rising inflation. 
 Affordability of and access to modern energy are very poor in Africa 
though in total, the continent produces more energy than it consumes. 
In 2009, extraction of crude oil, natural gas, and coal were 3.2, 2.2, 
 Researchers disagree on the root causes of the resource curse. The term itself tends to underplay two important factors. Regarding the 
ﬁ rst, it is becoming clear that poor institutions are largely responsible for economic under-performance, and vice versa: poor non-
diversiﬁ ed economies are obstacles to improving governance. The second factor is the character of the economy, institutions, and political 
culture in oil-rich states prior to the arrival of oil rents. OECD oil-producing states had developed the institutions (strong and accountable 
governments, a free press, a robust political party system, etc.) that proved instrumental in steering oil revenues in a constructive 
direction decades before oil materialized. In much the same way, many of the problems found in oil-rich-but-poor states were everyday 
occurrences before oil: fragile economies, despotic rulers, and weak and inefﬁ cient institutions. In this context, oil accentuated 
pathologies that existed already. 
 More detailed recent analysis shows that endowment with national resources may be a curse or a blessing, depending on many other 
conditions. The larger the endowment of natural resources, the stronger are the institutions needed to overcome the risk of resource 
curse. However, under certain conditions – prevalent in many developing countries – the opposite occurs. The presence of natural 
resources actually weakens the institutions, which in turn are unable to manage the natural resource wealth; this leads to more 
resource-dependency, further weakening of the institutions, etc. Thus, suffering from resource curse or falling into a natural resource 
trap is not inevitable. However, it is a matter of very high risk and affects many developing oil-exporting nations. While analysts dispute 
what is at the root of the disappointing performance of most petroleum exporters – ranging from the single-minded determinism of a 
resource curse to more nuanced institutional and sociological analyses – there is a near consensus that few states have gone up the 
developmental ladder by virtue of their oil endowments. 
 As evidence that the resource curse does not always occur, one recent study looked at oil and gas production in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, and Thailand from 1987–2007. In each of these countries, including Myanmar, economies have become more diversiﬁ ed, 
per capita incomes have risen, and life expectancies and living standards have improved along with increased energy supply. Political 
transparency and accountability have remained constant in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and oil and gas have contributed less to 
government revenues over time in Indonesia and Thailand. The situation in Southeast Asia suggests that extractive resources themselves 
are neither a curse nor a blessing. Instead, it is how they are used and the particular socio-political environment in which they evolve 
that determines whether they contribute to peace and prosperity or risk conﬂ ict and environmental degradation. The successful practice 
of managing energy export revenues in Chile included avoiding excessive spending in boom times, allowing deviations from a target 
surplus only in response to output gaps and long-lasting commodity price increases, as judged by independent panels of experts rather 
than politicians. Other measures to avoid the resource curse proposed by experts include hedging export proceeds in commodity futures 
markets, denominating debt in terms of commodity prices, allowing some nominal currency appreciation in response to an increase in 
world prices of the commodity, but also adding to foreign exchange reserves, especially at the early stages of the boom when it may 
prove to be transitory. 
 Source: Fardmanesh,  1991 ; Auty,  1993 ;  1994 ; Chaudhry,  1997 ; Karl,  1997 ;  1998 ; Leite and Weidmann,  1999 ; Fearon and Laitin,  2003 ; 
Katz et al.,  2004 ; Karl,  2005 ; Soares de Oliveira,  2006 ; Collier,  2007 ; Soares de Oliveira,  2007 ; Brunnschweiler and Bulte,  2008 ; EIU,  2009 ; 
Sovacool,  2010 . 
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and 1.34 times higher than their respective use, whereas the overall 
total primary energy supply was more than twice the amount of primary 
energy used. However, these aggregate figures mask a high degree 
of intra-African diversity in energy demand and supply, which largely 
reflects the diverging regional resource endowments. 
 The TPES in Africa grew by a mean of 4% between 2005 and 2009, 
mainly as a result of robust growth in crude oil production in North 
and West Africa. The share of biomass, while still significant in parts of 
Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, decreased from 62% in 1971 to 
less than 45% in  2009 . However, Africa’s use of combustible renewable 
energy (mainly wood-fuel) still remains significantly higher than the 
world average. Total primary energy use in the same time period rose by 
an annual average of 3.7%. 
 Though the continent exports energy, it is unable to meet the energy 
needs of its population, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The systemic 
energy problem in Africa is especially evident within its power sector. 
Africa is estimated to require 7000 MW of new power generation capac-
ity each year, but has been installing only 1000 MW annually. Outside 
South Africa, power consumption averages 124 kWh (4.46 GJ) per per-
son per year. Only one-fifth of the population of sub-Saharan Africa has 
access to electricity, compared with one-half in South Asia and four-
fifths in Latin America. At the same time, the cost of electricity is higher 
in Africa. Frequent power outages force firms to rely on expensive back-
up generators that cost up to US$0.40 per kWh. Many countries rely on 
inefficient, expensive, small-scale, oil-based power generation. Africa is 
well endowed with large-scale, cost-effective energy resources, but they 
tend to be located a long distance from the major demand centers and 
their development is often too expensive for the countries where they 
are found. 
 Energy resource ownership and use vary widely across Africa. For 
instance, three countries – South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria – account 
for two-thirds of total primary energy use. Algeria and Egypt account for 
73.6% of total natural gas consumption. South Africa and Egypt jointly 
account for 61% of the continent’s hydroelectricity consumption. South 
Africa alone accounts for 93% of total African coal consumption and 
100% of its nuclear energy generation. 
 Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, and Libya are the major producers of oil, 
although oil is also produced in Cameroon, Chad, Congo, C ô te d’Ivoire, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritania, Sudan, and Tunisia. Natural 
gas reserves are located in four major countries: Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, 
and Libya. 
 There is a very limited amount of intra-Africa trade in energy. Only 1.8% 
of the continent’s oil exports go to other African countries. LNG trade 
from Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, and Nigeria go to coun-
tries in North America, Europe, and Asia/Pacific. Three countries – Egypt, 
Mozambique, and South Africa – are responsible for nearly all the coal 
exports in Africa. Most of the coal exports go to other African countries – 
Algeria, Congo Kinshasa, Kenya, Morocco, Mauritius, Namibia, and 
Senegal. There is also some electricity trading within the continent, espe-
cially within the various sub-regions. A good example is the West African 
Power Pool, designed to interconnect national grids across 5000 km of 
most West African countries. Another important initiative in West Africa 
is the West African Gas Pipeline. The US$635 million project was initially 
developed to utilize some of the gas currently being flared in Nigeria for 
power generation in Benin, Togo, and Ghana. 
 The presently low level of energy trade among countries has made it 
difficult to leverage the huge energy surplus produced in the continent 
to meet the needs of energy-poorer countries. Hence, significant scope 
exists for energy cooperation across sub-regions on the continent. 
Although there are a number of pan-African cooperative energy initia-
tives, the pace of implementation of these initiatives has been slow. 
 The diversity of energy resources in Africa is relatively low. Oil is the dom-
inant fuel in most African countries. Four-fifths of the countries derive 
over 50% of their energy use from oil. Over one-third of the refined 
petroleum consumed in the region is imported. While the amount may 
vary, all the countries import some proportion of their product consump-
tion. Over 63% of the countries import more than 90% of the refined 
products they consume. Paradoxically, Nigeria, the leading producer and 
exporter of crude oil in Africa, imports 69.8% of its product requirements 
and accounts for 17.7% of the continent’s total imports. Dependency on 
imported energy is a risk to energy security and makes the country vul-
nerable to high and volatile world oil prices. 
 In some African countries, energy sources other than oil dominate con-
sumption. Countries significantly dependent on coal are South Africa 
(76.4%), Zimbabwe (53.4%), Botswana (41%), and Swaziland (34.7%). 
Countries with high natural gas dependency are Equatorial Guinea 
(92.6%), Algeria (64.4%), Tunisia (50.5%), Egypt (49%), C ô te d’Ivoire 
(44.5%), and Nigeria (41.7%). Countries heavily dependent on hydroelec-
tric energy are Mozambique (82.1%), Zambia (75.2%), Congo Kinshasa 
(68.2%), Malawi (45.3%), and Cameroon (41.6%). Countries that depend 
almost exclusively on a single primary energy source are Benin, Chad, 
Djibouti, The Gambia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Togo. 
 The generally low energy diversity in Africa relates to low capacity and a 
weak technological base in most countries. Poverty and a lack of appro-
priate technologies have hampered diversification into renewables such 
as solar, wind, and small hydro. 
 Several options are open to African countries to address the huge 
energy gap in the region. These include the use of renewable energy to 
supplement the non-renewable energy sources that currently dominate 
the energy mix, the reduction of huge energy losses and wastages and 
adoption of energy efficiency technologies, increased investment in new 
technologies and energy supply infrastructure, and an enhanced level of 
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intra-regional energy cooperation. The latter is required because many 
African countries are very small and may not be able to finance the huge 
investment costs needed to develop alternative energy sources. Africa 
must engage the private sector in addressing its energy supply inad-
equacies. While energy subsidies may not disappear for a while, such 
subsidies must be smart and better targeted to meet specific societal 
objectives. 
 5.2.5.2  Energy Security in Europe 21 
 Europe 22 is among the world’s largest energy-consuming regions. Oil, 
natural gas, and coal constitute the dominant fuels in Europe’s energy 
mix. In 2009, coal accounted for 17% of Europe’s total primary energy 
demand, oil accounted for 35%, and gas for 25%. That year, Europe 
represented around 18% of the global demand for oil, some 17% of the 
global demand for natural gas, and 9% for coal. Nuclear made up 14% 
and renewables 9% of primary energy use in Europe. Overall, Europe, 
representing 7% of the world’s population, accounted for 15% of the 
world’s primary energy demand. 
 Europe is also a key supplier of energy. In 2009, it produced 2.6% of 
global oil output, 5.7% of global gas output, 4.6% of global coal output 
and 11% of global renewable energy. Still, Europe is crucially relying on 
energy imports to satisfy its needs. In 2009, the EU imported more than 
half of its energy from non-EU countries. This number has increased in 
recent years, rising from less than 40% of gross energy use in 1980 to 
55% at present. If the present trends continue, European import depend-
ency is likely to steeply increase in the near future, a function of policies 
aimed at reducing carbon-intensive fuels such as coal with comparably 
less carbon-heavy fuels such as gas, but also due to declining domestic 
production, notably in the North Sea. 
 European energy imports are dominated by a few producers of energy. 
Some two-thirds of EU-27 imports of natural gas stem from only three 
countries: Norway, Algeria, and Russia. Russia is also Europe’s domin-
ant supplier of crude oil, accounting for some 30% of the bloc’s imports 
in 2008. Even in hard coal, Russia plays an important role, supplying 
around 24% of European imports. High European import dependency is 
not a concern for all fuels. The coal market is relatively small in volume, 
and global reserves are relatively evenly distributed. The oil market is 
global, liquid, integrated, and therefore unlikely to give a dominant 
producer much political leverage over the consumer region supplied. 
Gas markets, however, still remain by and large regional and bilater-
alized in nature. Given the predominantly pipeline-bound infrastruc-
ture in natural gas, alternative suppliers are hard to find in the short 
to medium term. In light of this, concerns have been expressed over 
some European countries’ heavy reliance on gas imports from Russia, 
reaching up to 100% of total demand in Central and Eastern Europe, 
especially the Baltic States. Recent disputes over gas transit between 
Russia and neighboring Ukraine, and also Belarus, have added to this 
concern and sparked political initiatives to reduce overall European 
import dependency on Russia. The degree to which Russian gas actu-
ally poses a security problem is, however, disputed. Russia’s share of 
European natural gas imports has in fact declined steadily over the last 
two decades, from some 75% in 1990 to 31.5% today. Current devel-
opments in unconventional gas production (see  Box 5.5 ), coupled with 
the increasing global capacity in LNG, may possibly also change exist-
ing market structures and contribute to a higher integration of regional 
markets and more gas-to-gas competition in the European market (IGU, 
 2010 ). The planned construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline under 
the Baltic Sea, connecting Russia directly to Germany and Denmark, 
is intended to diversify gas trade routes and reduce dependency on 
transit countries. 
 Still, policy initiatives center on reducing gas import dependency on 
Russia by promoting diversification strategies, including pipelines in 
the “southern corridor” aimed at bringing Caspian gas to European 
households. A key European initiative in this context is the planned 
Nabucco pipeline, a 31 bcm per year interconnector for Azeri and pos-
sibly Turkmen or even Iraqi gas, via Turkey. Since available gas volumes 
remain uncertain, the pipeline has so far not left the planning stage. 
Recent Azeri pledges to commit parts of the gas output generated in the 
Shah-Deniz II field (planned to come on stream in the next years) may 
constitute a breakthrough for the project. 
 In addition to import dependency, European energy security challenges 
may, however, also be of domestic origin. In particular, they may stem 
from Europe’s commitment to pursue low-carbon energy transition. 
Policy packages such as the EU’s 20–20–20 initiative, aimed at reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases by 20% by 2020 and flanked by reach-
ing 20% of renewable energy in total energy use, will put demand-side 
pressure on European energy generation and systems. Replacing coal in 
power generation by bridge fuels (notably natural gas) before phasing 
them out to the benefit of renewables will pose unprecedented chal-
lenges with regards to finance, infrastructure, and technology. Adding 
to this challenge is a rapidly aging infrastructure in European nuclear 
energy, coupled with stiff public opposition to new nuclear power plants 
in most European countries. 
 5.2.5.3  Energy Security in North America 
 The North American continent has been endowed with immense energy 
wealth. The United States is among the world’s top ten producers of 
coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity from nuclear and hydroelectricity, 
while Canada is in the top ten for oil, natural gas, and electricity from 
nuclear and hydroelectricity production, and Mexico ranks in the top ten 
for oil production (IEA,  2010a ). Despite this, each country has its own set 
of energy security problems. 
 21  Sources: BP,  2010 ; IEA,  2010a ; Eurostat,  2011 . 
 22  The term “Europe” is used here to designate European OECD member countries or 
the European Union Member States. 
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 Probably the most dominant and well known of these problems is that 
being faced by the United States and its dependence on foreign supplies 
of crude oil. Every US president, from Nixon to Obama, has set targets, 
put forward proposals, commissioned reports, and signed legislation in 
an effort to stem crude oil imports and improve energy security (US DOE, 
 2010 ). Today, over 60% of US demand for crude oil is met from imports 
(US EIA,  2010 ). 
 Support for the US transportation system is the driving force behind 
all energy security legislation put forward in the United States. For 
example, the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) calls 
for, amongst other things, reducing vehicular fuel consumption through 
increased CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) standards, replacing 
gasoline with ethanol, and requiring auto manufacturers to develop a 
new generation of vehicles to operate on electricity (EISA,  2007 ). 
 EISA has had unintended consequences. The push for ethanol from 
cornstarch means that a significant percentage of US farmland is being 
diverted from food into fuel production; this has had an impact on 
world corn supplies, indirectly affecting food security in countries such 
as Mexico (Roig-Franzia,  2007 ). 
 The increasing demand for electricity in general, and the inevitable reli-
ance on mains electricity to meet the energy needs of plug-in electric 
vehicles in particular, will have an impact on (electrical) energy security. 
At present, about 50% of the electricity in the United States is produced 
from domestic coal, followed by natural gas and nuclear (about 20% 
each), hydroelectricity (5%), and a mix of renewables (2.5%) (US EIA, 
 2011a ). Demand pressures are forcing electricity suppliers to plan for 
new generation capacity and, if climate change is ever addressed seri-
ously by the US Congress, it will be necessary to develop generation 
facilities that emit little or no carbon. However, the supply mix is only 
part of the problem – the US electrical grid is showing its age and must 
be refurbished if it is to meet the expected future reliance on electricity. 
The costs of new generation facilities (whether or not the United States 
addresses the issue of climate change) and grid upgrades are estimated 
in the trillions of dollars – the price of ensuring the availability of the 
electrical supply. 
 Until the middle of the last decade, it was assumed that domestic sup-
plies of natural gas in the United States had peaked and, like crude oil 
before it, would make the United States increasingly reliant on imports 
of natural gas. To ensure (natural gas) energy security, plans were drawn 
up for dozens of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities around the con-
tinental United States (McAleb,  2005 ). Today, things look considerably 
different – the use of horizontal drilling fracking is making shale gas 
available as a replacement for declining stocks of conventional nat-
ural gas (Grape,  2006 ). Shale gas is rich in natural gas liquids (NGLs), 
meaning it can also improve US energy security by offsetting imports of 
crude oil (Sandrea,  2010 ). Optimistic reserve projections have industry 
analysts suggesting that the United States could soon start exporting 
LNG (PennEnergy,  2010 ); this would not appear to be in the long-term 
energy security interests of the United States. There are also concerns 
over the environmental impacts associated with the extraction of shale 
gas (Doggett,  2010 ); time will tell whether it is considered an accept-
able source of natural gas that will improve the energy security of the 
United States. 
 Two of the countries on which the United States depends for its 
energy are its nearest neighbors, Mexico and Canada; both countries 
are exporters of crude oil and other refined petroleum products to the 
United States, while Canada also exports natural gas and electricity. The 
United States’ reliance on Mexico and Canada for its energy has politi-
cians and analysts in all three countries talking about North American, 
or continental, energy security (Angevine,  2010 ). 
 North America’s energy security is governed by chapter six of NAFTA, 
the North America Free Trade Agreement, which outlines the rules and 
regulations regarding the trade of energy and petrochemicals. NAFTA 
requires a signatory to maintain its energy exports; short of war, any 
reduction in exports must be met by a proportional reduction in sup-
ply within the exporting nation. Mexico is exempt from this provision; 
Canada is not (NAFTA,  2002 ). 
 Mexico is facing energy security challenges of its own. Its most impor-
tant oil field, Cantarell (in the Gulf of Mexico), is in decline and further 
exploration is hampered by the Mexican constitution that restricts oil 
and natural gas development to the state oil company, Pemex. 
 Canada, unlike Mexico, has few restrictions on international players 
exploiting its crude oil and natural gas. Despite the availability of 
these resources, not all Canadians have access to them; for exam-
ple, although Canada is self-sufficient in crude oil, over 60% of it is 
exported to the United States, meaning that Canada meets almost 
50% of its crude oil needs from imports (Hughes,  2010 ). Canada is 
also self-sufficient in natural gas, yet almost 60% is exported to the 
United States (US EIA,  2011a ). Not only is Canada exporting energy 
that could improve its future energy security, but also it has com-
pounded the problem by failing to develop the pipeline infrastructure 
to connect parts of eastern Canada with the oil and natural gas fields 
in western Canada (Hughes,  2010 ). 
 Although Canada’s production of conventional crude oil and natural 
gas has peaked, the tar sands (euphemistically referred to as the “oil” 
sands in the United States) are seen as essential to continental energy 
security. Canada’s current prime minister has gone so far as to call 
Canada an “energy superpower” with respect to the development of 
unconventional energy resources such as the tar sands, shale gas, and 
Arctic oil and natural gas for export to the United States (Hester and 
Welsh,  2009 ). 
 Canada is one of the few countries with the capacity to improve its 
energy security with its own energy resources. Despite this, Canada’s 
trade and energy policies have evolved to the point where much of the 
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energy that could be used for its own energy security is, instead, contrib-
uting to the improvement of energy security in the United States. 
 5.2.5.4  Energy Security in Asia 23 
 Asia – meant here to encompass the big four energy consumers of China, 
India, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the developing economies 
including Southeast Asia and South Asia – faces a series of daunting 
energy security challenges that crisscross the three themes of robust-
ness, sovereignty, and resilience. 
 Growth in energy use, both in terms of per capita use and total use in 
aggregate, is expected to rise dramatically in the next few decades. As a 
whole, Asia Pacific’s per capita electricity demand was only about 1300 
kWh in 2005, compared to the world average of more than 2500 kWh. 
Under a business-as-usual scenario, between 2005 and 2030 energy 
demand is expected to grow at 2.4%, whereas the world average dur-
ing the same period will be 1.5%. Net imports of fossil fuels in Asia 
Pacific are expected to more than double. The region’s oil dependency 
will increase from 57.5% to 66.4%. The region will also need between 
US$7 trillion and US$9.7 trillion of cumulative investment in the energy 
sector during this period, of which about two-thirds will be in electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution. The 10 countries that com-
prise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for example, will likely 
experience an annual growth rate in energy demand of 2.5% between 
2010 and 2030. If that projection holds true, regional demand for energy 
will equal the current combined total demand of Japan, Australia, South 
Korea, and New Zealand. Yet, although Southeast Asia is home to 8.5% 
of the world population (530 million people), the region possesses 
about 1% each of the world’s oil and coal stocks and less than 4% of 
total natural gas reserves. 
 Security of supply has thus become a key economic and political con-
cern. In China, Beijing had to ration its gas supply to shopping malls and 
supermarkets in January 2010 as a result of extreme winter weather. In 
2008, India walked out of the deal to build an Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) 
gas pipeline – on which discussions were conducted over 13 years – 
over security issues and the inability of Pakistan to agree to provide pen-
alties for supply disruptions. Japan buys nearly 90% of its oil from the 
Middle East, making it vulnerable to disruptions of even a few days on 
the Strait of Hormuz or through shipping routes from the Middle East. 
 Threats need not be international or external. Laborers of India’s public-
sector petroleum company, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited 
(ONGC), went on a three-day strike in early 2009, shutting down the 
Hazira plant that processes oil and gas from offshore operations and 
threatening to create shortages of compressed natural gas used for pub-
lic transportation in Gujarat. Large parts of China also had to confront 
energy shortages in 2010 due to a combination of weather and infra-
structure factors: the difficulty of transporting coal in the snow, less 
hydropower output due to freezing temperatures, and reduced coal 
supplies from Shanxi province due to mine closures. In 2008, shortages 
of gasoline and diesel occurred in Bali, Indonesia, when oil tankers had 
trouble accessing the island during a series of storms, and in Kalimantan 
long lines formed at petrol stations due to a shortfall of 10,000 liters of 
gasoline. In Jakarta and Java, as well, shortages of premium gasoline and 
LPG occurred after a refinery had maintenance problems, and disruptions 
of electricity hit every Indonesian province in both 2007 and 2008. 
 Trade in energy is another essential challenge. Apart from Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei, all other Asian countries are currently 
net energy importers. This means that the promotion of trade is instru-
mental to building energy markets so that countries can improve access 
to multiple sources of energy. Without such access, buyers must negoti-
ate directly with producing nations such as those in the Middle East. 
Several “energy-poor” nations are relying on trade to overcome their 
energy shortages. The Bangladesh Power Development Board is cur-
rently holding a road show around the world to encourage foreign 
investors to help them erect about 3500 MW of new power plants 
and a terminal for LNG. The country suffers from an acute shortage of 
power, especially during the hot summer months. Pakistan is also facing 
severe energy shortages, and searching for private foreign investment 
by offering incentives related to upstream and downstream hydrocar-
bon development. 
 Some countries, such as China, India, and Japan, have begun aggressively 
investing overseas to then export energy fuels back to their mainland. 
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOC), after a well-pub-
licized yet unsuccessful takeover bid for Unocal in the United States in 
2005, took over Canadian-based PetroKazakhstan in 2006, and since 
then has won contracts in politically volatile places such as Angola and 
Nigeria and strengthened ties with Sudan, Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Sudan, 
Kazakhstan, and Myanmar. India’s government aimed to produce 20 mil-
lion barrels of equity oil and gas abroad by 2010, and the overseas arm 
of ONGC has already acquired properties in Vietnam, Russia, and Sudan. 
Japan, in its quest to produce more “Hinomaru” oil (oil developed and 
imported through domestic producers), has integrated its key oil compa-
nies – Inpex and Teikoku Oil – under a joint holding company, to make 
them more competitive against foreign oil companies. 
 5.2.5.5  Energy Security in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 The Latin America and the Caribbean region (LAC) has considerable 
energy resources, including oil, natural gas, biomass, and hydro energy, 
and is a net energy exporter, producing about 8.4% of global energy 
and consuming about 6.3%. Venezuela and Mexico are among the 
top global oil exporters, whereas Brazil is the largest ethanol exporter, 
accounting for half of the world’s bio-ethanol exports (US EIA,  2011a ). 
However, these resources are unequally distributed. For example, more 
 23  Sources: Asian Development Bank,  2009 ; IEA,  2010a ; Bambawale and Sovacool, 
 2011 . 
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than 90% of proven oil reserves in LAC are concentrated in three coun-
tries: Venezuela (which also holds about two-thirds of the region’s natu-
ral gas reserves), Brazil, and Mexico (BP,  2009 ). 
 Moreover, utilization of these resources requires considerable invest-
ment and capacities, which can often only be mobilized at the inter-
national level. For example, significant investment will be required to 
develop the giant Lula (Tupi) and other “pre-salt” oil and gas fields 
recently discovered in Brazil or to implement the ambitious plans 
for expanding production of hydroelectricity where only 22% of the 
regional potential is currently used (SESEM-CFT,  2005 ). The current 
underinvestment in energy infrastructure is sometimes explained by 
legal and political uncertainty and insecurity, including changing the 
rules and nationalization of energy assets in several countries (Iranzo 
and Carrasco,  2008 ). 
 The region is also diverse with respect to capacities of individual coun-
tries, some of which are both too small and poor to address their energy 
challenges. For example, Nicaragua, one of the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries, is dependent on imported oil for almost 40% of its primary 
energy supply, including electricity generation (IEA,  2010b ). Ecuador, 
another low-income country, relies on oil exports for almost half of its 
total export earnings and one-third of all tax revenues. Despite its large 
oil production, Ecuador must still import refined petroleum products due 
to a lack of sufficient domestic refining capacity. As a result, the country 
cannot always benefit from high oil prices, which increase its export 
revenues but also increase its refined product import bill (US EIA,  2009 ). 
Almost all of the electricity in Paraguay relies on one hydroelectric 
plant (Itaipu). 
 Energy infrastructure in politically unstable LAC countries is often the 
target of sabotage. Only in 2001, 170 attacks were registered on one 
of the most important oil pipelines in Colombia, Cano Lim ó n (CEPAL, 
 2007 ). The TransAndino pipeline connecting Colombia and Ecuador has 
also occasionally been the target of rebel forces in Colombia, and an 
attack in March 2008 shut the system down for several days. Similarly, 
another oil pipeline in Ecuador, Sistema Oleducto Trans-Ecuatoriano 
(SOTE), has suffered from natural disasters that severely disrupted 
Ecuador’s oil production. In March 2008, landslides damaged SOTE, 
shutting operations for several days. In 1987, an earthquake destroyed 
a large section of SOTE, reducing Ecuador’s oil production for that year 
by over 50% (US EIA,  2009 ). 
 In LAC, regional integration is often viewed as a means to both redis-
tribute uneven resources and to pool forces for infrastructure develop-
ment and needed investment. Several energy integration organizations 
were created in LAC as long ago as the 1960s and 1970s:
 OLADE (Latin America Energy Organization), formed in 1973 by 26  •
LAC countries as an umbrella organization promoting the political, 
institutional, and technical integration of energy systems as well as 
energy efficiency; 
 ARPEL (Latin America and Caribbean Regional Association of Oil and  •
Natural Gas Companies), created in 1976 by 27 public and private 
companies and organizations that account for 90% of total upstream 
and downstream operations in the region; and 
 CIER (Commission for Regional Electricity Integration), created in  •
1964 and including all South American countries except Surinam 
and Guyana. 
 Energy security has received high-level political attention in the last 
decade. In the Caracas Declaration (made in 2005), energy ministries 
of South America agreed to seek energy integration and cooperation. 
In April 2007, the first Presidential Energy Summit in South America 
resulted in a common energy strategy known as the “Margarita 
Declaration” (CEPAL,  2007 ), which advocates for a stronger role of the 
state in energy issues and promotion of renewables, especially biofuels. 
In November 2008, the Energy Ministers of OLADE member countries 
issued the Buenos Aires Declaration, which stated that energy security 
(defined as “safe and reliable energy resources availability”) is a priority 
of the region (OLADE,  2007a ;  2007b ). 
 Another regional energy integration effort is Venezuela-backed 
Petroam é rica, which provides a framework of cooperation initiatives 
in the areas of oil and gas supply and infrastructure (PDVSA,  2009 ). 
Petroam é rica is divided into sub-regional frameworks: Petrocaribe, 
Petroandina, and Petrosur. 
 Petrocaribe includes 14 Caribbean countries, as well as Venezuela and 
Surinam. Within Petrocaribe, Venezuela directly sells oil and products 
to these countries under favorable financing conditions (CEPAL,  2007 ; 
US EIA,  2008 ; PDVSA,  2009 ). In 2007, 10 Petrocaribe members signed 
an energy security agreement that promotes the expansion of refinery 
capacity, ethanol production, and LNG infrastructure, as well as energy 
efficiency measures (PDVSA,  2009 ). Many of the Caribbean countries 
import oil from Mexico and Venezuela under favorable terms. Under the 
San Jose Pact, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica 
receive oil and refined products from those two countries. 
 Petroandia includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. It 
is an alliance of state oil and energy organizations to promote electric 
and gas interconnection, mutual energy supply, and joint investments 
(PDVSA,  2009 ). As part of Petroandia, Venezuela operates joint ventures 
in oil exploration, production, and capacity with Bolivia and Ecuador 
(PDVSA,  2009 ). Petrosur is made up by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Activities within Petrosur include the construction of joint 
Venezuelan-Uruguayan and Venezuelan-Brazilian refineries and the 
creation of Petrosuram é rica, a joint Venezuelan-Argentinean company 
(Comesa ñ a,  2008 ). 
 One area of regional energy integration is jointly constructed infrastruc-
ture for transporting natural gas. An agreement on joint construction of 
“the southern gas pipeline” for transporting natural gas from Venezuela 
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to Brazil and Argentina was signed in 2005. However, a later discovery 
of large oil and gas reserves in Brazil decreased that country’s interest 
in the project. The needed investment (around US$25 billion) could not 
be secured, and the project was shelved in 2009 (Hidrocarburosbolivia.
com, 2009). A more recent project, called the “Energy Ring,” would con-
nect three gas exporters (Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru) to four (potential) 
importers (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay). However, the project 
was stopped due to the withdrawal of Bolivia and political differences 
between Chile and Peru. Instead, such countries as Chile have chosen to 
expand their LNG infrastructure to increase the diversity of gas import 
energy and routes. 
 There are also efforts to integrate electricity infrastructure such as a large 
integration initiative, the “Mesoamerican Integration and Development 
Project” (Proyecto Mesoam é rica,  2009 ). The Electrical Interconnection 
System for Central America (SIEPAC), a 1,800 km power line that links 
six countries (Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala), was almost completed at the time of writing and a 
Regional Electrical Market was being put in place. This infrastructure 
is complemented by the existing electrical interconnection between 
Guatemala and Mexico, and a project to interconnect Panama and 
Colombia (IADB,  2010 ). 
 5.2.6  Summary: Energy Security in the World 
 This section explores energy security conditions in the world with 
respect to vulnerabilities of primary energy sources at the national and, 
where appropriate, global level, security of national electricity systems, 
and vulnerabilities of vital end-use sectors: transport, residential and 
commercial, industrial, and energy export revenues. 
 The results of the analysis of energy sources are summarized in  Table 
5.6 . It shows that all primary energy sources have vulnerabilities from 
the robustness, sovereignty, and resilience perspectives. Globally, 
oil stands out as the most vulnerable in all three aspects among 
the internationally traded fuels, although natural gas may develop 
equally strong vulnerabilities in the near future. Rising demand plays 
as strong a role as supply limitations. Although the vulnerabilities 
of nuclear and hydro energy are not directly comparable to those of 
fossil fuels, they still affect hundreds of millions of people in dozens 
of countries. 
 Many countries using nuclear power experience aging of the reactor 
fleet and workforce as well as difficulties in accessing capital and tech-
nologies to renew, expand, or launch new nuclear programs. Of the 31 
countries with nuclear power programs, 20 have not started construct-
ing a new reactor in the last 20 years, and 19 countries have nuclear 
power plants with an average age of over 25 years. Large-scale enrich-
ment, reactor manufacturing, and reprocessing technologies and capac-
ities are currently concentrated in just a few countries. The transfer of 
these technologies and capacities to a larger number of countries is 
constrained by serious concerns over nuclear weapons, which is one of 
the main controversies and risks associated with nuclear energy. 
 Hydroelectric power production, especially from major dams located on 
internationally shared rivers, is often perceived as insecure, particularly 
in light of climate change affecting seasonal water availability. Over 700 
million people live in 31 countries that derive a significant proportion of 
their electricity from just one or two major dams, and are thus vulner-
able to failures of these dams. 
 The analysis also identifies vulnerabilities of national electricity sys-
tems. First of all, electricity systems inherit the vulnerabilities of energy 
sources used for electricity generation described above. For example, 
power plants relying on imported fossil fuels currently provide over 
50% of electricity in some 39 countries with 600 million people. Some 
450 million people in 35 countries primarily rely on just one source of 
energy for generating electricity, which is a concern from the resilience 
perspective. 
 In addition, electricity systems in developed countries often bear risks 
associated with aging power plants (especially pronounced in the case 
of nuclear reactors, which have not been renewed in most industrialized 
countries in the last 25 years) and other infrastructure. In developing 
and emerging economies, electricity systems are under strong demand-
side pressures. The majority of the world population – some 4.2 bil-
lion people – lives in 53 countries that will need to massively expand 
the capacity of their electricity systems in the near future because they 
either have less than 60% access to electricity or demand growth aver-
aging 6% or more over the last decade. Both fuels and infrastructure for 
such an expansion will need to be provided without further compromis-
ing the sovereignty or resilience of national electricity systems. 
 Finally, reliability of electricity supply is a serious concern, especially in 
developing countries. In almost three-quarters of low-income countries 
blackouts are on average for more than 24 hours per month, and in 
about one-sixth of low-income countries blackouts average over 144 
hours (six days) a month. In over one-half of low-income countries 
blackouts occur at least 10 times a month. 
 With respect to nationally vital end-use energy services, transport is glo-
bally the most vulnerable. The absolute majority of countries rely on oil 
products for most of their transport energy and, as we have seen, in 
most of the world this oil has to be imported. Around 4.9 billion people 
live in 93 countries that import more than one-half of their transport 
energy requirements. This supply-side vulnerability is made worse by 
demand-side pressures: in some 17 developing countries with 1.7 bil-
lion people, transport energy use was growing faster than 8% annually 
from 1998 to 2007. 
 The energy sector also provides vital export revenues to some 15–20 
countries. In the majority of these oil- and gas-exporting countries the 
revenues are not expected to last for more than one generation, and in 
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several cases they may cease in less than a decade. In addition, poor 
energy-exporting nations are at a high risk of the resource curse: eco-
nomic and political instability eventually affects human development 
and security. 
 If rapidly growing demand for energy and high risk of resource curse 
are considered vulnerabilities of energy systems, there will be very 
few, if any, countries in the world that do not experience significant 
energy security challenges. The next section considers how national 
governments and international institutions attempt to deal with such 
challenges. 
 5.3  Energy Security Actors and Institutions 
 The key to understanding energy security is not only in the quantita-
tive analysis of energy systems, but also in examining perspectives and 
strategies of energy security actors, primarily nation-states. These per-
spectives and strategies shape energy security risks by posing or dis-
suading real and perceived threats and by determining responses to 
likely disruptions. The energy security perspectives and strategies reflect 
the objective conditions but are also influenced and limited by cogni-
tive and political factors that shape the views of policymakers and by 
capacities to enact these views. In response to perceived energy secu-
rity threats, nations initiate energy security strategies, as we describe 
in this section. We also discuss the interaction of national strategies at 
the international level through both conflict and cooperation, including 
within various international institutions. 
 5.3.1  National Perspectives and Strategies 
 National energy security strategies exist in an increasing number of 
countries and focus on minimizing the risks for the energy end-uses 
(transport, residential and commercial energy, industry or energy export 
revenues) most vital for a given country. Some strategies are rooted 
in specific energy security perspectives – robustness, sovereignty, or 
resilience – whereas other strategies present more generic responses to 
multiple threats (see  Figure 5.1 ). This section first discusses the histori-
cally earlier and more prominent strategies and then reviews robustness 
and resilience strategies. 
 5.3.1.1  Sovereignty Strategies 
 The essence of sovereignty strategies is increasing control over energy 
systems vis- à -vis “foreign” or “external” agents. Such threats are often 
perceived as more imminent and more easily catching public attention. 
They have also historically been at the center of energy security concerns. 
 In many cases, sovereignty-driven strategies focus on attaining or 
increasing control over existing energy resources. One example is the 
so-called “resource nationalism” of energy exporters that has recently 
attracted significant attention following the re-nationalization of the 
energy sector in Venezuela in 2003; another example is the transfer 
of several major oil and gas projects from international oil companies 
(IOCs) to state companies in Russia in the last decade. Resource nation-
alism and the resulting dominance of national oil companies (NOCs) 
(see  Table 5.8 ) is not exactly a new phenomenon (see  Box 5.11 ). It is 
not uncommon for the states to seek sovereign control over technol-
ogy and infrastructure, as well as natural resources. For example, there 
was significant resistance in the UK against Russian Gazprom acquir-
ing Centrica, a gas distribution company, in 2006–2008, while the US 
blocked the attempt of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) to buy a US oil company, Unocal, in 2005. 
 Resource nationalism is not only typical in energy-exporting countries. 
Most notably the emerging major importers, such as India and China, 
are supporting their NOCs in acquiring energy assets around the world. 
Even OECD countries such as Japan and Korea have shown a renewed 
interest in the idea of securing supply through a state-owned corpor-
ation. A plethora of existing bilateral energy deals, long-term contracts, 
and joint projects reflect the increasing interests of nation-states to 
enhance their influence over energy resources, if not to full control, then 
at least to management through a “trusted partner.” 
 As a result of this trend towards state actors in the global energy market, 
NOCs have come to dominate the scene, as shown in  Table 5.8 . In fact, 
only two of the world’s top 15 energy companies in terms of reserves 
are private, while only one is headquartered in an OECD country. 
 In fact, and contrary to widespread perception, the trend towards a 
greater role of NOCs in global energy does not fundamentally affect 
supply, although it increases the market power of certain states. A 
strong role of NOCs in global energy does not necessarily imply “less 
market.” Producer NOCs supply the same global market as their private 
counterparts, while major consumer NOCs tend to sell significant vol-
umes of their equity oil on global markets rather than shipping it back 
home (IEA,  2007 ). 
 Similarly to oil, and with the exception of North America, state com-
panies also dominate the supply of natural gas. In Eurasia, these are, 
among others, Russia’s Gazprom, Algeria’s Sonatrach, Norway’s Statoil 
and Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). 24 
State-owned companies also tend to dominate the downstream gas mar-
ket in Asia (with Malaysia’s Petronas, China’s China National Petroleum 
Company [CNPC], and India’s GAIL being prominent examples). At the 
same time, most European downstream markets have been privatized. 
Due to restricted access of gas producers to attractive European down-
stream markets, private retail companies – such as Germany’s EoN 
 24  Where IOCs are admitted to exploration and production endeavors (as in the case of 
the Azerbaijan International Operating Company [AIOC] developing Azeri gas), state 
companies are at least party to all of the international consortia developing new gas 
projects. 
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Ruhrgas, Spain’s Gas Natural, or France’s GDF Suez 25 – enjoy a generally 
powerful position vis- à -vis producers. 
 Other examples of moves to secure control over resources include an 
increasing number of deals that involve China, India, Russia, the United 
States, and other countries to secure access to uranium deposits in 
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian countries (Pistilli,  2009 ). 
 It should also be noted that asserting full or partial control over fossil 
fuel resources is not an option for the majority of countries that both 
lack such resources domestically and do not have economic, political, 
or military power to project their influence internationally. Their pri-
mary sovereignty strategies are to increase their reliance on domestic 
resources. Among resources available to a majority of countries – and 
thus playing an increasingly important role in national energy security 
strategies – are renewables (hydro, wind, solar, and modern biomass) 
as well as, to a lesser extent, peat and coal. One of the most celebrated 
examples of increasing energy security by switching to indigenous fuels 
is the Brazilian ethanol program, which resulted in the replacement of a 
large share of imported oil as a transport fuel by domestically produced 
ethanol. Developing renewable energy resources is seen not only as 
addressing more pressing and immediate concerns with the volatilities 
and uncertainties of global fossil fuel markets, but also a more systemic 
and long-term pressure of the perceived scarcity of fossil fuels and in 
order to reduce climate impacts of energy systems. 
 Launching or expanding national nuclear energy programs may also be 
viewed as a sovereignty strategy. Although few states can build and man-
age a nuclear power plant and the related nuclear fuel cycle on their own, 
they typically feel that there are fewer uncertainties beyond their control 
once the facility is up and running. Nuclear power can also be considered 
a diversification strategy for states relying on fossil fuels. For example, 
several Gulf States are import-independent but excessively relying on oil 
and gas for their electricity generation (Jewell,  2010 ). Another example 
is Belarus, whose electricity sector almost entirely depends on imported 
Russian natural gas. Belarus’ planned nuclear power plant will be manu-
factured from Russian parts and most likely use Russian fuel and expert-
ise, thus not reducing the country’s dependency on its neighbor. However, 
it will provide the much-needed diversity in terms of related technologies, 
markets, and institutions so that disruptions of natural gas supply will not 
necessarily be devastating for the country’s electricity sector. 
 5.3.1.2  Robustness and Resilience Strategies 
 Robustness strategies focus on minimizing predictable and manageable 
risks within energy systems. For example, many industrialized countries 
have extensive standards concerning the reliability of electricity trans-
mission and generation (European Parliament,  2006 ; North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation,  2010 ). Robustness strategies may also 
be focused on constraining demand. For example, following the oil 
crisis of the early 1970s, Japan, the United States, and eight Western 
European countries (including energy-exporting Norway) reduced their 
energy intensity by 30–34% (Geller et al.,  2006 ). In its current energy 
strategy, Russia aims to reduce the energy intensity of its economy by 
40% by 2020, as compared to 2007 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation,  2010 ). However, no single country in modern times has been 
able to deliberately reduce or even stabilize its overall energy use over a 
long term, though demand could be reduced temporarily in response to 
short-term disruptions (Meier,  2005 ). 
 Resilience of an energy system is its ability to provide critical energy 
services in the face of disruptions. The concept of resilience has recently 
been brought into the public energy security debate, in particular in the 
United States, where an influential public figure commented in 2008:
 Our aim should not be total independence from foreign sources 
of petroleum. That is neither practical nor necessary in a world 
of interdependent economies. Instead, the objective should be 
developing a sufficient degree of resilience against disruptions in 
imports. Think of resilience as the ability to absorb a significant 
disruption, bigger than what could be managed by drawing down 
the strategic oil reserve (Grove,  2008 ). 
 Enhancing the ability to cope with short-term disruptions that do not 
alter the fundamental character of energy systems is often more prom-
inent in national energy security strategies. For example, emergency 
fuel stocks, which are currently maintained by all developed and many 








1 Saudi Aramco NOC 264.3 21.9
2 National Iranian Oil Co. NOC 137.5 11.4
3 Iraq National Oil Co. NOC 115.0 9.5
4 Kuwait Petroleum Corp. NOC 101.5 8.4
5 Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. NOC 92.2 7.6
6 Petr ó leos de Venezuala S.A. NOC 80.0 6.6
7 National Oil Corp of Libya NOC 41.5 3.4
8 Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. NOC 36.2 3.0
9 Lukoil (Russian G8 Presidency) IOC 16.1 1.3
10 Qatar Petroleum NOC 15.2 1.3
11 Gazprom NOC 13.8 1.1
12 Pemex (Mexico) NOC 12.9 1.1
13 Petrobras (Brazil) NOC 12.2 1.0
14 China National Petroleum Corp. NOC 11.5 1.0
15 Chevron (USA) IOC 8.0 0.7
 Total, top 15 957.9 79.3
Source: BP, 2007; Klare,  2008 .
 25  The French government holds a 37.5% stake in GDF Suez. 
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developing countries, address the risks of unexpected short-term 
interruptions of oil supply or price volatility. Some European countries 
now have emergency storage of natural gas, which serves the same 
purpose and proved instrumental in dealing with the shutdown of 
Russian gas deliveries to Europe in  2006 and  2009 . Russia is exploring 
constructing its own gas storage facilities to deal with potential inter-
ruptions of delivery, be it for economic, political, or technical reasons. 
 Another resilience strategy is increasing diversity. Diversity can ensure 
that an energy system is able to adjust to more systemic disruptions. It 
is important to distinguish between various types of “diversity” that can 
relate to individual elements or aspects of energy systems. 
 Many energy security strategies contain elements of diversification. 
These range from increasing the number of import/export routes, ori-
gins, or destinations, to increasing the number of actors in the energy 
sector or the number and types of energy facilities and primary energy 
sources. Some of the diversity strategies only address relatively lim-
ited threats. For example, diversification of import and export routes 
does not address global price volatility or resource scarcity. In order 
to deal with more systemic and long-term risks to energy security, 
more profound diversity strategies are needed. For example, many 
energy-exporting states are aware of their long-term vulnerability to 
price fluctuations, eventual resource depletion, and the resource curse. 
Some of them, most notably the Gulf States and Russia, proclaim stra-
tegic focus on diversification of their economies away from reliance 
on energy exports. 
 Diversity can also be fostered by certain types of institutions. Although 
the key rationale for introducing energy markets is economic efficiency, 
markets may also foster diversity. The existence of the global oil market, 
where the ability of any single actor to significantly disrupt the supply is 
limited, is an example of enhancing security through diversity. Naturally, 
markets (and international trade in general) may also have negative 
effects on resilience and sovereignty, as further discussed below. 
 5.3.1.3  Limitations of National Strategies 
 The majority of countries in the world pursues or at least declares 
energy security strategies that have both resilience and sovereignty 
dimensions. These strategies, however, have generally not been effec-
tive, which is best evidenced by the presentation of the dire situation 
of energy security in the world. The reasons for this ineffectiveness are 
manifold. First of all, the strategies may be internally inconsistent or 
otherwise poorly designed. 
 It has proven to be very difficult to strategically reconcile various aspects 
of energy security. Some measures to boost short-term energy security 
have had negative impacts in the long term. Certain resilience strat-
egies have adversely affected sovereignty, and vice versa. For example, 
liberalized markets may have increased the diversity of supply options 
but lead to increased price volatility and reduce the (real or perceived) 
control of critical resources by the government. 
 Similarly, some sovereignty strategies negatively affect resilience. 
Asserting control may increase confidence but also increase the object-
ively measured risks and vulnerabilities. For example, nationalization of 
oil and gas sectors has in some cases resulted in decreased govern-
ment income from energy revenues due to increasing inefficiencies. 26 
Squeezing foreign companies out of energy projects has also resulted 
in underinvestment and thus the deterioration of infrastructure, as 
national governments have not possesed the necessary capital, technol-
ogy, and know-how. 
 The next reason for the mixed record of national sovereignty strategies 
lies in the fact that energy policies become too entangled with economic 
interests, foreign policy, and even conventional security imperatives. 
Foreign bids by Sinopec, PetroChina, and the CNOOC, for instance, tend 
to be accompanied by Chinese state aid projects; Gazprom’s efforts to 
make the Ukraine pay “market prices” serves both Gazprom’s economic 
and Russian state foreign policy interests. In addition, NOCs do not nec-
essarily rely on financial markets when financing their exploration and 
production endeavors, and also enjoy a compelling lender of last resort: 
the state. Such “political” components of the NOCs’ operation almost by 
definition compromise their energy security performance. What is worse, 
there is a dangerous trend of viewing energy security policies as an 
extension of conventional security policies, which leads to the discourse 
of geopolitics considered in more detail in the next section. 
 The other line of NOCs’ evolution is perhaps more promising, even 
though it goes against the hope of asserting their parent states’ con-
trol over energy resources. Observers note that maturing NOCs behave 
more and more like private companies, especially when operating in 
global or international markets. This is because they are subject to the 
same market rules and pressures. In particular, and ironically, some 
NOCs are affected by the same “resource nationalism” of host coun-
tries that resulted in their emergence in the first place. The case in point 
is Petrobras, a Brazilian semi-public NOC, having its assets nationalized 
in Bolivia. As any globally operating company, NOCs seek a stable and 
transparent regulatory environment, a level playing field, and well-pro-
tected property rights. 27 
 The final reason for the lack of success may lie in the fundamental limi-
tations to conceive and implement an energy security strategy by a sin-
gle nation-state acting alone. It is quite obvious that small economies 
are rarely, if ever, able to implement energy system transformations 
on their own, since they simply do not possess the necessary financial, 
 26  A case in point here is Venezuela’s PDVSA, which has experienced a strong downward 
trend both in output and overall efﬁ ciency after Chavez’s re-nationalization of the 
energy sector in 2003. 
 27  That is why Russian Gazprom is, for example, domestically championing corporate 
social responsibility and other “good business” causes and the CNOC is reportedly 
considering joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
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technological, and human resources. For example, a study shows that 
launching a national nuclear power program relying on their own 
resources may be out of reach for at least 28 of the 52 countries that 
expressed an interest in nuclear energy based on their energy security 
imperatives (Jewell,  2011 ). 
 Even larger countries face serious limitations in ensuring their own 
energy security. This is not only due to lack of capacity, but also to the 
natural reflexivity of energy security. If states start acting alone or in 
closed groups, other states may perceive their actions as threats to 
their own energy security. In no time, energy security becomes a “zero-
sum game” dominated by “geopolitical” and other discourses drawn 
from the vocabulary of diplomacy and military security. We turn to such 
developments in the next section. 
 5.3.2  Energy, Geopolitics, and Confrontation: the 
Specter of Energy Wars 
 A comprehensive understanding of energy security includes perceptions 
and perspectives of nation-states alongside “objective” indicators. A pecu-
liar aspect of such perceptions is reflexivity: their ability to dynamically 
influence each other. If the position or actions of a country are perceived 
as a “threat” to energy security, other countries may start responding in 
such a way that is also perceived as threatening, causing another round 
of threatening responses, etc. The situation may escalate into a zero-sum 
game, with the energy security of certain nations only being achieved at 
the expense of other nations. Eventually, such developments may result in 
a lack of much-needed confidence, disrupted cooperation, increased ten-
sions, or even conflicts over energy resources or infrastructure. 
 The risk of conflicts over energy resources is a significant concern on 
the global security agenda. The extreme form of such confrontation is 
a much-feared “resource war” – an inter-state armed conflict aimed 
to secure access to energy resources. In 1980, the US President Jimmy 
Carter proclaimed that the United States would use military force in the 
Persian Gulf region to defend its national interests, specifically “the free 
movement of Middle Eastern oil” (Carter,  1980 ). The fear of resource 
wars has considerably grown in recent years, particularly prompted by 
the rise of the “new consumers” of globally tradable energy resources 
(India and China), concerns over inadequate capacity to meet the 
increasing demand for oil, rising oil prices, and a series of high-profile 
disputes involving Russian gas supply to Europe. An influential geopo-
litical school of thought (e.g., Klare,  2008 ) points to numerous factors 
increasing the risk of such a confrontation in the near future. 
 Other researchers (Jaffe et al.,  2008 ) note that there have been very 
few – if any – resource wars in the recent past 28 (save the Iraq-Kuwait 
war of 1990) and downplay the risks of such conflicts in the future. The 
arguments about the future probability of oil conflicts are difficult to 
resolve. On the one hand, the risk of resource wars significantly depends 
upon non-energy factors such as the capacity of international and bilat-
eral regimes and institutions; on the other hand, the configuration of 
global oil production, trade, and use are undoubtedly major factors 
determining such risks. Moreover, there are several forms of confronta-
tions involving energy resources that are only marginally less worrisome 
than resource wars. 
 First, energy resources, particularly oil, have played an important role 
(sometimes as a weapon) in past inter-state confrontations, including 
armed conflicts. The “tanker war” linked to the Iran-Iraq conflict, the 
Arab oil embargo related to the Arab-Israeli war, and other modern 
examples are listed in  Table 5.9 . It may be argued that the presence of 
oil (or many other natural resources, for that matter) have made some 
armed conflicts more prolonged or destructive. 
 Second, energy resources and infrastructure have shaped inter-state 
relations, prompting either collaboration or confrontation or, more com-
monly, a mixture of both. The most prominent examples include:
 the dispute over borders in the potentially oil- and gas-rich Arctic  •
(but also possible collaboration over the exploration of oil and gas 
in the Arctic); similar disputes have also been documented in other 
regions; 29 
 debates over gas and oil pipeline routes in Eurasia (such as the Nord  •
Stream gas pipeline bringing Russian gas to Western Europe and the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (TBC) pipeline transporting Caspian oil to the 
Mediterranean); these were closely linked to several heated disputes 
over gas and oil supplies between Russia and former Soviet states in 
Eastern Europe (Belarus and Ukraine), as well as in the Caucasus; 
 military and development support from major oil importers (nota- •
bly the United States and China) to some oil-producing and transit 
countries in Africa (e.g., Sudan and Nigeria), the Gulf Region (e.g., 
Saudi Arabia), the Caucasus (Georgia and Azerbaijan), and Central 
Asia (e.g., Kazakhstan); which is often linked to: 
 the struggle for influence in the remaining few oil-producing regions  •
among major oil importers (the United States, Western Europe, 
China, and Japan). 
 Third, increasingly strained supplies of energy resources justify the 
growing deployment of military overseas to “protect” oil infrastructure 
(for example, terminals, tanker routes, etc.) against real and perceived 
threats and disruptions. The recent creation of the US Navy command 
 29  The Spratly Islands are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam; parts of them are 
claimed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei (Klare,  2008 ). The Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) are claimed by the United Kingdom and Argentina (Luft,  2010 ). 
 28  On the other hand, historically more wars can be linked to some resource issues. The 
very devastating Paraguay-Argentinean war (1932–1935) for Gran Chaco was for 
presumed oil reserves in that area (that never materialized). Many aspects of World 
War II (e.g., Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies or the German-Soviet battle 
over the Caucasus) also had an oil sub-text. 
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for Africa (AFRICOM) and Russia’s plans to increase its military presence 
in the Baltic to protect the Nord Stream gas pipeline (as well as the 
Swedish response of increasing its own forces in the Baltic) are quoted 
as some examples. US national security and oil imports, as well as the 
implications of various energy issues for the US Navy, have been the 
subject of two recent RAND reports (see  Box 5.9 ). 
 Not only do energy resources (particularly oil and gas) shape inter-state 
relations, but they may also affect internal security issues, especially 
in poorer countries that face nation-building challenges. Current inter-
ethnic conflicts in Iraq – largely related to oil – are most prominent, but 
energy resources shape and color internal tensions in many other coun-
tries. Civil wars in Angola, Colombia, the Republic of Congo, Indonesia 
(Aceh), Morocco, and Sudan, as well as a simmering conflict in the Niger 
Delta in Nigeria (see  Box 5.10 ), have also been linked to oil. Whether the 
political challenges of allocating revenues from oil and gas production 
will lead to instability and conflict depends on the quality of governance 
and institutions as well as key international actors. 
 Finally, there have been concerns about the connection between energy 
resources and international terrorism, particularly the argument that 
oil revenues help to fund terrorist activities. However, very few, if any, 
facts have been found to support this assertion except circumstantial 
evidence that certain terrorist organizations and individuals come from 
the Arab-speaking countries which also happen to have significant oil 
reserves. On the contrary, many researchers point out that terrorism is 
a “low-cost activity” that does not depend on oil revenues. Moreover, 
the emergence of contemporary terrorist networks (such as al-Qaeda) 
occurred in the mid-1990s when oil revenues were at their lowest. On 
the other hand, the resource curse – i.e., economic and political prob-
lems in many poor oil-exporting countries, described earlier – has con-
tributed to dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement of individuals and 
social groups that eventually support or engage in terrorist activities. 30 
 Table 5.9 |  Major inter-state conﬂ icts and tensions related to oil and gas systems 




Security event or measure
1950 US and other oil exports to 
China
The Western bloc’s Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls placed China under an oil 
embargo during the Korean War of 1950.
1956 Saudi oil reserves/production Saudi oil embargo against France and the 
United Kingdom following the Suez crisis
1967 Middle Eastern oil embargo Imposed by Arab nations on the USA, the 
UK or in relation to all oil exports after 
the beginning of the Six-Day War.
1973–1974 Oil production/reserves of Arab 
oil exporting countries
OPEC and Arab oil embargo, generating 
the ﬁ rst “oil price shock”
1979 Oil exports of Iran Iranian revolution
1980 Crude oil exports of Iran/Iraq “Tanker War” between Iraq and Iran
1981 Algerian gas supply “Gas Battle” between Algeria, Italy, the 
United States and others
1990–1991 Kuwait oil reserves Iraq invasion of Kuwait eventually 
repelled by the United States and allies
2003 Russian crude oil delivery/
pipeline infrastructure
Cut-off in Russian oil supplies to Latvia
2003 Iraq and Middle East oil 
reserves
US invasion of Iraq
2005 Pricing mechanism of Russian 
gas
Gas dispute/cut-off in Russian gas 
supplies to Georgia
2006 Pricing mechanism of Russian 
gas
Cut-off in Russian gas supplies to Ukraine 
and Moldova
2006 Russian crude oil delivery/
pipeline infrastructure
Cut-off in Russian oil supplies to Lithuania
2007 Pricing mechanism of Russian 
oil deliveries to Ukraine
Russian interruption of the Druzhba oil 
pipeline
2009 Pricing mechanism of Russian 
gas
Cut-off in gas supplies to Western Europe, 
causing side unclear (Ukraine or Russia)
 30  This hypothesis explains why terrorism often emerges during low rather than high oil 
prices when the level of popular dissatisfaction may be highest in those economies 
that primarily rely on oil revenues for their welfare programs. 
 31  USCENTCOM is a military force created in 1979 to be available for worldwide contin-
gencies. However, its focus quickly tilted heavily toward the Persian Gulf region. 
 Box 5.9 |  Energy and US Defense Costs 
 Due to heavy dependency of the United States on imported oil, access to foreign oil remains a top priority driving the country’s strategy 
and defense policy. US military forces have been present in the Persian Gulf since the 1970s to protect access to Middle Eastern oil. US 
efforts to ensure secure access to foreign oil also include, since the 1990s, deepened ties (economic, political, and military) with oil-
producing states in Central Asia, South America, and West Africa. 
 The presence of US military forces to maintain the security of international oil ﬂ ows for the global market undoubtedly incurs substantial 
costs. However, to date, there has been no comprehensive, accurate, publicly available US government study of the costs. Nevertheless, 
several attempts have been made to quantify them. In general, the analyses addressed the costs incurred by US Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) 31 in its mission to protect the maritime transit of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, as well as to assist in 
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the defense of United States-friendly oil-producing governments. Estimates in these studies have varied from as low as US 2005 $12 billion 
up to as high as US 2005 $130 billion of military spending per year, representing, respectively, 2.5% and 27% of the defense budget in 2006. 
This range in estimates reﬂ ects the complexity of how US forces are planned and operated and, thus, the difﬁ culty of being very speciﬁ c 
in allocating precise costs to this mission. 
 Recently, two RAND research teams estimated the incremental costs that the US government would likely avoid if it were to entirely drop 
the mission of ensuring the secure production and transit of oil from the Persian Gulf for the global market. Estimates of potential annual 
savings amounted to between US$67.5 billion and US$83 billion – respectively, 12% and 15% of the US defense budget. However, 
these estimates do not claim to be precise. Moreover, RAND’s analysis does not argue that a partial reduction of the US dependency on 
imported oil would automatically lead to a proportional reduction in US spending that is focused on this mission (Crane et al.,  2009 ). 
Another RAND study predicts that the defense budget is likely to decrease due to future increased social spending for the United States’ 
growing numbers of elderly citizens, which, in turn, will likely affect the incremental amount available for protecting oil supply and transit 
(Gordon et al.,  2008 ). 
 Two other academic assessments produce similarly startling ﬁ gures. Researchers at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the United 
States estimated that from 1970 to 2004 American dependency on foreign supplies of oil has cost the country US$5.6–14.6 trillion in 
macroeconomic shocks and unnecessary transfers of wealth. 32 When the numbers are adjusted to 2007 dollars, the amount is greater 
than the costs of all wars fought by the country going back to the Revolutionary War, including both invasions of Iraq. Researchers from 
the University of California-Davis and University of Alaska-Anchorage calculated that US defense expenditures exclusively to protect oil 
in the Persian Gulf amount to about US 2005 $28 billion to US 2005 $75 billion per year (Delucchi and Murphy,  2008 ). 
 Box 5.10 |  Resource Wealth, Civil Conﬂ ict and Disruption of Oil Supplied in Nigeria 
 The complex interplay between resource wealth, political and inter-ethnic conﬂ ict, and its impact on production facilities, infrastructure, 
and output is evident in the case of political conﬂ ict in the energy-rich Niger Delta. Nigeria is one of the world’s top 10 oil exporters and 
produced around 3% of the world’s total output in 2006 (BP,  2007 ). Yet traditional tension between different ethnic groups in the Niger 
Delta, one of the most densely populated areas in the world, turned into violent conﬂ ict as oil revenue started to pour into the country. 
The behavior of large oil corporations and poor capacities of the local government is largely regarded as having contributed to raising 
the degree of violence and to prolonging conﬂ ict. Violence has become a major cause of slowing production and causing interruptions 
in Nigerian crude deliveries. Attacking installations, kidnapping oil corporations’ personnel, and siphoning off crude from pipelines have 
become common features. In 2006, militant attacks on oil facilities resulted in a shutdown of almost 500,000 barrels per day, or 20% of 
Nigeria’s oil output. In addition, oil tankers have been stolen, with the crude being sold on foreign markets (Vesely,  2004 ). 
 5.3.3  Energy Alliances, Institutions, and Markets 
 Despite the rhetoric of geopolitics, the zero-sum game, and the resource 
wars, the actual international interaction in the field of energy security 
has so far been largely dominated not by conflict but by cooperation, 
albeit imperfect. This section examines the existing cooperation mecha-
nisms as well as their successes and shortcomings. 
 At the moment there is no overarching global energy institution, 
but rather a plethora of alliances, multi- and bilateral deals, and 
 32  Source: Greene and Ahmad,  2005 . Numbers have been adjusted to US 2007 $. 
arrangements. The most significant international energy alliances unite 
major exporters and importers of energy (primarily oil). First and fore-
most, these include OPEC, established in 1960 in Baghdad, with the 
aim of regulating global oil production. OPEC seeks to influence oil 
prices by adjusting production levels through the use of a quota sys-
tem. At present, OPEC member states control around 80% of global oil 
reserves and almost half of global production. Gas-producing countries 
established the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in 2001, which 
remains a rather loose gas club that might – depending on the devel-
opment of the take-or-pay-dominated market – potentially become a 
future gas cartel similar to OPEC. 
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 The International Energy Agency (IEA) is a watchdog for energy-import-
ing members of the OECD. It has developed rules concerning strategic 
petroleum reserves and a supply shock emergency response mecha-
nism. The IEA can draw on the International Energy Program (IEP, estab-
lished in 1974) for larger supply interruptions, and on the coordinated 
emergency response mechanism (CERM), which applies for smaller 
emergencies. 
 Another type of energy alliance is formed on the basis of regional 
proximity. One example is the EU, whose prototype, the European 
Community for Coal and Steel, was created to govern access to coal 
resources, the then-dominant energy source. The EU aims to operate a 
single energy market. For that purpose, it fosters an integrated energy 
infrastructure (such as in electricity and natural gas) and liberalized 
cross-border trade of energy services governed by common rules and 
policy agenda. The EU has also sought to develop a common energy 
policy towards third parties, encompassing energy security and other 
energy-related goals as well as environmental and climate-related 
topics. Vis- à -vis main producers, the EU has initiated steps towards 
linking up with neighboring regions via energy partnerships within 
the realm of various agreements, including the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Russia, or via efforts targeting the 
Maghreb/Mashrek region. Project proposals also exist for the large 
scale import of renewably generated electricity from northern Africa 
(Komendantova et al.,  2009 ). 
 Another regional club is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
uniting Russia, Central Asian countries (all net energy exporters), and 
China (an energy importer). Whether the energy role of the SCO will 
extend beyond declarations is so far not clear. Regional “clubs” with 
energy agendas also exist in other regions. For example, in West Africa, 
common arrangements feature the West African Power Pool, West Africa 
Gas Pipeline projects, and the West Africa Regional Energy Access ini-
tiative, all designed to reduce energy insecurity in the region. Similar 
arrangements are being tried with the East African Power Pool and the 
Southern Africa Power Pool. 
 Some energy alliances have also been established based on nations’ 
economic, rather than regional, characteristics. For example, the his-
torically prominent G7, created in the aftermath of the first oil shock 
in 1973, gathered the largest economies of that time (Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Canada) to 
coordinate its members’ energy-related and macroeconomic policies. 
The G7 did not noticeably address energy issues during the almost two-
decade-long low-price period on the oil market from the early 1980s to 
the early 2000s. It was joined by Russia in 2004, becoming the G8, and 
has recently sought to include other large economies including major 
consumers and producers of energy (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, 
and Mexico) to become the G20. However, the G8 and G20’s energy 
activities so far have been limited to declarations rather than to estab-
lishing permanent effective institutions. 
 The relationships between various different alliances are sometimes 
portrayed as competition or confrontation. 33 In our view, a more accur-
ate description would be that of “non-engagement.” As already noted, 
there are very few global energy rules or institutions extending beyond 
specific alliances. The International Energy Forum (IEF), an organization 
that seeks to unite energy exporters and importers, has not yet resulted 
in any tangible institutions or arrangements. Perhaps the only widely 
applicable organizing principle is that of a free market for certain energy 
products, most importantly oil. 
 Establishing a global oil market was facilitated by the advances in 
transportation and communication technologies, as well as the end of 
the Cold War. As a result, many security concerns of the 1970s and the 
earlier era have subsided. The producer countries are no longer at the 
mercy of international oil corporations dictating their conditions (see 
also  Box 5.11 on IOCs and NOCs). The consumer countries can seam-
lessly switch and mix suppliers and not worry about excessive depend-
ency on a single supplier. The global oil trade system can assimilate 
minor shocks of disruptions in particular countries or regions. 
 However, the free market has its limitations. For example, it does not func-
tion well under conditions of imperfect information or monopoly, which 
often arise naturally in the case of grid based carriers (compare to  Chapter 
22 ). Also the global oil market has increasingly developed some of these 
features. Information about reserves and production capacities has been 
severely impeded by an explicit non-reporting policy of OPEC and other 
exporters. Moreover, due to the increasing geographic concentration of oil 
reserves and the lack of suitable substitutes, the global supply develops 
the characteristics of a monopoly. In addition, as discussed above in rela-
tion to national energy security, markets tend to under-provide such public 
goods as sufficient investment in production capacity and infrastructure. 
 This last feature has been empirically observed in the case of global 
oil markets. A prime example includes the current global shift from a 
“strategically planned,” vertically integrated approach in the energy 
industry, practiced even in private companies, towards decision-making 
based on immediate economic objectives such as return on capital. This 
shift, partially encouraged by the financial investment community and 
seen especially in the low oil price environment of the 1990s, led to a 
decrease in spare capacity in production, storage, and transportation, 
thus increasing the effects of even small disruptions. Markets in their 
current shape tend not to reward players for maintaining spare capacity 
and do not have adequate mechanisms for charging for capacity on a 
pay-as-you-go basis, which tends to enhance booms and busts. Price 
hikes effectively allow some of those market players who did invest for 
extraordinary circumstances to obtain a return on their investments, 
albeit in a one-off fashion, as opposed to a constant stream of income. 
 33  For example, the SCO is sometimes considered a “geopolitical bloc” aimed at under-
mining the US presence in Central Asia. In the eyes of some pundits, such new geopol-
itical constellations will be increasingly framed by energy issues and will compete with 
each other (e.g., the SCO competing with the United States and Japan in the Western 
Paciﬁ c). See, among others, Klare,  2008 . 
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To buffer these shortcomings, institutional arrangements need to be 
strengthened to provide for a greater degree of information, notably 
data collection and exchange. Here, the IEA’s data-generating activities 
(though notoriously criticized on analytical fronts and short on infor-
mation on producing countries) and institutions of producer-consumer 
cooperation such as the IEF in Riyadh become essential. The IEF’s Joint 
Oil Data Initiative (JODI) is a particularly promising step. 
 Finally, there are vocal concerns that market arrangements might crum-
ble in the face of rapidly unfolding scarcity or another severe energy 
security crisis. According to Klare ( 2008 ):
 Oil will cease to be primarily a trade commodity, to be bought and 
sold on the international market, becoming instead the preeminent 
strategic resource on the planet, whose acquisition, production, and 
distribution will increasingly absorb the time, effort, and focus of 
senior government and military officials. 
 While it is difficult to judge the validity of such concerns, history definitely 
provides many examples of when market arrangements were either heav-
ily modified or entirely replaced by other rules in times of severe crisis. This 
leads many observers to believe that markets should not be viewed as the 
only or the most effective mechanism for providing energy security. 
 To summarize this brief overview of the most notable international insti-
tutions, the world governance of energy security has been ineffective for 
the following two reasons: 
 First, there has been little success in creating institutions that would 
serve and include key actors and stakeholders. There is no effective 
organization that would unite exporters and importers of energy. Some 
of the largest consumers, China and India, are not part of the “importers 
club,” the IEA. The majority of countries are simply “too small” to qualify 
for various memberships, although their energy security concerns are no 
less significant than those of larger countries. 
 Second, the existing energy security institutions largely focus on 
oil and partially on naturally gas. This is understandable from the 
point of view of the present concerns, where these resources are at 
the front and center of energy security. However, this also shapes 
the expertise and the frame of reference of the existing institutions 
and largely predetermines their inability to govern seriously sys-
temic energy transitions involving various supply, infrastructure, and 
demand elements. 
 Third, the international arena governing energy security should be 
more strongly connected to the international arenas governing cli-
mate change and supporting the provision of access to modern energy. 
These three arenas have historically developed in isolation from each 
other, but it is no longer possible for them to operate independently 
in the world where energy challenges are increasingly entangled 
(Cherp et al.,  2011 ). 
 Potential pathways for the future evolution of global energy security 
institutions are touched upon in  Section 5.3 . 
 34  The “Seven Sisters” consisted of Exxon (or Esso, Humble, Standard of NJ), Royal Dutch 
Shell, BP (originally British Petroleum, Burmah Oil + Anglo-Iranian), Gulf, Texaco, Mobil 
(Standard of NY or Socony-Vacuum), and Chevron (Standard of California). 
 Box 5.11 |  IOCs, NOCs and the Global Oil Market 
 The origins of the current global oil market date back to the 1930s. At that point, the industry became dominated by a small number of 
transnational corporations, controlling most of the sales of oil products. Most oil-rich nations lacked the domestic capacity to develop 
their reserves and were thus dependent on these large, integrated oil companies, also since the latter controlled the downstream assets 
in the main Western markets. The notions of the “Seven Sisters” or “Big Oil” still reﬂ ect the unprecedented power of the Western-
dominated international oil companies (IOCs) in that era. 34 US policies supporting the “one base” or “Gulf plus freight” formula (later 
revised to the “two base” oil pricing formula) helped maintain a single price for all oil consumers outside the United States and secured 
enormous rents for this cartel. Until the 1960s, the United States was a major producer and a net exporter of oil. Thereafter, the decline 
of US mainland production, coinciding with the process of decolonialization and a growth in nationalism in producing countries shifted 
the balance of (market) power to the countries actually owning the resources. OPEC, initially established to enable producing countries 
to enhance their share in oil revenues vis- à -vis the dominating Western IOCs, is a result of this process, and profoundly changed the 
global oil market by introducing production quotas, a tool to inﬂ uence oil prices. In response to OPEC’s cartelization efforts in the 
1970s, industrialized countries established the IEA, a consumers’ club intended to strengthen the market power of importing nations; in 
addition, they pushed for energy efﬁ ciency improvements and the development of advanced offshore production techniques in the 1970s 
and the 1980s, leading to the opening up of new hydrocarbon provinces. As a result, the global oil market became more liquid and highly 
integrated, reducing the power of OPEC to set prices. OPEC defended the high price level established in 1980 by cutting production 
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every year until 1986, the long-term trends of world oil demand and non-OPEC supply eventually resulting in longer prices. However, in 
the new millennium, due to economic globalization and a steep rise in demand from “emerging consumers” (e.g., India and China), the 
pendulum has again swung back. In addition, ﬁ nancial market actors and mechanisms have entered the global oil market, which is now 
characterized by a variety of hedging instruments, swap and future contracts. 
 As this brief historical survey suggests, IOCs – i.e., private players – dominated the oil market for a long time. Historically, many of them 
(BP and the predecessors of Total, ENI) were fully or majority-owned by Western governments, and even private companies enjoyed 
a high level of support from their home states. In that respect, their role was somewhat comparable to the national oil companies 
(NOCs) from emerging importing nations such as India and China: a secure energy supply for their home nations abroad. With a more 
integrated global oil market, these companies have become fully ﬂ edged proﬁ t-driven enterprises. IOCs see their core competence in the 
ability to mobilize the large amounts of capital, equipment, and manpower required to develop and manage large projects; to use their 
technical expertise and know-how to reach even increasingly difﬁ cult reserves; and to live with price and resource market uncertainties 
and to manage political risks even in “frontier” environments through large investment portfolios. IOCs usually received a share in the 
upstream (equity oil) of the projects in which they were involved. More recently, and particularly against the backdrop of rising resource 
nationalism and market pressure to reduce costs, a second set of private players including integrated service providers (ISPs) such as 
Halliburton and Schlumberger have entered the scene. These companies bring in their specialized expertise and act as contractors to both 
IOCs and NOCs. In contrast to IOCs, they usually do not engage in exploration and production projects with their own capital. 
 5.4  The Future of Energy Security 
 This section considers possible future developments in energy security. 
It discusses the implications of projected or likely demographic, eco-
nomic, natural resource, technological, and institutional developments. 
It also lays the foundation for a quantitative analysis of energy secur-
ity under sustainable energy transition pathways modeled in GEA. This 
analysis is presented in  Chapter 17 . 
 5.4.1  Technology and Resource Developments 
 The role of oil on the global energy security scene will likely become even 
more important in the short- to medium-term future. Oil production will 
probably become more geographically concentrated, and demand for oil 
will continue to increase, primarily in Asia. Several present-day export-
ers (for example, the United Kingdom and Argentina) will likely become 
importers, and many countries will need to import more in both abso-
lute and relative terms. The  World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA,  2010a ) 
predicts that both supply and demand of oil will become less responsive 
to prices, which will likely lead to long-term price increases for this fuel. 
At one point in the future, perhaps as soon as in one or two decades, the 
global production of conventional oil will likely “peak” or “plateau.” 
 Many concerns have been expressed in connection with this imminent 
“peak oil.” Some predictions paint a collapse of organized oil mar-
kets with catastrophic economic, and possibly political and military, 
consequences (Korowicz,  2010 ). It seems more likely that peak oil will 
have many more localized effects on those countries (mostly in the 
developing world) that lack the capacity to cope with steep increases 
in energy prices. Whether the international community will be able to 
mitigate the shock for these and other countries depends not only on 
other technological and resource developments but also upon the pres-
ence, focus, and effectiveness of global energy governance institutions 
in the future. 
 The production of natural gas is also likely to become more concentrated, 
but it is unlikely to peak in the nearest decades. The main developments 
affecting the situation with natural gas will most likely be advances in 
transportation technologies and infrastructure. A much more extended 
network of gas pipelines is likely to emerge in Eurasia, linking Russian 
and Central Asian producers not only to Europe but also to China and 
the rest of Asia. The development of LNG infrastructure will lead to the 
sharp increase in intercontinental trade. Growing LNG trade, while con-
tributing to the emergence of a truly global natural gas market, may 
imply similar supply security patterns as the global oil market, including 
an increasing dependency on less reliable producer countries, transpor-
tation choke-points, and global supply-demand balances. Technological 
developments affecting the accessibility of shale and other unconven-
tional gas may also alter the global gas market landscape, although the 
exact extent of this much-heralded “shale gas revolution” are difficult 
to predict. 
 A likely consequence of the dynamics of global oil and natural gas pro-
duction will be a shift away from these energy sources, which is already 
vigorously pursued by many countries. It is unlikely that a new globally 
dominant source of energy, such as oil, will be found. Instead, there will 
be a shift to diverse sources, appropriate to national and regional con-
texts. One such source may be coal, especially if technologically and eco-
nomically acceptable ways of low-carbon utilization of coal are found. 
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 Nuclear energy will clearly be another alternative to fossil fuels con-
sidered by many countries. While the global scale of future nuclear 
expansion is not clear, it is likely that nuclear energy will be able to 
address energy security challenges only in a relatively limited number of 
countries. At the moment, the lion’s share of the world’s nuclear capac-
ity is concentrated in the United States, whereas almost all short-term 
growth occurs in China, other Asian economies, France, and Russia. For 
most of the other countries with existing nuclear energy programs, such 
programs may become a liability rather than a solution to their energy 
security challenges. 
 There are over 50 “newcomer countries” that are interested in launch-
ing nuclear energy programs for the first time, by and large, to meet 
their energy security needs. According to Jewell ( 2011 ), safe deployment 
of nuclear power is likely in only 10 such countries under present condi-
tions. Others will need very significant international help, including pos-
sibly forming energy partnerships among themselves, or dramatically 
altered nuclear energy markets and policies (see  Figure 5.7 ). 
 Finally, oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear power may be partially displaced 
by renewable energy sources. One such source is biomass. If the future bio-
fuels or biomass systems assume production and transportation patterns 
similar to that of present-day fossil fuels (i.e., concentrated production 
regions away from consuming regions and large centralized refineries), they 
may also become subject to similar risks and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, 
the availability of biomass feedstocks may be disrupted by climate change 
as well as policies guided by conflicting uses (e.g., food production or eco-
systems preservation). Given the emerging state of the present-day biofu-
els systems, the scale of these risks is difficult to estimate. 
 Replacing with other renewables (such as wind and solar) will require 
technological innovation and creation of new infrastructure, including 
(as penetrations rise significantly) new systems for the storage and dis-
tribution of energy and for possible new propulsion systems for vehicles 
(e.g., electricity or hydrogen). There are possibilities that the storage 
requirements associated with large-scale electricity system transitions 
towards distributed renewable resources may be offset by synergies 
between parallel emerging smart management procedures for distrib-
uted energy storage in electric vehicles. Relatively simple co-ordination 
systems enabling the remote control of certain consumer products also 
offer an important resource in cost-effective management of intermit-
tency and other electricity security challenges. Specific technologies for 
carbon capture at centralized fossil fuel plants may also present oppor-
tunities for improving capacity to manage intermittency. These devel-
opments introduce a potentially significant level of effective aggregate 
electricity system storage capacity as a side effect. However, the task of 
 Figure 5.7 |  Feasibility and uncertainty of nuclear power adoption by new countries. Source: Jewell,  2011 . 
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realizing the positive synergies of these technological innovations raises 
many challenges for associated infrastructural, organizational, contrac-
tual, and regulatory innovation. Wind, solar, and hydro energy are more 
likely to be produced domestically and thus not invoke traditional sov-
ereignty concerns. However, there are also plans (such as Desertec) to 
generate solar energy for intercontinental trade. 
 Another imminent development affecting energy security in the future 
is the increasing role of electricity in energy systems. Electricity will play 
a more important role due to the likely advent of plug-in electric pro-
pulsion vehicles and the continuing spread of ICTs and other consumer 
technologies requiring electricity, as well as to the increasing use of 
electricity by the rising middle class in emerging economies. 
 An increasing reliance on electricity will mean that reliability of its pro-
duction and distribution is likely to come to the forefront of energy secu-
rity concerns in the future. The complexity of future electricity systems is 
likely to increase to incorporate:
 technologies for storage of electricity;  •
 “smart grids” including “active load” devices;  •
 “super grids” for transferring large quantities of electricity over long  •
distances with minimal losses (e.g., through high-voltage direct cur-
rent lines) when localized distributed systems are not feasible or suf-
ficient; and 
 hybrid systems,  • 35 to increase reliability of power generation and 
distributed generation such as modular small-scale systems with 
improved or increased energy storage capacity. 
 Some of these approaches may reduce the risk of “cascading fail-
ures” inherent in modern complex centralized grids. It is possible that 
other approaches to increasing reliability will evolve as a result of a 
combination of electric and information technologies. As the role of 
electricity in energy systems increases, the factors affecting energy 
security will have increasingly more to do with institutional structures 
and capacities than with more traditional issues of access to natural 
resources. 
 5.4.2  Institutional Uncertainties in Future Energy Security 
 Energy security perspectives and strategies are both a key driving force 
of and a central strategic uncertainty in future energy transformations. 
Security has been a main driver of past technological and political trans-
formations, and it is also a prominent consideration in most, if not all, of 
the global long-term scenarios. It is not certain which of the perspectives 
on energy security will prevail in national energy agendas and discourses. 
Another, separate uncertainty is whether new international energy insti-
tutions will emerge and be able to function effectively (see  Table 5.10 ). 
 If the resilience and robustness perspectives gain more prominence at 
the national level, countries are likely to promote diverse energy solu-
tions. The focus of national policies may become decentralized and 
distributed energy generation, improvement of electricity grids, and 
demand-side measures such as energy efficiency. Regulated but gen-
erally liberalized markets may become more common national energy 
arrangements. Many such measures will also improve sovereignty – i.e., 
reduce import dependency – although nations driven by these two per-
spectives may remain open to international trade and investments. 
 An additional uncertainty in this case may arise at the international 
level. If effective international energy institutions are created, they will 
be able to help countries with technology transfer, ensuring investments 
and well-functioning markets to enhance energy resilience. These global 
energy institutions may be able to oversee new patterns of intensive 
international energy trade (e.g., in electricity, hydrogen, or biofuels). This 
will be a more favorable scenario. 
 It will be more difficult for most countries to pursue resilience and 
robustness strategies in the absence of effective international institu-
tions. The pace of transformation to diverse and more robust energy 
systems may be significantly slowed down, especially in smaller and 
poorer economies. More disparity in energy security may emerge as a 
result. In fact, the absence of functioning international institutions may 
push many countries towards the sovereignty perspective. 
 If the sovereignty perspective in national energy security policies pre-
vails, countries may view international trade, foreign capital, and even 
domestic private actors with a degree of suspicion. Energy solutions are 
likely to be less diverse, more centralized, and relying on state support 
(e.g., nuclear power, or coal with carbon capture and storage). If interna-
tional energy institutions continue to be weak, the global energy markets 
may start failing, especially in the case of increasingly scarce “strategic” 
 35  For example, hybrid systems using wind or solar photovoltaics to provide emergency 
back-up to conventionally distributed electricity. 
 Table 5.10 |  Factors in future energy scenarios related to national energy security strategies and international institutions. 
 Focus of national strategies 
 International institutions 
Sovereignty Robustness and Resilience
 Less effective Fragile markets and geopolitics; national state-driven transitions to 
centralized solutions
Self-organizing markets; decentralized and diverse transitions
 More effective Strong rules and powerful alliances; regulated markets More uniform transitions at several levels
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commodities such as oil and natural gas. Geopolitics may become the rule 
of the day, with stronger and larger countries gaining better “access” to 
scarce resources. This may, in turn, push national governments towards 
surprisingly rapid transformations of energy systems. There is naturally no 
guarantee that such transformations will always be safe or successful. 
 Finally, one can imagine strong international institutions in the world 
where most countries pursue sovereignty strategies. The role of such 
institutions will be more limited than in the resilience scenario, but they 
will still be able to set the rules of the game (such as market institu-
tions) to prevent geopolitical manipulations from exploding into open 
confrontation. Regionally or ideologically based “energy clubs” based 
on “mutual trust” may also become increasingly prominent. 
 5.4.3  Energy Security under Sustainable Energy 
Transitions 
 The GEA argues that energy systems can support such global goals as 
poverty reduction and the stability of Earth’s climate only if they are 
radically and rapidly transformed.  Chapter 17 (Energy Pathways for 
Sustainable Development) defines multiple pathways for such sustain-
able energy transitions. 
 The question is: what are the energy security implications of these path-
ways? Due to the radical transformations of energy systems, the energy 
security concerns identified in this chapter cannot be simply projected 
into the future. While some of these concerns may disappear or become 
irrelevant, new vulnerabilities may emerge. For example, oil, an energy 
source that is at the heart and center of most energy security concerns 
today, may be phased out and replaced by other fuels. But will using 
these new fuels on the global scale result in similar energy security con-
cerns? Will they be produced in just a few countries and regions that 
will set terms for the global market? Will they dominate end-use sectors 
and lack easily available substitutes so that any disruption may be cata-
strophic? Will poorer countries and regions spend a significant portion 
of their revenues to procure these new fuels? 
 This section summarizes generic energy security considerations that form 
the basis of assessing energy security under sustainable energy transitions. 
We presume that, although energy security concerns might change in the 
future, the perspectives on energy security will remain the same. This means 
that nations will still be concerned about the robustness (i.e., the protection 
from certain known risks), the sovereignty (i.e., the protection from actions 
by external actors), and the resilience (i.e., the ability to withstand various 
disruptions, both known and unknown) of their energy systems. 
 Applying these three perspectives to energy sources, carriers, end-use 
services, and regions 36 of the future will answer the following questions:
 With respect to   • energy sources : what will be the energy sources 
of the future? Will any of them dominate the global energy supply 
to the same degree that oil, gas, and coal dominate the present-
day energy landscape? Will they be based on non-renewable and 
hence limited resources or utilize renewable energy? Which of these 
sources will be traded on the global scale? Will their global trade be 
equally as intensive as it is currently for oil? Will their production be 
concentrated in only a few regions or be more evenly spread around 
the world? 
 With respect to   • energy carriers and  end-use sectors : will they be 
based on diverse energy sources or dominated by one fuel, like 
the transport sector today? Will they primarily rely on imported or 
domestic energy sources? Will they experience very rapid and desta-
bilizing growth or decline during any periods of the transition? 
 With respect to   • countries and regions : will any of them be signifi-
cantly dependent on imported energy? Will any of them rely on just 
a small number of energy sources? Will energy intensity and hence 
vulnerability to changing energy prices increase or decline? 
 The above questions are answered in  Chapter 17 with the help of a 
quantitative projection of selected energy security indicators. The overall 
conclusion of this analysis is that in most pathways of the GEA Scenario, 
energy systems become more secure from all perspectives and in most 
of the regions. At the same time, certain vulnerabilities may emerge in 
particular regions or globally, and these need to be taken into account 
and mitigated while managing sustainable energy transitions. 
 5.5  Conclusions 
 Adequate protection from disruptions of vital energy systems – “energy 
security” – is one of the most politically prominent energy-related con-
cerns. Disruptions of energy systems may result from both short-term 
shocks, such as natural events, technical failures, malfunctioning mar-
kets, or deliberate sabotage, and slowly unfolding but more permanent 
threats, such as resource scarcity, aging of infrastructure, and unsus-
tainable demand growth. Such disruptions may affect broader security 
issues ranging from the viability of national economies and stability 
of political systems to the danger of armed conflicts. This means that 
policies developed in the quest for higher energy security have been, 
and are likely to remain, a key driving force in the transformations of 
energy systems. 
 Although energy security concerns differ from one country to another, 
they typically relate to the robustness, sovereignty, and resilience of 
energy systems. Robustness means minimizing risks arising from well-
defined natural, technical, and economic factors. It is associated with 
sufficient energy resources, reliable infrastructure, energy efficiency, 
and managed demand. Sovereignty means the protection from dis-
ruptions to energy systems by external agents. Reliance on domestic 
 36  The GEA model cannot forecast energy developments in individual nations, and the 
analysis is, therefore, concentrated on the regional level. The caveats of such an ana-
lysis of energy security are explained in the relevant section of  Chapter 17 . 
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resources and technologies, stable prices, control over infrastructure, 
and trusted institutions are typically associated with sovereignty. 
Resilience means the ability of energy systems to withstand diverse 
and uncertain threats. Resilience is linked to diversity of supply and 
infrastructure options, redundancies and spare capacities, and institu-
tions capable of adequately adjusting to disruptions, as well as flex-
ibility in demand. 
 This chapter examines robustness, sovereignty, and resilience concerns 
with respect to energy sources, electricity systems, and the primary end-
uses of energy in over 130 countries. Its main conclusion is that signifi-
cant energy security concerns from at least one of these perspectives 
affect the absolute majority of countries and are likely to become more 
serious in the short- to medium-term if the present trends are allowed 
to continue. Whereas the primary energy security concern of most indus-
trialized countries is import dependency and aging infrastructure, many 
emerging economies have additional vulnerabilities such as insufficient 
capacity, high energy intensity, and rapid demand growth. In many low-
income countries supply and demand vulnerabilities overlap, making 
them especially insecure. 
 Most globally prominent energy security concerns relate to the oil sec-
tor. Oil is a significant source of energy in almost every nation, whereas 
the majority of countries must import most or even all of the oil and 
petroleum products they need. Over three billion people live in 83 coun-
tries that import more than 75% of the oil and petroleum products they 
consume. This number does not yet include China, with its 1.3 billion 
people, where oil consumption has been rising on average by 7% per 
year over the last decade, and the current oil import dependency of 
53% is projected to reach 84% by 2035 (IEA,  2010a ). Virtually all of 
the world’s low-income countries import over 80% of their oil supplies. 
Those that do not have another type of dependency: on oil export rev-
enues to sustain their economies. 
 Furthermore, the recent rise in the global demand for oil has not been 
matched by an increase in the supply capacity, which – together with 
concerns over eventual scarcity – has made markets more volatile. 
A longer-term issue, the much-discussed “peak oil” – a rapid forced 
decline in production and consumption – also cannot be dismissed, 
although it is likely to be initially experienced as painful disruptions of 
vital energy services in low-income countries rather than as a global 
energy crisis. Peak oil is covered in more detail in  Chapter 7 (Energy 
Resources and Potentials). 
 Oil is the main, but not the only, energy source causing widespread 
energy security concerns. Natural gas accounts for over 10% of pri-
mary energy supply in 78 countries with a combined population of 
some 2.9 billion people. Among those, almost 650 million people live in 
32 Eurasian countries that import over 75% of their gas needs. In 
addition, 12 countries with some 780 million people have a domestic 
reserves/consumption ratio of natural gas under 16 years and are thus 
likely to experience significant import dependency in the future. 
 For many countries, coal is a potential solution to the energy sovereignty 
problem, since its resources are more abundant and more evenly geo-
graphically distributed. Only a small number of countries (12) currently 
significantly depend on coal imports, and this number is not likely to 
significantly increase in the near future. However, the use of coal may be 
subject to environmental and health constraints, as discussed in other 
parts of this publication. 
 These vulnerabilities of energy sources affect the security of national 
electricity systems. For example, almost 600 million people live in 39 
countries where over 50% of electricity production is based on imported 
fossil fuels. In many developing and transition countries these sover-
eignty concerns are aggravated by low robustness and resilience: 
inadequate generation capacity, as well as low diversity of electricity 
generation options. For example, in 35 countries with a population of 
450 million people, the absolute majority of electricity production comes 
from just one or two major power plants. In addition, both developing 
and industrialized countries suffer from disruptions of electricity sys-
tems due to natural and technical failures exacerbated by increasing 
complexity, poor maintenance, aging infrastructure, and insufficient 
investment. 
 In addition to fossil fuels, many countries rely on nuclear power for 
significant parts of their electricity supply. The sovereignty aspects of 
nuclear power are access to enrichment, reactor manufacturing, and 
reprocessing technologies and capacities, which are currently concen-
trated in just a few countries. For example, large-scale uranium enrich-
ment plants exist in only six countries, and commercial reprocessing 
facilities in only five. One of the main problems with currently operating 
nuclear power programs is the aging of reactors and workforce. There 
are 21 countries with 1.3 billion people with existing nuclear power 
programs that have not started constructing a new reactor in the last 20 
years, and 19 countries (1.4 billion people) have nuclear power plants 
with an average age of over 25 years. The nuclear power programs in 
these countries would need to be either “re-launched” or phased out. 
Access to capital and technology will be critically important for nuclear 
power expansion and renewal. 
 An additional 52 countries have expressed their intention to start nuclear 
power programs for the first time. However, only about one-quarter of 
them are likely to be able to securely deploy nuclear power with their 
own resources. In the remaining “newcomers,” access to capital and 
creating necessary institutional arrangements for secure deployment of 
nuclear power will present serious challenges. For the same reasons, 
nuclear power will remain beyond the reach of the majority of less-
developed countries. 
 Another significant source of electricity supply in many countries is 
hydropower. In many regions of the world, notably in Southern Europe, 
Africa, and South Asia, its long-term security may be affected by shift-
ing patterns of water availability due to climate change. Many existing 
hydroelectric plants are located on internationally shared rivers, with 
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divergent water use interests of the riparian states in some cases threat-
ening the secure supply of hydroelectricity. Finally, over 700 million 
people live in 31 countries that derive a significant proportion of their 
electricity from just one or two major dams and thus are vulnerable to a 
variety of natural and technical factors affecting these dams. 
 Reliability of electricity systems is a source of concern for both indus-
trialized and developing countries. The economies of the former are 
increasingly sensitive to even minor disruptions of electricity supply, so 
even relatively short blackouts (typically not exceeding a few hours per 
year) translate into major economic costs. The scale and frequency of 
blackouts in most developing countries is at least one to two orders 
of magnitude higher. Companies in the majority of low-income coun-
tries experience 10 or more blackouts averaging 24 hours or more every 
month, and in some cases the number of blackouts exceeds 100 a month 
and their total duration approaches 100 hours. 
 In addition to these supply-side vulnerabilities, electricity systems in 
developing countries are also under strong demand-side pressures. The 
majority of the world’s population – some 4.2 billion people – live in 
53 countries that will need to massively expand the capacity of their 
electricity systems in the near future because they either have less than 
60% access to electricity or average annual demand growth of over 6% 
over the last decade. Both fuels and infrastructure for such an expansion 
will need to be provided without further compromising the sovereignty 
or resilience of national electricity systems. 
 Insecurities of energy sources and electricity systems affect vulnerabil-
ities of vital energy services: transport, industry, the residential and 
commercial sector, and providing energy for export. 
 Insecurities of oil supply affect first and foremost the transport sec-
tor, where petroleum products provide at least 90% of energy in the 
majority of countries. Almost five billion people live in countries that 
import over 50% of fuels for their transport sector. The situation could 
get especially serious in 17 countries (with 1.7 billion people) where 
transport energy use has grown on average more than 8% per year 
over the last decade. 
 In the industrial sector, 46 countries with some 800 million people, and 
in the residential and commercial sector, 39 countries with some 500 
million people rely on imported fuels for over 50% of energy use. This 
does not include 25 countries with some 700 million people that use 
traditional biomass for over 80% of their residential energy use. 
 Some 15–20 national economies significantly rely on revenues from 
energy (primarily oil) exports. In the majority of these oil-exporting 
countries the revenues are not expected to last for more than one gen-
eration, and in several cases they are likely to cease in less than a dec-
ade. In addition, poor energy-exporting nations are at a high risk of the 
resource curse: economic and political instability eventually affecting 
human development and security. 
 National energy security strategies throughout the world seek to 
address those of the above-listed issues that are most prominent in a 
particular national context. Such strategies generally seek to increase 
the robustness, sovereignty, or resilience of national energy systems. 
With respect to robustness, the main strategies are to switch to more 
abundant and affordable energy sources, stimulate investments in 
infrastructure, and manage energy demand. With respect to resilience, 
many states maintain emergency stocks of critical fuels and seek to 
increase reliability of energy infrastructure by securing necessary 
investment. Energy exporters seek to achieve resilience by establishing 
Sovereign Welfare Funds and promoting diversification of their econo-
mies. One generic resilience strategy is to increase the diversity of vari-
ous elements in energy systems: import or export transportation routes, 
production options and facilities, primary energy sources, or actors on 
the energy market. 
 In addition, most nation-states pursue sovereignty strategies that range 
from switching to domestic energy resources and entering long-term 
contractual arrangements with trusted partners to nationalizing energy-
related assets (“resource nationalism”), establishing nationally control-
led energy companies to secure energy resources abroad, and in some 
cases projecting economic, political, or military power to secure access 
to energy resources. Domestically, sovereignty strategies may mean 
increasing state control over the supply and use of energy. 
 Many nation-states lack the capacity to implement coherent and 
effective energy security strategies. One reason is that they often 
focus on shorter-term issues and solutions such as potential disrup-
tions of supply, especially by “hostile” actions of “foreign” actors. 
Thus, politically it is often challenging to strike the right balance 
between short-term sovereignty and longer-term resilience strate-
gies. Moreover, energy security strategies need to be reconciled with 
broader foreign policy and economic strategies that do not neces-
sarily favor the most secure energy solutions. Finally, many countries 
simply lack financial and other resources to implement the required 
energy security measures. 
 Resource nationalism and some other sovereignty strategies may be 
beneficial when they mobilize additional resources and capacities to 
energy systems but may turn self-defeating in the international context, 
where the pursuit of energy security may become a zero-sum game, 
where states seek to achieve their own energy security at the expense 
of each other. Thus, in some situations concerns over energy security – 
especially in relation to oil and to a lesser extent natural gas – translate 
into broader geopolitical concerns. Although all-out “resource wars” 
are highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, the “energy security fac-
tor” already plays a significant role in US defense outlooks and may 
increase the tensions between states and make existing confrontations 
more protracted. 
 However, the present international interaction in the field of energy is 
largely dominated by cooperation rather than conflict. Unfortunately, 
Chapter 5 Energy and Security
379
the plethora of existing energy institutions and alliances have not 
always been successful in reducing national energy security concerns. 
This may be largely due to their narrow focus (on a particular energy 
sector, region, or a group of countries) not reflecting the systemic nature 
of the energy security risks and their connection with other energy 
issues such as access and climate change. 
 The future of energy security will be affected by a variety of techno-
logical, economic, and natural factors. It is likely that the production 
of conventional oil will reach its maximum in the next few decades, 
whereas the resources of both oil and natural gas may become more 
geographically concentrated as the center of consumption will shift 
towards Asia, especially China and India. New nuclear energy pro-
grams – despite their large costs – may be able to alleviate energy 
security concerns in some of the larger and more prosperous economies. 
At the same time, the inevitable phasing-out of some of the existing 
nuclear programs will result in new energy security issues. Many coun-
tries are likely to expand energy supply from domestic resources such 
as coal and renewables (including biofuels). The prominence of energy 
security concerns related to electricity will undoubtedly increase. 
Whereas the overall demand for energy, and especially for electricity, 
will grow dramatically, especially in developing countries, there may 
also be significant gains in energy efficiency, reducing this demand to 
more manageable levels. 
 The energy security landscape of the future will depend critically on 
both the direction of national strategies and the nature of international 
energy institutions. In the scenario where national strategies focus on 
sovereignty concerns and international institutions are weak, one can 
expect centralized but not internationally integrated energy infrastruc-
ture and fragile markets subordinated by resource nationalism and geo-
politics. In the opposite scenario, when the national strategies focus on 
resilience under strong international institutions, it may be possible to 
support transitions to more secure energy systems even in those coun-
tries that lack the capacity to do it on their own. 
 Under sustainable energy transitions modeled in the GEA Scenario in 
 Chapter 17 , the energy security landscape will change so significantly 
that many of the current energy security threats may disappear and new 
ones may emerge. To assess energy security in the future, it is important 
to know how diverse and geographically concentrated the future global 
energy supply will be, what the diversity of fuels used in key end-use 
sectors will be, and whether some regions will continue to be seriously 
dependent on imported energy sources. 
Energy and Security Chapter 5
380
 References 
 Adenikinju ,  A. ,  2005 :  Analysis of the Cost of Infrastructure Failures in a Developing 
Economy: The Case of the Electricity Sector in Nigeria .  AERC Research Paper 148, 
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) ,  Nairobi, Kenya . 
 Adenikinju ,  A. ,  2008 :  West African Energy Security Report .  University of Ibadan, the 
Centre for Energy Economics at the University of Texas at Austin, and the Kumasi 
Institute of Energy ,  Technology and Environment, Ibadan ,  Nigeria; Austin, TX ; 
 Kumasi, Ghana . 
 Alhajii ,  A. F. ,  2007 :  What is energy security? (4/5) .  Middle East Economic Survey , 
 L (52). 
 Andersson ,  G. ,  P.  Donalek ,  R.  Farmer ,  N.  Hatziargyriou ,  I.  Kamwa ,  P.  Kundur ,  N. 
 Martins ,  J.  Paserba ,  P.  Pourbeik ,  J.  Sanchez-Gasca ,  R.  Schulz ,  A.  Stankovic , 
 C.  Taylor and  V.  Vittal ,  2005 :  Causes of the 2003 Major Grid Blackouts in North 
America and Europe, and Recommended Means to Improve System Dynamic 
Performance.  IEEE Transactions on Power Systems ,  20 (4): 1922 – 1928 . 
 Angevine ,  G. ,  2010 :  Towards North American Energy Security: Removing Barriers to Oil 
Industry Development .  Studies in Energy Policy ,  Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC . 
 Anyanwu ,  J. C. ,  k.  Abderrahim and  A.  Feidi ,  2010 :  Crude-oil and Natural Gas 
Production in Africa and the Global Market Situation .  Commodities Brief , Vol. 1, 
Issue 4.,  African Development Bank, Abidjan, C ô te d ’ Ivoire . 
 Arnold ,  M. ,  G.  Kohlin and  R.  Persson ,  2006 :  Wood fuels, Livelihoods, and Policy 
Interventions: Changing Perspectives.  World Development ,  34(3) : 596 – 611 . 
 ASCE ,  2009 :  Dams . Available at www.infrastructurereportcard.org/fact-sheet/dams 
(accessed 24 March, 2010). 
 Asian Development  Bank ,  2009 :  Energy Outlook for Asia and the Paciﬁ c.  Asian 
Development Bank ,  Manila, Philippines . 
 Auty ,  R. M. ,  1993 :  Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource 
Curse Thesis.  Routledge ,  London, UK and New York, NY . 
 Auty ,  R. M. ,  1994 :  Industrial policy reform in six large newly industrializing coun-
tries: The resource curse thesis.  World Development ,  22 (1): 11 – 26 . 
 Balat ,  M. and  H.  Balat ,  2009 :  Recent trends in global production and utilization of 
bio-ethanol fuel.  Applied Energy ,  86 (11): 2273 – 2282 . 
 Bambawale ,  M. J. and  B. K.  Sovacool ,  2011 :  China ’ s Energy Security: The Perspective 
of Energy Users.  Applied Energy ,  88 (5): 1949 – 1956 . 
 Bates ,  B. C. ,  Z. W.  Kundzewicz ,  S.  Wu and  J. P.  Palutikof , (eds.),  2008 :  Climate 
Change and Water . Technical Paper of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate 
Change (IPCC).  IPCC Secretariat ,  Geneva . 
 Bohi ,  D. R. and  M. A.  Toman ,  1996 :  The Economics of Energy Security.  Kluwer 
Academic Publishers ,  Norwell, Massachusetts . 
 BP ,  2007 :  Statistical Review of World Energy 2007.  BP plc.,  London, UK . 
 BP ,  2009 :  Statistical Review of World Energy 2009 .  BP plc.,  London, UK . 
 BP ,  2010 :  Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 .  BP plc.,  London, UK . 
 Brown ,  L. ,  2010 :  U.S. Car Fleet Shrank by Four Million in 2009 – After a Century of 
Growth, U.S. Fleet Entering Era of Decline . Available at www.earth-policy.org/
index.php?/plan_b_updates/2010/update87 (accessed 7 April, 2010). 
 Brunnschweiler ,  C. N. and  E. H.  Bulte ,  2008 :  The Resource Curse Revisited and 
Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings.  Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management ,  55 (3): 248 – 264 . 
 Burnett ,  S. H. and  W.  Dwyer ,  2011 :  Will Green Energy Make the United States Less 
Secure? Brief Analyses No. 739,  National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA) , 
 Dallas, TX . 
 Buttle ,  J. ,  J. T.  Muir and  J.  Frain ,  2004 :  Economic Impacts of Climate Change on 
the Canadian Great Lakes Hydro-electric Power Producers: A Supply Analysis. 
 Canadian Water Resources Journal ,  29 : 89 – 109 . 
 Cancel ,  D. ,  2009 :  Venezuela Orders 20% Reduction in Electricity Use (Update2) . 
Available at www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ah2q612
aVM58 (accessed 22 December, 2009). 
 Carter ,  J. ,  1980 :  State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the 
Congress .  President of the United States of America . 
 CEPAL ,  2007 :  La Seguridad Energ é tica en America Latina y el Caribe en el Contexto 
Mundial (Energy Security in Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global 
Context) .  Santiago ,  Chile, Comisi ó n Econ ó mica para Lationamerica y el Caribe 
de Naciones Unidas (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean [ ECLAC ] ) 
 Chaudhry ,  K. A. ,  1997 :  The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle 
East.  Cornell University Press ,  Ithaca, NY . 
 Cherp ,  A. and  J.  Jewell ,  2010 : Measuring energy security: From universal indicators 
to contextualized frameworks. In  The Routledge Handbook to Energy Security . 
 B.  Sovacool , (ed.),  Routledge . 
 Cherp ,  A , and  J. Jewell ,  2011 :  The Three Perspectives on Energy Security: Intellectual 
History, Disciplinary Roots and the Potential for Integration.  Current Opinion in 
Environmental Sustainability,  3 (4): 202 – 212 
 Cherp ,  A. ,  J.  Jewell and  A.  Goldthau ,  2011 :  Governing Global Energy: Systems, 
Transitions, Complexity.  Global Policy ,  2 (1): 75 – 88 . 
 Chester ,  L. ,  2010 :  Conceptualising Energy Security and Making Explicit its Polysemic 
Nature.  Energy Policy ,  38 (2): 887 – 895 . 
 Chopra ,  K. and  P.  Dasgupta ,  2000 : Common Property Resources and Common 
Property Regimes in India: a Country Report.  Institute of Economic Growth, New 
Delhi (Draft) . 
 Collier ,  P. ,  2007 :  The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What 
Can be Done About It.  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford, UK . 
 Comesa ñ a ,  F. ,  2008 :  Integraci ó n energ é tica en Am é rica Latina (Energy Integration 
in Latin America) . Available at www.economias.com/2008–03–27/569/integra-
cion-energetica-en-america-latina/ (accessed 3 April, 2011). 
 Coutsoukis ,  P. ,  2008 :  World Pipelines Maps . Available at www.theodora.com/pipe-
lines/index.html (accessed 24 February, 2011). 
 Crane ,  K. ,  A.  Goldthau ,  M.  Toman ,  T.  Light ,  S. E.  Johnson ,  A.  Nader ,  A.  Rabasa 
and  H.  Dogo ,  2009 :  Imported Oil and US National Security.  RAND Corporation , 
 Santa Monica, CA . 
 Delucchi ,  M. A. and  J. J.  Murphy ,  2008 :  US Military Expenditures to Protect the Use 
of Persian Gulf Oil for Motor Vehicles.  Energy Policy ,  36 (6): 2253 – 2264 . 
 Dobson ,  I. ,  B. A.  Carreras ,  V. E.  Lynch and  D. E.  Newman ,  2007 :  Complex systems 
analysis of series of blackouts: cascading failure, critical points, and self-organi-
zation.  Chaos ,  17 (2): 026103 . 
 Doggett ,  T. ,  2010 :  EPA Begins Study on Shale Gas Drilling .  Reuters .  Washington, DC 
 Donnan ,  S. ,  2005 :  Financial Times .  Indonesian Outage Leaves 100m Without Electricity 
 EISA ,  2007 :  Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 . Public Law 110–
140,  110th United States Congress ,  Washington, DC . 
 EIU ,  2009 :  Index of Democracy 2008 .  Economist Intelligence Unit ,  London, UK . 
 European  Commission ,  2000 :  Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
Supply .  Green Paper, Communication from the Commission to the European par-
liament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions ,  European Commission, Brussels . 
Chapter 5 Energy and Security
381
 European  Parliament ,  2006 :  Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 18 January 2006 Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security 
of Electricity Supply and Infrastructure Investment .  Ofﬁ cial Journal of the 
European Union, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union , 
 Strasbourg . 
 Eurostat ,  2011 :  Statistical Ofﬁ ce of the European Communities . Available at epp.euro-
stat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ (accessed 24 April, 2011). 
 Fardmanesh ,  M. ,  1991 :  Dutch Disease Economics and Oil Syndrome: An Empirical 
Study.  World Development ,  19 (6): 711 – 717 . 
 Farrell ,  A. E. ,  H.  Zerrifﬁ  and  H.  Dowlatabadi ,  2004 :  Energy Infrastructure and 
Security.  Annual Review of Environment and Resources ,  29 (1): 421 – 469 . 
 Fearon ,  J. D. and  D. D.  Laitin ,  2003 :  Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.  American 
Political Science Review ,  97 (01): 75 – 90 . 
 Finon ,  D. and  F.  Roques ,  2008 :  Financing Arrangements and Industrial Organisation 
for New Nuclear Build in Electricity Markets .  Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge ,  Cambridge, UK . 
 Geller ,  H. ,  P.  Harrington ,  A. H.  Rosenfeld ,  S.  Tanishima and  F.  Unander ,  2006 : 
 Polices for Increasing Energy Efﬁ ciency: Thirty Years of Experience in OECD 
Countries.  Energy Policy ,  34 (5): 556 – 573 . 
 Gordon ,  J. ,  R. W.  Button ,  K. J.  Cunningham ,  T. I.  Reid ,  I.  Blickstein ,  P. A.  Wilson 
and  A.  Goldthau ,  2008 :  Domestic Trends in the United States, China, and 
Iran. Implications for US Navy Strategic Planning.  RAND Corporation ,  Santa 
Monica, CA . 
 Grape ,  S. G. ,  2006 :  Technology-Based Oil and Natural Gas Plays: Shale Shock! 
Could There Be Billions in the Bakken?  Washingtonk, DC ,  United States Energy 
Information Administration (US EIA) 
 Greene ,  D. L. and  S.  Ahmad ,  2005 :  Costs of US Oil Dependence: 2005 Update . ORNL/
TM-2005/45,  United States Department of Energy (USDOE) ,  Washington, DC . 
 Greene ,  D. L. ,  2010 :  Measuring energy security: Can the United States achieve oil 
independence?  Energy Policy ,  38 (4): 1614 – 1621 . 
 Grove ,  A. S. ,  2008 :  An Energy Policy We Can Stick To .  The Washington Post 
 Gupta ,  E. ,  2008 :  Oil Vulnerability Index of Oil-importing Countries.  Energy Policy , 
 36 (3): 1195 – 1211 . 
 Hester ,  A. and  J.  Welsh ,  2009 :  Superpower? Oil could make Stephen Harper a 
Superhero .  The Globe and Mail .  Toronto, ON 
 Hidrocarburosbolivia.com ,  2009 :  Oﬁ cial: Gasoducto del Sur al archivo” (Ofﬁ cial: 
South Gas Pipeline Shelved) . Available at www.hidrocarburosbolivia.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16570:oﬁ cial-gasoducto-del-sur-
al-archivo&catid=75:brasil&Itemid=98 (accessed 24 April, 2011). 
 Hines ,  P. ,  J.  Apt and  S.  Talukdar ,  2008 : Trends in the history of large blackouts in 
the United States.  Power and Energy Society General Meeting – Conversion and 
Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, IEEE , 20–24 July,  Pittsburgh, PA . 
 Hughes ,  L. ,  2010 :  Eastern Canadian crude oil supply and its implications for regional 
energy security.  Energy Policy ,  38 (6): 2692 – 2699 . 
 IADB ,  2010 :  Mesoamerica Renews Push Towards Integration . Available at www.iadb.
org/en/news/webstories/2010–10–25/integration-mesoamerica-idb,8234.html 
(accessed 3 April, 2011). 
 IAEA ,  2007a :  Extending the Operational Life Span of Nuclear Plants . Available at 
www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/news/2007/npp_Extension.html (accessed 7 April, 
2010). 
 IAEA,  2007b :  Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme .  International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ,  Vienna, Austria . 
 IAEA,  2008 :  Financing of new nuclear power plants . No. NG-T-4.2,  International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ,  Vienna, Austria . 
 IAEA,  2010 :  Power Reactor Information System .  International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) ,  Vienna, Austria . 
 IAEA,  2011 :  Integrated fuel cycle information system . Available at www-nfcis.iaea.
org (accessed 25 July, 2011). 
 Ibitoye ,  F. I. and  A.  Adenikinju ,  2007 :  Future Demand for Electricity in Nigeria. 
 Applied Energy ,  84 (5): 492 – 504 . 
 IEA ,  2007 :  World Energy Outlook 2007.  International Energy Agency (IEA) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ,  Paris, 
France . 
 IEA,  2009a :  Natural gas information 2009 .  IEA Statistics, International Energy Agency 
(IEA) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) , 
 Paris, France . 
 IEA,  2009b :  Oil information 2009 .  IEA Statistics, International Energy Agency (IEA) 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ,  Paris, 
France . 
 IEA,  2010a :  World Energy Outlook 2010.  International Energy Agency (IEA) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ,  Paris, France . 
 IEA,  2010b :  International Energy Agency: Statistics and Balances .  International Energy 
Agency (IEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) ,  Paris, France . 
 IGU ,  2010 :  World LNG Report .  Petronas and International Gas Union (IGU), Kuala 
Lumpur ,  Malaysia and Oslo, Norway . 
 IHS ,  2011 :  IHS Indexes . Available at www.ihsindexes.com/ (accessed 24 April, 2011). 
 Iimi ,  A. ,  2007 :  Estimating Global Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower Projects: 
Applications in India, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.  Policy Research Working Paper 
4344, The World Bank ,  Washington, DC . 
 IPCC ,  1998 :  The Regional Impacts of Climate Change, An Assessment of Vulnerability. 
A Special Report of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge, UK . 
 Iranzo ,  S. and  M. C.  Carrasco ,  2008 :  La situaci ó n energ é tica en Latinoam é rica. 
(Energy Status in Latin America) .  Bolet í n Econ ó mico, Banco de Espa ñ a ,  Madrid . 
 Jaffe ,  A. M. ,  M. T.  Klare and  N.  Elhefnawy ,  2008 :  The Impending Oil Shock: An 
Exchange.  Survival: Global Politics and Strategy ,  50 (4): 61 – 82 . 
 Jansen ,  J. C. ,  W. G.  van Arkel and  M. G.  Boots ,  2004 :  Designing Indicators of 
Long-term Energy Supply Security . ECN-C-007,  Energy Research Centre of the 
Netherlands (ECN) ,  Petten, Netherlands . 
 Jansen ,  J. C. and  A. J.  Seebregts ,  2010 :  Long-term Energy Services Security: What is 
it and How Can it be Measured and Valued?  Energy Policy ,  38 (4): 1654 – 1664 . 
 Jewell ,  J. ,  2011 : A Nuclear-powered North Africa: Just a Desert Mirage or is There 
Something on the Horizon?  Energy Policy , 39(8): 4445–4457. 
 Jewell, J.  2011 :  Ready for Nuclear Energy?: An Assessment of Capacities and 
Motivations for Launching New National Nuclear Power Programs.  Energy 
Policy ,  39 (3): 1041 – 1055 . 
 Jones ,  D. W. ,  P. N.  Leiby and  I. K.  Paik ,  2004 :  Oil Price Shocks the Macroeconomy: 
What Has Been Learned Since 1996.  Energy Journal ,  25 (2): 1 – 32 . 
 Kane ,  R. P. ,  2002 :  Precipitation Anomalies in Southern America Associated with a 
Finer Classiﬁ cation of El Nino and and La Nina Events.  International Journal of 
Climatology ,  22 : 357 – 373 . 
 Karl ,  T. L. ,  1997 :  The Paradox of Plenty, Oil Booms and Petro-State.  University of 
California Press ,  Berkley . 
Energy and Security Chapter 5
382
 Karl, T.L.,  1998 : State Building and Petro Revenues.  The Geopolitics of Oil, Gas, and 
Ecology in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea Basin ,  M.  Garcelon ,  E. W.  Walker ,  A. 
 Patten-Wood and  A.  Radovich , (eds.),  UC Berkeley :  Berkeley Program in Soviet 
and Post-Soviet Studies ., Berkely, CA. 
 Karl, T.L.,  2005 : Understanding the Resource Curse. In  Covering Oil: A Guide to 
Energy and Development , Revenue Watch,  Open Society Institute ,  New York, NY , 
pp.21–27. 
 Katz ,  M. ,  U.  Bartsch ,  H.  Malothra and  M.  Cuc ,  2004 :  Lifting the Oil Curse: Improving 
Petroleum Revenue Management in Sub-Saharan Africa.  International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) ,  Washington, DC . 
 Kaufmann ,  D. ,  A.  Kraay and  M.  Mastruzzi ,  2008 :  Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2007 .  Policy Research 
Working Paper 4654, Development Research Group and Global Governance 
Program, The World Bank ,  Washington, DC . 
 Kendell ,  J. M. ,  1998 :  Measures of Oil Import Dependence .  United States Department 
of Energy (US DOE) ,  Washington, DC . 
 Klare ,  M. T. ,  2008 :  Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy. 
 Metropolitan Books ,  New York, NY . 
 Komendantova ,  N. ,  A.  Patt ,  L.  Barras and  A.  Battaglini ,  2009 : Perception of risks 
in renewable energy projects: The case of concentrated solar power in North 
Africa.  Energy Policy ,  In Press, Corrected Proof . 
 Korowicz ,  D. ,  2010 :  Tipping point: Near-Term Systemic Implications of a Peak in 
Global Oil Production: An Outline Review.  The Foundation for the Economics of 
Sustainability ,  Dublin . 
 Kruyt ,  B. ,  D. P.  van Vuuren ,  H. J. M.  de Vries and  H.  Groenenberg ,  2009 :  Indicators 
for Energy Security.  Energy Policy ,  37 (6): 2166 – 2181 . 
 Le Coq ,  C. and  E.  Paltseva ,  2009 :  Measuring the Security of External Energy Supply 
in the European Union.  Energy Policy ,  37 (11): 4474 – 4481 . 
 Lehman  Brothers ,  2008 :  Global Oil choke Points: How Vulnerable is the Global Oil 
Market? ,  Lehman Brothers Inc .,  New York, NY . 
 Leite ,  C. A. and  J.  Weidmann ,  1999 :  Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, 
Corruption, and Economic Growth . Working Paper No. 99/85,  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) ,  Washington, DC . 
 Lovins ,  A. B. and  L. H.  Lovins ,  1982 :  Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National 
Security.  Brick house Publishing Company ,  Andover, MA . 
 Luft ,  G. ,  2010 :  The Falkland Islands –  A New Frontier in the 21st Century Resource 
War?  Journal of Energy Security , (March 2010). 
 Macfarlane ,  A. M. and  M.  Miller ,  2007 :  Nuclear Energy and Uranium Resources. 
 ELEMENTS ,  3 (3): 185 – 192 . 
 McAleb ,  W. ,  2005 :  The Future of the US LNG Marketplace .  Business Brieﬁ ng :  LNG 
Review, R.W. Beck and Touch Brieﬁ ngs , McLean, VA and London, UK. 
 Meier ,  A. ,  2005 :  Saving Electricity in a Hurry: Dealing with Temporary Shortfalls in 
Electricity Supplies .  International Energy Agency (IEA) of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ,  Paris, France . 
 Ministry of Energy of the Russian  Federation ,  2010 :  Energy Strategy of Russia for 
the Period up to 2030.  Moscow Institute of Energy Strategy ,  Moscow . 
 M ü ller-Kraenner ,  S. ,  2008 :  Energy Security: Re-measuring the World.  Earthscan , 
 London, UK . 
 NADA ,  2009 :  Economic Impact of America’s New-car and New-truck Dealers . 
Available at www.nada.com/nadadata (accessed 4 April, 2010). 
 NAFTA ,  2002 : Chapter Six: Energy and Basic Petrochemicals. In  North America Free 
Trade Association Treaty . 
 Nakano ,  J. ,  2011 :  Japan’s Energy Supply and Security since the March 11 Earthquake . 
Available at csis.org/publication/japans-energy-supply-and-security-march-11-
earthquake (accessed 3 March, 2011). 
 NEA ,  2008 :  Nuclear Energy Outlook. Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),  OECD Publishing ,  Paris, 
France . 
 Neff ,  T. ,  1997 :  Improving Energy Security in Paciﬁ c Asia: Diversiﬁ cation and Risk 
Reduction for Fossil and Nuclear Fuels . Project Commissioned by the Paciﬁ c Asia 
Regional Energy Security (PARES) Project,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology , 
 Cambridge, MA . 
 NEI ,  2010 :  Nuclear Industry’s Comprehensive Approach Develops Skilled Work Force 
for the Future .  Fact Sheet, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) ,  Washington, DC . 
 Nelson ,  P. and  C. M.  Sprecher ,  2008 :  What determines the extent of national reli-
ance on civil nuclear power?  NSSPI-08 – 014, Nuclear Security Science and Policy 
Institute ,  College Station, TX . 
 North American Electric Reliability  Corporation ,  2010 :  Reliability Standards for 
the Bulk Electric Systems of North America .,  Princeton, NJ . 
 OLADE ,  2007a :  Energy Statistics. Energy Economic Information System .  Latin 
American Energy Organisation (OLADE) ,  Quito, Equador . 
 OLADE,  2007b :  Eﬁ ciencia Energ é tica: Recurso no Aprovechado (Energy Efﬁ ciency: 
a Forgotten Resource) .  Latin American Energy Organisation (OLADE) ,  Quito, 
Ecuador . 
 Osborn ,  J. and  C.  Kawann ,  2001 :  Reliability of the US Electricity System: Recent 
Trends and Current Issues . LBNL-47043, Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory,  University of California ,  Berkeley, CA . 
 Parsons  Brinckerhoff ,  2009 :  Powering the Future: Mapping Out Low-carbon Path to 
2050 .  Parsons Brinckerhoff ,  Newcastle upon Tyne, UK . 
 PDVSA ,  2009 :  Petroamerica . Available at www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.
en/design/readmenuprinc.tpl.html&newsid_temas=46 (accessed 24 April, 2011). 
 PennEnergy ,  2010 :  Chesapeake Energy wants to export LNG . Available at 
qa.pennenergy.com/index/petroleum/display/6421909998/articles/oil-gas-
ﬁ nancial-journal/unconventional/chesapeake-energy.html (accessed 23 January, 
2011). 
 Pistilli ,  M. ,  2009 :  Uranium Resource Competition Heats Up . Available at www.u3o8.
biz/s/MarketCommentary.asp?ReportID=363571&_Title=Uranium-resource-
competition-heats-up (accessed 7 April, 2010). 
 Proyecto  Mesoam é rica ,  2009 :  Proyecto Integracion y Desarrollo Mesoamerica 
(Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project) .  San Salvador, El Salvador , 
 Proyecto Mesoamérica 
 Reuters ,  2009 :  Brazil’s Largest Cities Hit by Blackout ,  Reuters 
 Rogner ,  H.-H. ,  2009 : Nuclear Power in the World today: Today and in the 21st 
Century.  IAEA Regional Asia and the Paciﬁ c Seminar on Providing Decision 
Support for Nuclear Power Planning and Development ,  International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) ,,  Chengdu, China . 
 Roig-Franzia ,  M. ,  2007 :  A Culinary and Cultural Staple in Crisis: Mexico Grapples 
With Soaring Prices for Corn – and Tortillas .  Washington Post 
 Ross ,  M. L. ,  2001 :  Does Oil Hinder Democracy?  World Politics ,  53 (3): 325 – 361 . 
 Sacchetti ,  D. ,  2008 :  Generation Next.  IAEA Bulletin ,  49 (2): 64 – 65 . 
 Sandrea ,  R. ,  2010 :  U.S. Shale Gas – A Key to Energy Security . Available at www.
pennenergy.com/index/articles/display/2551165565/articles/pennenergy/micro-
blogs/rafael-sandrea/us-shale-gas-a-key-to-energy-security.html (accessed 23 
January, 2011). 
Chapter 5 Energy and Security
383
 SESEM-CFT ,  2005 :  A Review of the Power Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Evolution in the Market and Investment Opportunities for CFTs . Contract No. 
NNE5–2002–96, Securing Energy Supply and Enlarging Markets through 
Cleaner Fossil Technology (SESEM-CFT), Deutsche Montan Technologie GmbH 
(DMT), Latin American Energy Organisation (OLADE) and the Spanish Centre for 
Energy, Environment and Technology (CIEMAT), Essen, Germany;  Quito, Equador 
and Madrid ,  Spain . 
 Shore ,  J. and  J.  Hackworth ,  2003 :  EIA Petroleum Feature Articles ,. Impacts of the 
Venezuelan Crude Oil Production Loss, Energy Information Agency, (ed.)  US 
Department of Energy ,  Washington, DC . 
 Soares de Oliveira ,  R. ,  2006 : Context, Path Dependency and Oil-Based Development 
in the Gulf of Guinea. In  Dead Ends of Transition: Rentier Economies and 
Protectorates .  M.  Dauderst ä dt and  A.  Schildberg , (eds.),  Campus Verlag , 
 Frankfurt . 
 Soares de Oliveira ,  R. ,  2007 :  Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea.  Columbia University 
Press ,  New York, NY . 
 S ö derbergh ,  B. ,  K.  Jakobsson and  K.  Aleklett ,  2009 :  European Energy 
Security: The Future of Norwegian Natural Gas Production.  Energy Policy , 
 37 (12): 5037 – 5055 . 
 S ö derbergh ,  B. ,  K.  Jakobsson and  K.  Aleklett ,  2010 :  European Energy Security: An 
Analysis of Future Russian Natural Gas Production and Exports.  Energy Policy , 
 38 (12): 7827 – 7843 . 
 Sovacool ,  B. and  M.  Brown ,  2010 :  Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: 
An International Perspective.  Annual Review of Environment and Resources , 
 35 (1): 77 – 108 . 
 Sovacool ,  B. and  M. V.  Khuong ,  2011 : Energy Security and Competition in Asia: 
Challenges and Prospects for China and Southeast Asia. In  The Dragon and the 
Tiger Cubs: China, ASEAN, and Regional Integration .  D. S. L.  Jarvis and  A.  Welch , 
(eds.),  Palgrave MacMillan ,  New York, NY . 
 Sovacool ,  B. K. ,  2009 :  Sound climate, energy, and transport policy for a carbon con-
strained world.  Policy and Society ,  27 (4): 273 – 283 . 
 Sovacool, B.K.,  2010 :  The political economy of oil and gas in Southeast Asia: heading 
towards the natural resource curse.  Paciﬁ c Review ,  23 (2): 225 – 259 . 
 Stern ,  J. P. ,  2009 :  Continental European Long-Term Gas Contracts: Is a Transition 
Away from Oil Product-linked Pricing Inevitable and Imminent? ,  Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies ,  Oxford . 
 Stevens ,  P. ,  2010 :  Chatham House Report.  the Royal Institute of International Affairs , 
 London, UK . 
 Stirling ,  A. ,  1994 :  Diversity and Ignorance in Electricity Supply Investment: Addressing 
the Solution Rather than the Problem.  Energy Policy ,  22 (3): 195 – 216 . 
 Stirling, A.,  1998 :  On the Economics and Analysis of Diversity . Paper No. 28, Science 
Policy Research Unit,  University of Sussex ,  Sussex, UK . 
 US  DOE ,  2010 :  History of the Department of Energy . Available at www.energy.gov/
about/history.htm (accessed 23 January, 2011). 
 US  EIA ,  2008 :  Caribbean . Analysis Briefs,  United States Energy Information 
Administration (US EIA) ,  Washington, DC . 
 US EIA,  2009 :  Ecuador .  Country Analysis Brief, United States Energy Information 
Administration (US EIA) ,  Washington, DC . 
 US EIA,  2010 :  U.S. Crude Oil Imports by Country of Origin . Available at www.eia.doe.
gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_Epc0_im0_mbbl_m.htm (accessed 
23 January, 2011). 
 US EIA,  2011a :  International Energy Statistics . Available at www.eia.doe.gov/coun-
tries/ (accessed 24 April, 2011). 
 US EIA,  2011b :  International Petroleum (Oil) Prices and Crude Oil Import Costs . 
 Independent Statistics and Analysis, United States Energy Information 
Administration (US EIA) ,  Washington, DC . 
 US Government Accountability  Ofﬁ ce ,  2006 :  Energy Security: Issues Related to 
Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production . Report to the Chairman, 
Committee on Foreign Relations,  U.S. Senate .,  Washington, DC . 
 Vesely ,  M. ,  2004 :  The Vanishing Oil Tankers.  African Business ,  November ( 303 ): 44 . 
 von Hippel ,  D. ,  T.  Suzuki ,  J. H.  Williams ,  T.  Savage and  P.  Hayes ,  2009 : Energy 
Security and Sustainability in Northeast Asia.  Energy Policy ,  In Press, Corrected 
Proof . 
 Wohlgemuth ,  N. ,  2008 :  Powering Industrial Growth – The Challenges of Energy 
Security for Africa .  Working Paper, United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) ,  Vienna, Austria . 
 World  Bank ,  2010 :  Infrastructure . Available at www.enterprisesurveys.org/ (accessed 
1 August, 2010). 
 World Nuclear  Association ,  2011a :  Processing of used nuclear fuel . Available at 
www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf69.html (accessed 25 July, 2011). 
 World Nuclear Association,  2011b :  Uranium enrichment . Available at www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf28.html (accessed 25 July, 2011). 
 World Nuclear Association,  2011c :  World uranium mining . Available at www.
world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html (accessed 25 July, 2011). 
 Yergin ,  D. ,  1988 :  Energy Security in the 1990s.  Foreign Affairs ,  67 (1): 110 – 132 . 
 Yergin, D.,  2006 :  Ensuring Energy Security.  Foreign Affairs ,  85 (2): 69 – 82 . 
 Yu ,  W. and  M.  Pollitt ,  2009 :  Does Liberalisation cause more electricity blackouts? 
Evidence from a global study of newspaper reports . EPRG Working Paper 
0827, Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 0911, Electricity Policy Research 
Group (EPRG),  Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge ,  Cambridge, UK . 
